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The dissertation consists of three essays in law and economics. The rst chap-
ter compares the e¢ ciency of negligence and strict liability in unilateral accident
cases when the injurer faces ambiguity about accident risk. It generalizes the stan-
dard accident model to allow for ambiguity by assuming the injurer is a Choquet
expected utility maximizer and representing the injurers beliefs about accident
risk with a neo-additive capacity. The central result is that neither strict liability
nor negligence is generally e¢ cient in the presence of ambiguity. A key implica-
tion of the results is that negligence is more robust to ambiguity, which may help
explain why negligence is the general basis for accident liability under modern
Anglo-American tort law.
The second chapter examines how di¤erent allocation rules inuence the risk
that putative class members will opt out of a mass tort class action. It analyzes a
two-stage model of class action formation. The main result is that the class will
be asymptotically stable if the net recovery will be allocated pro rata by expected
claim values, but may not be asymptotically stable if the net recovery will be
shared equally or allocated pro rata by damage claims. Other results explore how
the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims, the scale benets of
the class action, and the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing and bargaining power
in settlement negotiations inuence the stability of the class.
The third chapter o¤ers a model of analogical legal reasoning. Under the model,
the outcome in the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes of prior
cases, where the weights are a function of fact similarity and precedential authority.
The main theoretical result is an axiomatization of similarity-weighted averaging
with an exponential similarity function based on a quasimetric. The chapter also
investigates whether the analogical model provides a better t than a rule-based
model (represented by a fractional polynomial) to the reported decisions by federal
judges in U.S. maritime salvage cases from 1880 to 2007. The principal conclusion
of the empirical analysis is that the rule-based model ts the data better than the
analogical model.
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PREFACE
The dissertation consists of three essays in law and economics. The essays are
connected by two themes. The rst theme, which connects the rst and second
chapters, is economics and torts. The second theme, which connects the rst and
third chapters, is decision theory and the law.
The rst chapter of the dissertation compares the e¢ ciency of negligence and
strict liability in unilateral accident cases when the injurer faces ambiguity about
accident risk. (Negligence and strict liability are the principal liability rules in
Anglo-American tort law. In unilateral accidents, the injurer, but not the victim,
can take care to reduce expected accident losses, and a liability rule is e¢ cient if
it induces the injurer to exercise optimal care.) The standard unilateral accident
model is based on the expected utility framework and represents the injurers be-
liefs about accident risk with a probability distribution. As a result, it does not
allow for Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity, with respect to accident risk and
cannot accommodate di¤erent attitudes toward to ambiguity, including optimism
and pessimism. The chapter generalizes the standard model to allow for ambiguity
by assuming the injurer is a Choquet expected utility maximizer and representing
the injurers beliefs about accident risk with a special type of nonadditive probabil-
ity called a neo-additive capacity. The central result of the model is that neither
strict liability nor negligence is generally e¢ cient in the presence of ambiguity.
This is in contrast with the standard result that both strict liability and negli-
gence are e¢ cient. Comparative statics analysis suggests that the injurers level
of care decreases (increases) with ambiguity if he is optimistic (pessimistic) and
decreases (increases) with his degree of optimism (pessimism). A key implication
of the results is that negligence is more robust to ambiguity. This suggests that
negligence may be superior to strict liability in unilateral accident cases. It also
x
may help explain why negligence is the general basis for accident liability under
modern Anglo-American tort law. Finally, the chapter designs and demonstrates
the e¢ ciency of an "ambiguity adjusted" liability rule.
The second chapter examines how di¤erent allocation rules inuence the risk
that putative class members will opt out of a mass tort class action. It analyzes a
two-stage model of class action formation in which a single defendant faces multi-
ple plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage claims. A global class action is certied
at the outset. In stage 1, the plainti¤s play a coalition formation game in which
each plainti¤ simultaneously announces whether it will remain in the class or opt
out. Stage 1 is modeled as a noncooperative game in partition function form. The
global class is stable if the strategy prole in which all plainti¤s remain in the
class constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. In stage 2, the
class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are litigated or settled.
Stage 2 is modeled in the divergent expectations tradition and assumes that if the
parties settle their dispute they divide the joint surplus from settlement according
to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The main result of the model is that
the class is asymptotically stable (i.e., the probability that it is stable converges
to one as the class becomes arbitrarily large) if the net recovery of the class will
be allocated pro rata in accordance with its membersoutside options (their ex-
pected claim values), but that the class may not be asymptotically stable if the
net recovery will be shared equally or allocated pro rata in accordance with the
membersdamage claims. The analysis suggests that the shape of the distribu-
tion of the plainti¤sdamage claims is a key determinant of class stability under
equal sharing. It also suggests that the scale benets of the class action and the
plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial and bargaining power in settlement ne-
gotiations are important determinants of class stability. Monte Carlo simulations
of the model compare the relative stability of each allocation rule. The results of
xi
the analysis suggest criteria to attorneys and courts for structuring and approving
e¢ cient allocations plans in mass tort class actions and for evaluating the "supe-
riority" requirement for class certication in mass tort cases, which requires that
a class action must be superior to other available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently
adjudicating the controversy.
The third chapter o¤ers a model of analogical legal reasoning and examines
whether the analogical model has more explanatory power than a rule-based model.
The use of analogical reasoning in law is a central topic in the jurisprudence lit-
erature; commentators lament, however, that it is infrequently described with any
rigor or care. Similarly, although the legal model of judicial decision making (which
posits that judges decide cases solely by application of legal doctrine) is a leading
paradigm in the literature, the lack of a formal model has led critics to argue that
the legal model su¤ers from theoretical and empirical indeterminacy. The chapter
contributions to the literature in two ways. First, it uses the apparatus of case-
based decision theory to build a formal model of analogical legal reasoning. Under
the model, the outcome in the case at hand is a weighted average of the outcomes
of prior cases, where the weights are a function of the fact similarity and preceden-
tial authority of the prior cases. The main theoretical result is an axiomatization
of similarity-weighted averaging with an exponential similarity function based on
a quasimetric. The chapters second contribution is an empirical investigation of
whether the analogical model provides a better t than a rule based-model (for-
mally represented by a fractional polynomial) to the reported decisions by federal
judges in U.S. maritime salvage cases from 1880 to 2007. The principal conclusion
of the empirical analysis is that the rule-based model ts the data better than
the analogical model. The chapter also presents a regression tree analysis of the
maritime salvage cases as a supplement to the main empirical analysis. Finally, it
discusses the implications and limitations of the empirical analysis.
xii
CHAPTER 1
A UNILATERAL ACCIDENT MODEL UNDER AMBIGUITY
Fathered by Coase (1960), the economic analysis of tort law lies at the foun-
dation of modern law and economics. The workhorse of tort law and economics
is the basic accident model, which was rst formalized by Brown (1973) and later
expounded by Shavell (1987) and Landes and Posner (1987).1 The basic accident
model provides a framework for analyzing the e¤ects of liability rules on agents
incentives to take care against accidents and, therefore, on the social costs of acci-
dents. Consequently, it has been widely used to examine positive and normative
questions about the e¢ ciency and suitability of alternative liability rules.2
Standard formulations of the basic accident model assume that agents are ex-
pected utility maximizers in conformity with the decision theories of von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944), Savage (1954), or Anscombe and Aumann (1963). Under
expected utility theory,3 agents are assumed to make decisions under uncertainty
as if they assign a probability distribution over the set of possible events and choose
an act from the set of available acts that maximizes the expected value of a utility
function with respect to such probability distribution. Due to its mathematical
simplicity and normative appeal, as well as the explanatory power of many of its
predictions, expected utility theory is the dominant framework for the analysis of
individual decision making under uncertainty in economics.
Notwithstanding its primacy, there have been many challenges to expected
utility theory as a positive decision theory. One of the most famous is the paradox
1A more recent comprehensive treatment of the basic accident model is contained in Miceli
(1997).
2I adhere to the view that e¢ ciency is the appropriate normative goal of the legal system. In
defense of this view, see Kaplow and Shavell (2001, 2002b).
3I use the term "expected utility theory" broadly to encompass objective expected utility
theory as formulated by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as well as subjective expected
utility theory as formulated by Savage (1954) and Anscome and Aumann (1963).
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of Ellsberg (1961). One version of the Ellsberg paradox goes as follows. There are
two urns. Urn I contains 50 red balls and 50 black balls. Urn II contains 100 red
and black balls in an unknown proportion. Subjects engage in two gambles. In
gamble A, subjects receive $100 if they draw a red ball and nothing if they draw
a black ball. In gamble B, subjects receive $100 if they draw a black ball and
nothing if they draw a red ball. Before each gamble, subjects choose the urn from
which they prefer to draw the ball. Most subjects in this situation choose to draw
from urn I in both gambles (see Becker and Brownson 1964). This result, however,
is paradoxical to expected utility theory, for it would imply that the assigned
probability of drawing a red ball from urn II is less than one half in gamble A and
greater than one half in gamble B. In other words, these subjects are not acting as
if they assigned probabilities to uncertain events and, therefore, expected utility
theory cannot explain their choices.
The Ellsberg paradox highlights the signicance of ambiguity for individual de-
cision making. Knight (1921) made a distinction between risk uncertain events
with specied probabilities and uncertainty uncertain events with unspecied
or ambiguous probabilities. The approach of expected utility theory, however,
obviates this distinction. As a result, models based on the expected utility frame-
work, including the basic accident model, do not allow for Knightian uncertainty,
which has come to be known in the literature as ambiguity, and therefore cannot
capture di¤erent attitudes toward or reactions to ambiguity, including ambiguity
loving, or optimism, and ambiguity aversion, or pessimism.
Psychology research suggests that people exhibit optimism and pessimism in
the accident context. Optimism has been found to be robust with respect to a
variety of accident risks (see, e.g., Weinstein 1980, 1989, 1999; Sunstein 1997; Jolls
1998). In the case of tra¢ c accidents, for example, studies have found that while
peoples beliefs about societal accident risks are fairly accurate (see, e.g., Lichten-
2
stein et al. 1978), people generally are optimistic with respect to the likelihood
that they will cause or otherwise be involved in an accident (see Svenson 1981;
Svenson et al. 1985; Finn and Bragg 1986; Matthews and Moran 1986; DeJoy
1989; McKenna et al. 1991; Guppy 1992). Pessimism tends to be displayed with
respect to the risk of accidents that are available for example, highly salient,
perhaps due to media attention; dramatic or catastrophic in nature; intrinsically
vivid, imaginable, or memorable; or technological in nature (see Sunstein 1997;
Jolls 1998; Jolls et al. 1998; Gigerenzer 2005; see also Slovic et al. 1982; Covello
and Johnson 1987; Viscusi and Magat 1987; Viscusi 1992). This research calls for
the modication of the basic accident model to allow for ambiguity.
The Ellsberg paradox and subsequent experimental evidence of the importance
of ambiguity attitudes for decisions4 have inspired various alternatives to and gen-
eralizations of expected utility theory to accommodate ambiguity.5 One of the most
inuential axiomatic generalizations of expected utility theory that accommodates
ambiguity is Choquet expected utility theory, which was pioneered by Schmeidler
(1989).6 Under Choquet expected utility theory, agentsbeliefs about the likeli-
hood of uncertain events are represented with a non-additive probability called a
capacity.7 Agents are assumed to act so as to maximize the expected value of a util-
ity function with respect to such capacity, which is calculated using the Choquet
(1954) integral. The non-additivity of the capacity allows for di¤erent ambiguity
attitudes. In particular, a concave (superadditive) capacity reects optimism while
4For a more detailed discussion of the Ellsberg paradox and a survey of the related experi-
mental evidence, see Camerer (1995).
5For a survey of alternatives to and generalizations of expected utility theory, including those
that accomodate ambiguity, see Camerer and Weber (1992).
6Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) axiomatize Choquet expected utility in the Anscome
and Aumann (1963) and Savage (1954) frameworks, respectively. An additional axiomatization
of Choquet expected utility is provided by Sarin and Wakker (1992).
7Expected utility is a special case of Choquet expected utility in which the capacity is additive
(that is, a probability). A capacity  is additive if (E) + (F ) = (E [ F ) for all mutually
exclusive events E and F .
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a convex (subadditive) capacity reects pessimism (see Schmeidler 1989; Wakker
2001).8 Choquet expected utility with a convex capacity, for instance, can capture
pessimism as exemplied by the Ellsberg paradox.
This chapter presents a unilateral accident model under ambiguity.9 Speci-
cally, it generalizes the basic unilateral accident model to allow for ambiguity by
assuming the injurer is a Choquet expected utility maximizer and representing the
injurers beliefs about accident risk with a special type of capacity called a neo-
additive capacity, which was introduced by Chateauneuf et al. (2007). Choquet
expected utility with a neo-additive capacity is the simplest generalization of ex-
pected utility that can accommodate optimistic and pessimistic reactions to ambi-
guity. It assumes that an agent makes decisions under uncertainty as if he believes,
with incomplete condence, that a specied probability distribution describes the
likelihood of uncertain events and chooses an act from the set of available acts that
maximizes a weighted sum of the minimum utility, the maximum utility, and the
expected utility with respect to such probability distribution. The parameters of
the model allow us to measure the injurers degree of ambiguity, which is the com-
plement of his degree of condence, and his degrees of optimism and pessimism,
which determine the respective weights assigned to the maximum utility and the
minimum utility. As a result, we can perform comparative statics on changes in
optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity.10
I show that in the basic unilateral accident setting neither strict liability nor
negligence is generally e¢ cient in the presence of ambiguity. In particular, I show
8A capcity  is convex if (E) + (F )  (E [F ) for all mutually exclusive events E and F .
It is concave if the reverse inequality holds.
9In unilateral accidents, the injurer, but not the victim, can take care to reduce expected
accident losses.
10Closely related to Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity is -maxmin ex-
pected utility with multiple priors (Ghirardato et al. 2004). Under this approach, ambiguity
is represented by a set of probability distributions, and optimism and pessimism correspond to
the respective weights applied to the maximum and minimum expected utility over the set of
probability distributions.
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that (i) in the case of xed accident losses (when the injurers level of care does
not a¤ect the magnitude of accident losses), the injurer will exercise too little care
under strict liability and may exercise too little care under negligence and (ii) in
the case of variable accident losses (when the injurers level of care does a¤ect
the magnitude of accident losses), the injurer may exercise too little or too much
care under strict liability and may exercise too little care under negligence. In
addition, I nd that, in general, the injurers level of care (i) decreases with his
degree of optimism and increases with his degree of pessimism and (ii) decreases
with ambiguity if he is optimistic and increases with ambiguity if he is pessimistic.
The results are in contrast with the standard results of the basic unilateral accident
model, namely that, in both cases on accident losses, the injurer will take optimal
care under strict liability and negligence. The results suggest that negligence is
more robust to ambiguity and, therefore, may be superior to strict liability in
unilateral accident cases. Finally, I design and demonstrate the e¢ ciency of an
ambiguity adjusted liability rule.
This chapter contributes to strands of the law and economics and the applied
decision theory literatures. Within the law and economics literature, this chapter
is the rst to adopt the Choquet expected utility framework to incorporate am-
biguity with respect to accident risk into the basic accident model.11 As such, it
contributes to the well-established literature on the economics of tort law12 and to
the burgeoning behavioral law and economics literature.13 Within the applied de-
11There are many papers that study the e¤ects of uncertainty with respect to other aspects
of the basic accident model. See infra footnotes 22-23. Shavell (1992) considers a situation in
which agents face uncertainty about accident risk, but he examines the incentives that alternative
liability rules create for injurers to obtain information about accident risk and whether these
incentives are socially optimal. There are a limited number of papers that consider the e¤ects
of ambiguity on the economic analysis of other areas of law, for example, taxation (Jolls 1998;
Chorvat 2002) and the criminal process (Segal and Stein 2006).
12Surveys of this literature are contained in Bouckaert and De Geest (2000, part 3), Kaplow
and Shavell (2002a, pp. 1667-1682), and Mattiacci and Parisi (2005).
13Sunstein (1997) and Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler (1998) were early calls for the modication
of standard law and economics models to reect advances in behavioral economics and decision
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cision theory literature, this chapter adds to the growing number of applications of
Choquet expected utility theory to accommodate ambiguity,14 including applica-
tions that use neo-additive capacities to represent beliefs (see, e.g., Schipper 2005;
Chateauneuf et al. 2007; Eichberger et al. 2008; Ford et al. 2008; Eichberger and
Kelsey 2009).
Most closely related to this chapter are works by Posner (2003), Eide (2005,
2007), and Bigus (2006). Posner (2003) introduces optimism about low probability
accidents into the basic unilateral accident model by assuming agents know the
probability of an accident when it is above some threshold but treat accident
probabilities below the threshold as though they were zero. For the case of xed
accident losses, he nds that, under both strict liability and negligence, agents
might take too much or too little care for su¢ ciently high levels of optimism and
will take optimal care for su¢ ciently low levels of optimism. Posner also analyzes
the case of variable activity levels and briey discusses bilateral accidents, neither of
which I address in this chapter. However, he does not consider the case of unilateral
accidents with variable accident losses, which I do. Eide (2005, 2007) and Bigus
(2006) analyze the basic accident model under rank dependent expected utility
theory (Quiggin 1982, 1993) and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979),
respectively.15 For the case of unilateral accidents, Eide nds that under strict
liability the injurer may take too much or too little care depending on the slope of
the probability weighting function and that under negligence the injurer may take
too little care if he substantially underweights the probability of an accident. Bigus
theory. Sunstein (2000) and Parisi and Smith (2005) are recent collections of behavioral law and
economics papers.
14For a survey of this literature, see Mukerji and Tallon (2004).
15Rank dependent expected utility theory is a special case of Choquet expected utility theory
in which the agents capacity is an increasing probability weighting function (see Wakker 1990;
Hong and Wakker 1996). Prospect theory is an alternative decision theory that is not directly
related to Choquet expected utility theory. However, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and
Kaneman 1992) is a generalization of Choquet expected utility theory that permits di¤erent
treatment of gains and losses (see Tversky and Wakker 1995).
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nds that the injurer will take too little care under strict liability and may take
too little care under negligence depending on the slope of the probability weighting
function. These ndings are consistent with the results of this chapter. Eide and
Bigus also study bilateral accidents and vague standards of due care, respectively.
Neither chapter, however, distinguishes the cases of xed and variable accident
losses or performs comparative statics.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.1 presents the
model. It describes the basic setup and explains how ambiguity about accident
risk is modeled by Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity. Section
1.2 states the results of the model in the absence of ambiguity, which correspond to
the standard results of the basic unilateral accident model, and derives the results
of the model in the presence of ambiguity. Section 1.3 develops a simple numerical
example to illustrate the models results. Section 1.4 discusses certain implications
of the model and designs an ambiguity adjusted liability rule that is e¢ cient in
the presence of ambiguity. Section 1.5 contains concluding remarks and suggests
directions for future research. A formal description of the Choquet expected utility
framework is set forth in the Appendix.
1.1 THE MODEL
1.1.1 Basic Setup
The model is based on the basic unilateral accident model of Shavell (1987). There
are two agents an injurer and a victim and a numeraire good income in terms
of which all payo¤s and costs are dened. Both agents are risk neutral and their
Bernoulli utility of income is equal to income. The agents are strangers and not
parties to any contract or market transaction, and transaction costs are su¢ ciently
high to preclude Coasian bargaining.
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Each agent engages in a risky activity from which he receives a payo¤. For
example, the injurer could be driving a car and the victim could be a pedestrian.
Let k > 0 denote the payo¤ to the injurer from engaging in his activity and
normalize the victims payo¤ to be zero. The injurer, but not the victim, has the
ability to choose a level of care, expressed in terms of its cost, to exercise when
engaging in his activity. Let c  0 denote the level of care exercised by the injurer.
An accident involving the injurer and the victim occurs with probability  2 (0; 1].
In the event of an accident, the victim incurs accident losses l > 0. Hence, expected
accident losses are L = l.
I consider two cases on accident losses: xed accident losses and variable acci-
dent losses. In the case of xed accident losses, the injurer can take care to reduce
the probability of an accident, but the magnitude of accident losses is xed. Thus,
expected accident losses are L(c) = (c)l. In the case of variable accident losses,
the injurer can take care to reduce the probability of an accident and the magni-
tude of accident losses, and therefore expected accident losses are L(c) = (c)l(c):
In both cases, I assume (c) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreas-
ing, and strictly convex 0(c) < 0 and 00(c) > 0. In the case of variable accident
losses, I further assume l(c) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly decreasing,
and strictly convex l0(c) < 0 and l00(c) > 0.
Whether the victim receives compensation from the injurer for accident losses
depends on the applicable liability rule. I consider three liabilities rules: (i) no lia-
bility, under which the victim receives no compensation from the injurer, regardless
of the level of care exercised by the injurer; (ii) strict liability, under which the
victim receives full compensation for his accident losses from the injurer, regardless
of the injurers level of care; and (iii) negligence, under which the victim receives
full compensation for his accident losses if the injurer fails to meet the applicable
standard of due care, denoted c. In modern Anglo-American law, negligence is the
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general basis for liability in cases of accidents among non-contracting parties or
strangers. Strict liability applies only in certain accident cases, including cases in
which the injurer engages in an abnormally dangerous activity or manufactures a
defective product, certain nuisance and trespass cases, and cases involving certain
environmental harms (see Dobbs 2001).
1.1.2 Modeling Ambiguity
In departure from the basic unilateral accident model, I assume the injurer faces
ambiguity with respect to accident risk. To incorporate ambiguity into the model,
I assume the injurer is a Choquet expected utility maximizer whose beliefs about
accident risk may be represented with a neo-additive capacity  based on .16 For
simplicity, I assume the victim is an expected utility maximizer.
Formally, I assume the injurers belief about the likelihood of an accident is
given by () = (1   ) + (1   )(c), where ;  2 [0; 1] and we normalize
(0) = 0 and (1) = 1. Similarly, the injurers belief about the likelihood of no
accident is given by (1  ) = (1 ) + (1  )(1  (c)). Note that, in general,
the injurers beliefs are non-additive: () + (1   ) 6= 1 unless  = 0 or  = 1
2
.
Given his beliefs, the injurers Choquet expected utility of exercising level of care
c under a rule of no liability or strict liability is
V(c) = m(c) + (1  )M(c) + (1  )E(c) (1.1)
where m(c), M(c), and E(c) denote the minimum utility, the maximum utility,
and the expected utility with respect to , respectively, of exercising level of care
c given the applicable liability rule. Under a negligence rule, the injurer e¤ectively
faces no liability if he satises the standard of due care (c  c) and faces strict li-
16More precisely,  is based on the probability distribution f; 1 g. To simplify the notation,
however, I occassionally let  stand for the probability distribution f; 1  g.
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ability otherwise (c < c). Thus, the injurers Choquet expected utility of exercising
level of care c under a negligence rule is
8><>: V(c) under no liability if c  cV(c) under strict liability if c < c .17
Note that because there are only two possible events accident or no accident
and given the basic setup of the model, under each liability rule the minimum utility
m(c) is the outcome in the event of an accident, the maximum utility M(c) is the
outcome in the event of no accident, and the expected utility E(c) is the expected
outcome (c)m(c) + (1 (c))M(c). Accordingly, we can rewrite equation (1.1) as
V(c) = [ + (1  )(c)]m(c) + [(1  ) + (1  )(1  (c))]M(c): (1.2)
From equation (1.2) we can see that in evaluating the Choquet expected utility of
exercising level of care c, the injurer assigns weight +(1 )(c) to the accident
outcome, m(c), and weight (1 )+(1 )(1 (c)) to the no accident outcome,
M(c). It is important to note that these weights are not subjective probabilities
corresponding to the injurers beliefs about accident risk but rather are decision
weights generated by a neo-additive capacity based on  that represents his non-
additive beliefs.18 In particular, the weight assigned to the accident outcome,
 + (1   )(c), does not correspond to the injurers belief about the likelihood
of an accident, ().19
Intuitively, representing the injurers beliefs about accident risk with a neo-
17Technical details underlying  and V are supplied in the Appendix.
18For a detailed discussion of capacities and decision weights, see Sarin and Wakker (1998).
19In fact, they coincide only if there is no ambiguity ( = 0), the injurer is neither optimistic
nor pessimistic ( = ), or the injurer reacts to ambiguity with equal degrees of optimism
and pessimism ( = 12 ). Note, however, that the weight assigned to the no accident outcome,
(1   ) + (1   )(1   (c)), does correspond to the injurers belief about the likelihood of no
accident, (1 ), and that +(1 )(c) = 1 (1 ). The former reects a general property
of Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity, namely that the weight assigned to the
best outcome corresponds to the agents capacity of the best outcome (see Eichberger and Kelsey
2009). The latter reects the peculiar fact of the model that there are only two outcomes. It
does not hold in the general case where there are more than two outcomes (see Eichberger and
Kelsey 2009).
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additive capacity based on  assumes the injurer believes the probability of an
accident is , but lacks condence in this belief. The injurers degree of condence
is measured by (1   ). It is the weight the injurer puts on  in his capacity
and on E in his utility function. The degree of ambiguity is measured by . It
represents the degree to which the injurer lacks condence in . The injurer reacts
to ambiguity by overweighting either the outcome in the event of an accident,m, or
the outcome in the event of no accident,M . If the injurer overweights the accident
outcome, we say he is pessimistic. If he overweights the no accident outcome,
we say he is optimistic. Which outcome the injurer overweights depends on the
parameter . If  > , the injurer overweights the accident outcome; if  < ,
the injurer overweights the no accident outcome.20 Accordingly, we interpret  as
the injurers degree of pessimism and 1  as his degree of optimism. Note that if
there is no ambiguity ( = 0) or if the injurer is neither optimistic nor pessimistic
( = ), then Choquet expected utility with respect to  based on  reduces to
expected utility with respect to  (i.e., V = E) and the model reduces to the
standard unilateral accident model.21
In order to focus on the e¤ects of ambiguity on the standard results of the
basic unilateral accident model, I assume there is no uncertainty with respect to
any other aspect of the model.22 For example, I assume that the agents know the
applicable legal standards and that the court accurately determines all relevant
facts, including the probability of an accident, the magnitude and incidence of
accident losses, and the agentspreferences and acts.23 In addition, I abstract from
20To see this, note that +(1 ) >  if and only if  >  and that (1 )+(1 )(1 ) >
1   if and only if  < .
21To see that V(c) = E(c) if there is no ambiguity, simply substitute  = 0 into equation (1).
To see that V(c) = E(c) if the injurer is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, substitute  = 
into equation (2) and recall that E(c) = (c)m(c) + (1  (c))M(c).
22Shavell (1987) and Miceli (1997) provide textbook coverage of various models that introduce
uncertainty with respect to other aspects of the basic accident model.
23Craswell and Calfee (1986) present an accident model in which defendants face uncertainty
about the applicable legal standards. Shavell (1985) presents an accident model in which courts
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other complexities that have been introduced in the literature, such as bilateral
care, variable activity levels, bilateral harm, risk aversion, and the judgment proof
problem.24
1.1.3 Remarks
Before turning to the results of the model, I conclude this section with a few general
remarks regarding Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity.
Capacities and ambiguity. A capacity can capture di¤erent ambiguity atti-
tudes because it is non-additive. To illustrate, let us show how a convex neo-
additive capacity can capture ambiguity aversion, or pessimism, as exemplied
by a preference for urn I (the unambiguous urn) in both gambles in the Ellsberg
paradox. Let u(x) denote the utility of prize x and normalize u(0) = 0. Con-
sider an agent who evaluates gambles according to expected utility and whose
belief about the likelihood of drawing a red ball from urn II (the ambiguous
urn) is given by a probability p. A preference for urn I in gamble A implies
1
2
u(100) + 1
2
u(0) > pu(100) + (1   p)u(0), or 1
2
> p, and a preference for urn I in
gamble B implies 1
2
u(0)+ 1
2
u(100) > pu(0)+(1 p)u(100), or 1
2
> 1 p. Combining
these conditions we have p + (1   p) < 1, which contradicts the additivity of p.
This illustrates the paradox. It also illustrates that ambiguity aversion is akin to
subadditivity. Next consider an agent who evaluates gambles according to Cho-
face uncertainty about causation. Hylton (1990) presents an accident model in which courts are
unable to determine accurately in every case whether the defendant acted negligently.
24I restrict attention to unilateral care because it is the primitive form of the basic accident
model. In conformity with the basic accident model, I assume that the agentsactivity levels
are xed and do not a¤ect expected accident losses, that only the victim incurs accident losses,
and that the agents are risk neutral. Shavell (1980) introduces the issue of the choice of activity
level to the basic accident model. Leong (1989) and Arlen (1990, 1992) present models in which
both the injurer and the victim incur accident losses. Shavell (1982) introduces risk aversion into
the basic unilateral accident model. Shavell (1986) examines the judgment proof problem. For
additional complexities that have been introduced in the literature, see generally Shavell (1987)
and Miceli (1997).
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quet expected utility and whose belief about the likelihood of a drawing a red ball
from urn II is given by a convex neo-additive capacity  based on p. In addition,
assume the agent faces ambiguity ( > 0). Now a preference for urn I in gamble A
implies 1
2
u(100) + 1
2
u(0) > [+ (1  )(1  p)]u(0) + [(1  ) + (1  )p]u(100),
or 1
2
> (1  ) + (1  )p = (p), and a preference for urn I in gamble B implies
1
2
u(0) + 1
2
u(100) > [ + (1   )p]u(0) + [(1   ) + (1   )(1   p)]u(100), or
1
2
> (1   ) + (1   )(1   p) = (1   p). Combining these conditions we have
(p) + (1  p) < 1, which is consistent with the convexity of .
Neo-additive capacities. A neo-additive capacity is a probability weighting
function. In particular, it is a simple version of the familiar inverse-S shaped prob-
ability weighting function from cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kaneman
1992). Empirical studies indicate that individuals tend to overweight low probabil-
ities and underweight high probabilities with the most pronounced misweighting
near the extremes of the probability scale (see Gonzalez and Wu 1999). This sys-
tematic distortion of probabilities implies an inverse-S shaped probability weight-
ing function. There is overwhelming evidence from parametric and non-parametric
studies for the inverse-S shape (see Wakker 2001). A standard non-linear specica-
tion of an inverse-S shaped probability weighting function is depicted in Figure 1.1
(dashed curve). A neo-additive capacity, also depicted in Figure 1.1 (solid line), is
a simple linear specication.
Under Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity, an agents pref-
erences are represented by a weighted sum of the minimum utility, the maximum
utility, and the expected utility. There is experimental evidence that preferences
have this form. Lopes (1987) proposes a theory for risky choice that integrates
two factors: a dispositional tendency to seek either security or potential and a
situational aspiration level. Under Lopestheory, the security/potential factor re-
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Figure 1.1: Neo-additive Capacity as Linear Probability Weighting Function
ects how a person weights the worst and best outcomes, while the aspiration level
reects an assessment of what outcome is reasonable to expect under the circum-
stances. On the basis of her theory, Lopes makes predictions about preferences over
lotteries. She then presents experimental evidence consistent with her predictions.
Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. An advantage of representing beliefs
with a neo-additive capacity is that it allows us to dene concrete notions of
ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. Ambiguity corresponds to an agents lack
of condence in his belief about the probability of uncertain events. Optimism
and pessimism are dened according to the weights applied to extreme outcomes.
Optimism means the weight applied to the best outcome exceeds the probability
of the best outcome and pessimism means the weight applied to the worst outcome
exceeds the probability of the worst outcome.25
25In general, the agent may overweight both the best and worst outcomes and underweight
non-extreme outcomes. In the present model, however, in which there are only two outcomes,
the injurer overweights either the accident outcome or the no accident outcome, but not both.
A disadvantage of a neo-additive capacity is that it only allows the best and worst outcomes to
be overweighted. A more general type of capacity called a JP-capacity allows a number of good
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The usage of the terms "optimism" and "pessimism" in the present frame-
work is consistent with their usage within an expected utility framework, in which
optimism means the agents subjective probability of a favorable (unfavorable)
outcome is greater (less) than the objective probability of that outcome and pes-
simism means the agents subjective probability of a favorable (unfavorable) out-
come is less (greater) than the objective probability of that outcome (see, e.g.,
Posner 2003; Bar-Gill 2006). In both frameworks, optimism and pessimism corre-
spond to "incorrect" decision weights resulting from misweighted or misperceived
probabilities. The key distinction lies in their interpretation. In the present frame-
work, optimism and pessimism properly may be interpreted as attitudes toward
or reactions to ambiguity. Specically, optimism corresponds to a concave (super-
additive) capacity which reects ambiguity loving while pessimism corresponds to
a convex (subadditive) capacity which reects ambiguity aversion (see Schmeidler
1989; Wakker 2001). However, as illustrated above, ambiguity attitudes cannot
be captured within an expected utility framework because beliefs are represented
with probabilities. In the expected utility framework, therefore, optimism and
pessimism may not be interpreted as reactions to ambiguity.
Another advantage of a neo-additive capacity is that it parameterizes ambi-
guity, optimism, and pessimism. In the model, we interpret  as the degree of
ambiguity because it is the complement of the injurers degree of condence in
. We interpret  and 1    as the injurers degrees of pessimism and optimism
because they determine the respective weights assigned to the accident and no
accident outcomes.
We can further motivate interpreting , , and 1    as the injurers degrees
of ambiguity, pessimism, and optimism by reference to a multiple priors version of
and bad outcomes to be overweighted (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2009). However, when there
are only two outcomes, as in the present model, a JP-capacity is isomorphic to a neo-additive
capacity.
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the model, in which the injurers beliefs about accident risk are represented by a
set of probabilities "centered" around  (see Chateauneuf et al. 2007; Eichberger
and Kelsey 2009). It can be shown that equation (1.1) is equivalent to
V(c) =  min
p2P()
Ep(c) + (1  ) max
p2P()
Ep(c) (1.3)
where P() = fp 2 [0; 1] : (1   )  p   + (1   )g represents the set
of accident probabilities p the injurer considers possible and Ep(c) denotes the
expected utility with respect to p of exercising level of care c given the applicable
liability rule (see Eichberger and Kelsey 2009). In this version, we interpret  as
the degree of ambiguity because it determines and measures the size of the set
P(). If  = 0 the injurer unambiguously believes the probability of an accident is
 (i.e., P() = fg). As  ! 1 the injurer considers an increasing range of accident
probabilities to be possible. For  = 1 he believes all probabilities are possible (i.e.,
P() = [0; 1]). We interpret  and 1  as the injurers degrees of pessimism and
optimism because they correspond to the respective weights the injurer applies to
the minimum and maximum expected utility over the set P(). Stated another
way, we interpret  and 1  as degrees of pessimism and optimism because they
reect the respective degrees to which the injurer evaluates the expected utility
of exercising level of care c by the lowest and highest accident probabilities he
considers possible.
Relationship to other models. Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive
capacity  based on a probability distribution p contains as special cases or is
mathematically equivalent to several alternative models of decision making under
uncertainty, including but not limited to: (i) subjective expected utility where p
represents the agents beliefs, if  = 0 and  2 [0; 1]; (ii) -maxmin expected utility
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with multiple priors (Ghirardato et al. 2004) where the set of priors is D = fq 2
4 : q  (1  )pg (see Chateauneuf et al. 2007; Eichberger and Kelsey 2009); (iii)
rank dependent expected utility with probability weighting function !(p) = (p)
(see Wakker 1990); and (iv) cumulative prospect theory with probability weighting
function !(p) = (p) and symmetric treatment of gains and losses (see Tversky
and Wakker 1995).26
1.2 RESULTS
In order to establish the benchmark for comparison, I rst derive the socially
optimal level of care and state the results of the model in the absence of ambiguity,
which correspond to the standard results of the basic unilateral accident model. I
then derive the results of the model in the presence of ambiguity.
1.2.1 Socially Optimal Level of Care
In conformity with Shavell (1987) and others, I assume the social goal is to mini-
mize total accident costs c + L(c). That is, I assume the socially optimal level of
care c solves
min
c0
c+ L(c): (1.4)
Assuming c is positive, it is implicitly dened by the rst-order condition
 L0(c) = 1: (1.5)
Condition (1.5) requires that the marginal reduction in expected accident losses
i.e., the marginal benet of care equals the marginal cost of care. Note that
condition (1.5) denes the socially optimal level of care whether accident losses
26Additional relationships to other well-known models are identied in the Appendix.
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are xed or variable.27
1.2.2 Results Without Ambiguity
As noted above, in the absence of ambiguity ( = 0) the model reduces to the
basic unilateral accident model. In both cases on accident losses, therefore, the
results of the model without ambiguity correspond to the standard results of the
basic unilateral accident model, which may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1.1 (Shavell 1987) Under a rule of no liability, the injurer will
exercise no care. Under strict liability, the injurer will exercise the socially optimal
level of care. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the
socially optimal level of care, the injurer will exercise the socially optimal level of
care.
Proof. Under each liability rule, the injurers problem is to choose the level of
care that maximizes the expected outcome of engaging in his activity. Because the
injurer is risk neutral and his payo¤ k is xed, the injurers problem is equivalent
to minimizing his expected costs, which equal his cost of care plus his expected
liability. Specically, under a rule of no liability, the injurers problem is
min
c0
c (1.6)
and the injurer will choose cNL = 0 < c. Under strict liability, the injurers
27In contrast to the standard model, in the present model minimizing total accident costs is
not necessarily equivalent to maximizing the sum of the utilities of the injurer and the victim.
They do not coincide if the injurer faces ambiguity about accident risk and he is either optimistic
or pessimistic (that is, if  > 0 and  6= ). However, c is the level of care that would be chosen
by a rational social planner as part of a Pareto optimal allocation (see Appendix). Accordingly,
I maintain that minimizing total accident costs is the appropriate social goal. Note that Posner
(2003), Eide (2005), and Bigus (2006) take the same view. But compare Eide (2007).
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problem is
min
c0
c+ L(c): (1.7)
Assuming the solution is positive, it is implicitly dened by the condition L0(cSL) =
1: Together with condition (1.5), this implies the injurer will choose cSL = c be-
cause L00(c) > 0. Under a negligence rule, the injurers problem is
min
c0
8><>: c if c  cc+ L(c) if c < c : (1.8)
If the court sets the standard of due care equal to the socially optimal level of care
(c = c), then the injurer will choose cN = c because c = arg min
cc
c and, given
our assumptions, c < c + L(c)  min fc+ L(c) : c 2 [0; c)g.
It is obvious why the injurer will exercise no care under a rule of no liabil-
ity. Under strict liability, the injurers marginal benet of care equals the social
marginal benet of care. Consequently, strict liability induces the injurer to take
optimal care. The reason the injurer takes optimal care under a negligence rule
with the standard of due care set equal to the socially optimal level of care is
twofold. First, the injurer will not exercise too much care because he faces no
liability if his level of care is at or above the socially optimal level of care. Second,
the injurer will not exercise too little care because he faces strictly liability if his
level of care is below the socially optimal level of care, and strict liability induces
him to exercise the socially optimal level of care.
The results of Proposition 1.1 are illustrated by Figure 1.2, which is a variation
of a classic diagram from the tort law and economics literature (see, e.g., Shavell
1987; Miceli 1997). The curve c + L(c) represents the injurers expected cost
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Figure 1.2: E¢ cient Care under Strict Liability and Negligence
schedule under strict liability, while the thick portion of c + L(c) plus the line
segment c represent the injurers expected cost schedule under a negligence rule
with the standard of due care set equal to the socially optimal level of care. As
shown in Figure 1.2, under each liability rule the injurers expected cost schedule
attains its minimum at the socially optimal level of care, c.
1.2.3 Results under Ambiguity
I now consider the injurers behavior under ambiguity ( > 0). I analyze separately
the cases of xed accident losses and variable accident losses. In the case of xed
accident losses, certain of the comparative statics results will depend on a property
of (c) that I shall call local convexity and measure by (c)   
00(c)
0(c) . We may
view (c) as a measure of the local convexity of (c) because, loosely speaking, it
measures the degree of curvature of  at c.28 I shall say that (c) exhibits increasing
28This view of (c) is motivated by the standard interpretation of the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cient
of absolute risk aversion ru(x) =  u
00(x)
u0(x) as a measure of the curvature of the utility function u
at x (see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. 1995, p. 190).
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(decreasing) local convexity if (c) is an increasing (decreasing) function of c.
A. Fixed Accident Losses
No liability. Under a rule of no liability, whether or not an accident occurs, the
outcome for the injurer is the same: m(c) = M(c) = k c. It follows from equation
(1.1) that the injurers problem is max
c0
k  c, which is equivalent to problem (1.6).
Hence, he will choose cNL = 0 < c. That is, the injurer will exercise no care.
Strict liability. Under strict liability, the worst outcome is m(c) = k   c   l
and the best outcome isM(c) = k  c. Accordingly, by equation (1.1) the injurers
problem is
max
c0
(k c  l)+(1 )(k c)+(1 )[(c)(k c  l)+(1 (c))(k c)]; (1.9)
which is equivalent to
min
c0
c+ l + (1  )L(c): (1.10)
Assuming  < 1 and the solution to (1.10) is positive, it is implicitly dened by
the rst-order condition
 L0(cSL) = 1
1   : (1.11)
Condition (1.11) implies the following results.
Proposition 1.2 In the case of xed accident losses, the level of care exercised by
the injurer under strict liability will be less than the socially optimal level of care.
In addition, the injurers level of care decreases with the degree of ambiguity. As
a result, the di¤erence between the socially optimal level of care and the injurers
level of care increases with the degree of ambiguity. Furthermore, while the injurers
level of care increases with the magnitude of accident losses, so does the di¤erence
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between the socially optimal level of care and the injurers level of care if (c)
exhibits decreasing local convexity.
Proof. By assumption,  2 (0; 1). Thus, conditions (1.5) and (1.11) imply
 L0(cSL) = 1
1  > 1 =  L0(c), which in turn implies cSL < c because L00(c) > 0.
Implicitly di¤erentiating conditions (1.5) and (1.11) with respect to , we have
@cSL
@
=   1
L00(cSL)(1 )2 < 0 =
@c
@
because L00(c) > 0. Hence, cSL is decreasing in 
and the di¤erence c   cSL is increasing in .
Implicitly di¤erentiating conditions (1.5) and (1.11) with respect to l, we have
@c
@l
=   0(c)
00(c)l > 0 and
@cSL
@l
=   0(cSL)
00(cSL)l > 0 because 
0(c) < 0 and 00(c) > 0.
Furthermore, if (c) =  
00(c)
0(c) is a decreasing function of c, then
@c
@l
= 1
(c
)l >
1
(c
sl)l
= @c
SL
@l
because cSL < c. Therefore, although cSL is increasing in l, the
di¤erence c   cSL is increasing in l if (c) exhibits decreasing local convexity.
The intuition behind Proposition 1.2 is straightforward. If we rewrite condition
(1.11) as  (1  )0(cSL)l = 1, we see that ambiguity leads the injurer to discount
the marginal benet of care. As a result, the injurer will exercise too little care.
An increase in the degree of ambiguity increases the ambiguity discount but does
not a¤ect the marginal benet of care. Consequently, the injurer reduces his level
of care further below the unchanged socially optimal level of care. On the other
hand, an increase in the magnitude of accident losses increases the marginal benet
of care but does not a¤ect the ambiguity discount. Both the injurers level of care
and the socially optimal level of care increase in response to the increase in the
marginal benet of care. However, if the marginal benet of care decreases too
rapidly with the level of care, the ambiguity discount leads the injurer to increase
his level of care by less than the increase in the socially optimal level of care.
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Negligence. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal
to the socially optimal level of care (c = c), the injurers problem is
min
c0
8><>: c if c  c

c+ l + (1  )L(c) if c < c
: (1.12)
Note that c = arg min
cc
c and that cSL = arg min
c2[0;c)
c+ l + (1  )L(c). It follows
that the injurer will choose
cN =
8><>: c
 if c  F (cSL)
cSL < c if c > F (cSL)
(1.13)
where F (cSL)  cSL + l + (1   )L(cSL). Note that F (cSL) is the injurers
expected costs if he is negligent. Therefore, it is the expected benet of exercising
due care. Condition (1.13) implies the following results.
Proposition 1.3 In the case of xed accident losses, the injurers level of care
under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially opti-
mal level of care will be less than or equal to the socially optimal level of care. The
likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care (i) increases with the degree
of ambiguity if he is optimistic and decreases therewith if he is pessimistic, (ii)
increases with his degree of optimism and decreases with his degree of pessimism,
and (iii) increases with the magnitude of accident losses if F (cSL)   cSL < 1
(c
)
and decreases therewith if the reverse inequality holds.
Proof. Recall that F (cSL)  cSL + l + (1   )L(cSL). Condition (1.13) im-
mediately implies cN  c because model parameters exist such that c  F (cSL)
and c > F (cSL). For example, suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l = 49,  = 24
49
, and  = 1
5
. It
follows that c = 6:0  13:8 = F (cSL): Now suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l = 49,  = 45
49
,
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and  = 1
100
. Then we have c = 6:0 > 3:45 = F (cSL).
Now, by the envelope theorem, @F (c
SL)
@
= l L(cSL) = [ (cSL)]l. It follows
that @F (c
SL)
@
< 0 = @c

@
if  < (cSL) and that @F (c
SL)
@
> 0 = @c

@
if  > (cSL).
Thus, the likelihood that F (cSL) < c, and therefore that cSL < c, increases with
 if the injurer is optimistic and decreases with  if the injurer is pessimistic.
In addition, by the envelope theorem, @F (c
SL)
@
= l > 0 = @c

@
. Hence, the
likelihood that F (cSL) < c, and therefore that cSL < c, increases with 1   and
decreases with .
Finally, by the envelope theorem, @F (c
SL)
@l
=  + (1   )(cSL), which implies
@F (cSL)
@l
T @c
@l
as  + (1   )(cSL) T 1
(c
)l , or as F (c
SL)   cSL T 1
(c
) . Thus,
the likelihood that F (cSL) < c, and therefore that cSL < c, increases with l if
F (cSL)  cSL < 1
(c
) and decreases with l if F (c
SL)  cSL > 1
(c
) .
The results of Proposition 1.3 may be understood as follows. With or without
ambiguity, the injurer will never exercise too much care under a negligence rule
with the standard of due care set equal to the socially optimal level of care because
he can avoid liability simply by exercising due care. In the presence of ambigu-
ity, however, the cost of exercising due care, c, may exceed the expected benet,
F (cSL), in which case the injurer will exercise too little care. The likelihood that
the injurer will exercise too little care increases with the di¤erence c   F (cSL).
Because ambiguity a¤ects the expected benet, but not the cost, of exercising due
care, variation in the likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care in re-
sponse to changes in ambiguity or the injurers ambiguity attitude results from
variation in the expected benet of exercising due care. The expected benet of
exercising due care increases with ambiguity if the injurer is pessimistic because
he reacts by further overweighting the accident outcome; it decreases with ambi-
guity if the injurer is optimistic because he reacts by further underweighting the
accident outcome. Similarly, the expected benet of exercising due care increases
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as the injurer becomes relatively more pessimistic because he reacts by increasing
the weight on the accident outcome and decreases as he becomes relatively more
optimistic because he reacts by decreasing the weight on the accident outcome.
An increase in the magnitude of accident losses increases both the cost and the
expected benet of exercising due care. Whether the cost or the expected benet
increases at a faster rate depends on the relationship between F (cSL)   cSL, the
injurers expected liability if he is negligent, and 1
(c
) , the inverse local convexity
of (c) at c. When F (cSL)  cSL < 1
(c
) the cost of exercising due care increases
more rapidly than the expected benet, and when F (cSL)   cSL > 1
(c
) the ex-
pected benet increases more rapidly than the cost. This is because F (cSL)  cSL
and 1
(c
) are in the same proportion as the marginal expected benet and the
marginal cost of exercising due care.29
B. Variable Accident Losses
No liability. The nature of accident losses is irrelevant under a rule of no
liability. Thus, the injurers problem with variable accident losses is identical to
his problem with xed accident losses, and the injurer will exercise no care i.e.,
cNL = 0 < c:
Strict liability. Under strict liability, the injurers problem is
max
c0
c+ l(c) + (1  )L(c): (1.14)
29To see this, note that @F (c
SL)
@l =
F (cSL) cSL
l and
@c
@l =
1
(c
)l .
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Assuming  < 1 and the solution to (1.14) is positive, it is implicitly dened by
the rst-order condition
 L0(cSL) = 1 + l
0(cSL)
1   : (1.15)
Assuming  > 0, conditions (1.5) and (1.15) imply L0(cSL) T  L0(c) as l0(cSL) S
1

, which in turn implies
cSL S c as   l0(cSL) S 1

(1.16)
because L00(c) > 0.30 Conditions (1.15) and (1.16) imply the following results.
Proposition 1.4 In the case of variable accident losses, the injurers level of
care under strict liability may be less than, equal to, or greater than the socially
optimal level of care, where equality is a borderline case. The injurers level of care
decreases with his degree of optimism and increases with his degree of pessimism.
As a result, the likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care increases with
his degree of optimism and decreases with his degree of pessimism. Conversely, the
likelihood that the injurer will exercise too much care decreases with his degree of
optimism and increases with his degree of pessimism. The injurers level of care
decreases with the degree of ambiguity if he is optimistic or if he is pessimistic and
 < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and increases therewith if he is pessimistic and  >
L0(cSL)
l0(cSL) . Accordingly,
the likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care increases with the degree
of ambiguity if he is optimistic or if he is pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and decreases
therewith if he is pessimistic and  > L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) . Conversely, the likelihood that the
injurer will exercise too much care decreases with the degree of ambiguity if he is
optimistic or if he is pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and increases therewith if he is
30Note that condition (1.15) requires  l0(cSL) < 1 because L0(c) < 0.
26
pessimistic and  > L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) .
Proof. Condition (1.16) immediately implies cSL S c because model parameters
exist such that  l0(cSL) S 1

. For example, suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l(c) = 1000e c,
 = 9
10
, and  = 1
9
. It follows that cSL = 4:7896 and  l0(cSL) = 1000e 4:7896 =
8:3 < 9 = 1

. Now suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l(c) = 1000e c,  = 9
10
, and  = 2
9
. It
follows that cSL = 5:385 and  l0(cSL) = 1000e 5:385 = 4:6 > 4:5 = 1

. Finally,
suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l(c) = 1000e c,  = 9
10
, and  = 0:18636. It follows that
cSL = c = 5:2277 and  l0(cSL) = 1000e 5:2277 = 5:366 = 1

. Note that this
is a borderline case because (c; ) = (5:2277; 0:18636) is the unique pair that
simultaneously satises conditions (1.5) and (1.15).
Implicitly di¤erentiating condition (1.15) with respect to , we have @c
SL
@
=
  l0(cSL)
(1 )L00(cSL)+l00(cSL) > 0 because l
0(c) < 0, l00(c) > 0, and L00(c) > 0. Thus, cSL is
increasing in  and decreasing in 1 . Furthermore, @cSL
@
> 0 and l0(c) < 0 imply
 l0(cSL) is increasing in . Hence, since 1

is decreasing in , the likelihood that
 l0(cSL) < 1

, and therefore that cSL < c, is increasing in 1    and decreasing
in . Conversely, the likelihood that  l0(cSL) > 1

, and therefore that cSL > c, is
decreasing in 1   and increasing in .
Implicitly di¤erentiating condition (1.15) with respect to , we have @c
SL
@
=
L0(cSL) l0(cSL)
(1 )L00(cSL)+l00(cSL) . Note that (1  )L00(cSL) + l00(cSL) > 0 because L00(c) > 0
and l00(c) > 0. So @c
SL
@
T 0 as L0(cSL)   l0(cSL) T 0, or as  T L0(cSL)
l0(cSL) . Now
L0(cSL)
l0(cSL) =
0(cSL)l(cSL)+(cSL)l0(cSL)
l0(cSL) =
0(cSL)l(cSL)
l0(cSL) + (c
SL) > (cSL) because 0(c) > 0
and l0(c) > 0. It follows that @c
SL
@
< 0 if  < (cSL) < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) or if (c
SL) <  <
L0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and that
@cSL
@
> 0 if  > L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) > (c
SL). Thus, cSL is decreasing in  if
the injurer is optimistic or if he is pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and c
SL is increasing
in  if the injurer is pessimistic and  > L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) .
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Now l0(c) < 0 implies  l0(cSL) is decreasing in  if @cSL
@
< 0 and increasing
in  if @c
SL
@
> 0. Thus, since 1

is independent of , it follows that the likelihood
that  l0(cSL) < 1

, and therefore that cSL < c, is increasing in  if the injurer is
optimistic or if he is pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and decreasing in  if the injurer
is pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) . Conversely, the likelihood that  l0(cSL) > 1 , and
therefore that cSL > c, is decreasing in  if the injurer is optimistic or if he is
pessimistic and  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) and increasing in  if the injurer is pessimistic and
 < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) .
To understand why ambiguity may lead the injurer to exercise too little or
too much care under strict liability in the case of variable accident losses, rewrite
condition (1.15) as  (1  )L0(cSL)  l0(cSL) = 1. We see that while ambiguity
leads the injurer to discount the benet from a marginal reduction in expected
accident losses, it also leads the injurer to benet from a marginal reduction in
the magnitude of accident losses per se, which latter benet increases with the
injurers degree of pessimism. If the latter benet is su¢ ciently large and the
injurer is su¢ ciently pessimistic, he will nd it worthwhile to increase his level
of care above the socially optimal level of care, notwithstanding the ambiguity
discount on expected accident losses. Otherwise, as in the case of xed accident
losses, the ambiguity discount will cause the injurer to exercise too little care.
The comparative statics results on optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity are
consistent with the corresponding results of Proposition 1.3 above and Proposition
1.5 below and form part of a general nding that the injurers level of care decreases
with his degree of optimism, increases with his degree of pessimism, and decreases
or increases with the degree of ambiguity depending on whether he is optimistic or
pessimistic, respectively.31 This nding agrees with our basic intuition, for it seems
31It should be noted that, unlike in proposition 3 and proposition 5, the comparative statics
result with respect to ambiguity in proposition 4 does not match the general nding precisely.
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natural that if and to the extent the injurer reacts to ambiguity in an optimistic
way by overweighing the no accident outcome he would tend to reduce his level of
care, and if and to the extent the injurer reacts to ambiguity in a pessimistic way
by overweighting the accident outcome he would tend to increase his level of care.
It also agrees with the general thinking of legal scholars (see Posner 2003).
Negligence. Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal
to the socially optimal level of care, the injurers problem is
min
c0
8><>: c if c  c

c+ l(c) + (1  )L(c) if c < c
: (1.17)
If  l0(cSL)  1

, then the injurer will choose cN = c  cSL because c = arg min
cc
c
and c < c + l(c) + (1  )L(c)  min fc+ l(c) + (1  )L(c) : c 2 [0; c)g:
If  l0(cSL) < 1

, then cSL < c and the injurer will choose
cN =
8><>: c
 if c  G(cSL)
cSL < c if c > G(cSL)
; (1.18)
where G(cSL)  cSL + l(cSL) + (1   )L(cSL), because c = arg min
cc
c and
cSL = arg min
c2[0;c)
c + l(c) + (1   )L(c). The injurers decision rules imply the
following results.
Proposition 1.5 In the case of variable accident losses, the injurers level of
care under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially
optimal level of care will be less than or equal to the socially optimal level of care.
However, it deviates only when (cSL) <  < L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) = (c
SL)+ 
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) l(c
SL), and this range will
be narrow provided that the marginal reduction in the magnitude of accident losses is su¢ ciently
greater than the marginal reduction in the probability of an accident at cSL or that the magnitude
of accident losses given cSL is su¢ ciently small, either or both of which it seems reasonable to
assume.
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The likelihood that the injurer will exercise too little care (i) increases with his
degree of optimism and decreases with his degree of pessimism and (ii) increases
with the degree of ambiguity if he is optimistic and decreases therewith if he is
pessimistic.
Proof. Recall that G(cSL)  cSL + l(cSL) + (1   )L(cSL). In the proof of
Proposition 1.4, we show that model parameters exist such that  l0(cSL) S 1

.
Thus, to establish that cN  c, it is su¢ cient to show that model parameters
exist such that c > G(cSL). Suppose (c) = 1
1+c
, l(c) = 1000e c,  = 99
100
, and
 = 1
99
. It follows that c = 5:2277 and cSL = 2:6058,32 and thatG(cSL) = 2:6058+ 
99
100
  
1
99

(1000e 2:6058)+
 
1  99
100
  
1
1+2:6058

(1000e 2:6058) = 3:549 < 5:2277 = c.
Now, by the envelope theorem, @G(c
SL)
@
= l(cSL) L(cSL) = [ (cSL)]l(cSL).
It follows that @G(c
SL)
@
< 0 = @c

@
if  < (cSL) and that @G(c
SL)
@
> 0 = @c

@
if
 > (cSL). Thus, the likelihood that G(cSL) < c, and therefore that cSL < c,
increases with  if the injurer is optimistic and decreases with  if the injurer is
pessimistic.
Finally, by Proposition 1.4, the likelihood that  l0(cSL)  1

, and therefore that
cN = c, increases with  and decreases with 1 . If  l0(cSL) < 1

, the likelihood
that c  G(cSL), and therefore that cN = c, increases with  and decreases with
1    because, by the envelope theorem, @G
@
= l(cSL) > 0. It follows that the
likelihood that the injurer will choose cN = c increases with  and decreases with
1   , which implies the likelihood that the injurer will choose cN < c increases
with 1   and decreases with .
The results of Proposition 1.5 follow from previous results. The injurer may
exercise too little care under negligence for the same reason he may exercise too
little care under strict liability: he discounts the marginal benet of care. The in-
32Note that  l0(cSL) = 1000e 2:6058 = 73:844 < 99 = 1 .
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jurer will never exercise too much care under negligence because, as noted above,
he can avoid liability by exercising the socially optimal level of care. The compar-
ative statics results on optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity support the nding
that, in general, the injurers level of care decreases with optimism, increases with
pessimism, and decreases or increases with ambiguity depending on whether he is
optimistic or pessimistic, respectively.
1.3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
This section develops a simple numerical example in order to illustrate the results
of the model. Throughout the example, I assume:
 the probability of an accident is (c) = 1
1+c
;
 the degree of ambiguity may be zero, low, or high:  2 f0; 9
25
; 21
25
g; and
 the injurers degree of pessimism may be low or high:  2 f 1
50
; 39
50
g.
Note that (c) is strictly decreasing, strictly convex, and exhibits decreasing local
convexity.33 In addition, it turns out that (c) 2   1
50
; 39
50

for each level of care
the injurer may exercise. Accordingly, the injurer is optimistic when his degree of
pessimism is low and pessimistic when his degree of pessimism is high.
1.3.1 Fixed Accident Losses
To begin, suppose accident losses are xed and their magnitude may be low or
high: l 2 f25; 36g. Given our assumptions, the socially optimal level of care is
c =
p
l   1. Thus, c = 4 when accident losses are low and c = 5 when accident
losses are high.
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Table 1.1: Levels of Care under Strict Liability with Fixed Accident Losses
(l; ) c cSL
(25; 0) 4 4
(25; 9
25
) 4 3
(25; 21
25
) 4 1
(36; 0) 5 5
(36; 9
25
) 5 3:8
(36; 21
25
) 5 1:4
A. Strict Liability
Under strict liability, the injurers level of care is cSL =
p
(1  ) l 1. Note that
the injurers level of care does not depend on his degree of pessimism, . Table
1.1 sets forth the socially optimal level of care, c, and the injurers level of care,
cSL, for each possible pair (l; ). From Table 1.1 we can see that:
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity, but in the
presence of ambiguity he will take too little care.
2. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the injurers level of care below
the socially optimal level of care. In particular, as the degree of ambiguity
increases from zero to low to high, the injurers level of care falls from 4 to 3
to 1 if accident losses are low and from 5 to 3:8 to 1:4 if accident losses are
high.
3. While the injurers level of care increases in response to an increase in the
magnitude of accident losses, the gap between the injurers level of care and
the socially optimal level of care increases as well. Specically, if accident
losses increase from low to high, the socially optimal level of care increases
by 1 while the injurers level of care increases only by 0:8 if ambiguity is low
and by 0:4 if ambiguity is high.
33To see this, note that 0(c) =   1(1+c)2 < 0, 00(c) = 2(1+c)3 > 0, and 0(c) =   2(1+c)2 < 0.
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Figure 1.3: E¤ect on Care of Increasing Ambiguity under Strict Liability with
Fixed Accident Losses
Each of these results is consistent with Proposition 1.2. Figure 1.3 illustrates the
second result assuming low accident costs and a high degree of pessimism. Figure
1.4 illustrates the third result assuming a low degree of ambiguity and a high degree
of pessimism.
B. Negligence
Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially
optimal level of care, the injurer will exercise due care if the cost, c, does not
exceed the expected benet, F (cSL)  cSL + l + (1   )L(cSL); otherwise he
will exercise cSL. Table 1.2 sets forth the relevant cost-benet calculations and
species the injurers level of care, cN , for each possible triple (l; ; ). From Table
1.2 we can see that:
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity, if ambiguity
is low, or if he is pessimistic. The injurer will exercise too little care only
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Figure 1.4: E¤ect on Care of Increasing Fixed Accident Losses under Strict Lia-
bility
Table 1.2: The Injurers Level of Care under Negligence with Fixed Accident Losses
(l; ; ) c cSL F (cSL) cN
(25; 0; 1
50
) 4 4 9 4
(25; 0; 39
50
) 4 4 9 4
(25; 9
25
; 1
50
) 4 3 7:18 4
(25; 9
25
; 39
50
) 4 3 14:02 4
(25; 21
25
; 1
50
) 4 1 3:42 1
(25; 21
25
; 39
50
) 4 1 19:38 4
(36; 0; 1
50
) 5 5 11 5
(36; 0; 39
50
) 5 5 11 5
(36; 9
25
; 1
50
) 5 3:8 8:86 5
(36; 9
25
; 39
50
) 5 3:8 18:71 5
(36; 21
25
; 1
50
) 5 1:4 4:40 1:4
(36; 21
25
; 39
50
) 5 1:4 27:39 5
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when ambiguity is high and he is optimistic.
2. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the expected benet of exercising
due care if the injurer is optimistic and progressively increases it if he is pes-
simistic. In particular, if the injurer is optimistic, as the degree of ambiguity
increases from zero to low to high the expected benet of exercising due care
falls from 9 to 7:18 to 3:42 if accident losses are low and from 11 to 8:86 to
4:40 if accident losses are high. If the injurer is pessimistic, however, as the
degree of ambiguity increases from zero to low to high the expected benet
of exercising due care rises from 9 to 14:02 to 19:38 if accident losses are low
and from 11 to 18:71 to 27:39 if accident losses are high.
3. In the presence of ambiguity, the expected benet of exercising due care
increases with the injurers degree of pessimism. Specically, when ambiguity
is low, as the injurers degree of pessimism increases from low to high the
expected benet of exercising due care rises from 7:18 to 14:02 if accident
losses are low and from 8:86 to 18:71 if accident losses are high. When
ambiguity is high, as the injurers degree of pessimism increases from low to
high the expected benet of exercising due care leaps from 3:42 to 19:38 if
accident losses are low and from 4:40 to 27:39 if accident losses are high.
4. While both the cost and the expected benet of exercising due care increase in
response to an increase in the magnitude of accident losses, the gap between
them increases as well.
All four results are consistent with Proposition 1.3. Note that the second and
third results are consistent because the likelihood that the injurer will exercise
too little care varies inversely with the expected benet of exercising due care in
response to changes in ambiguity or the injurers ambiguity attitude. To see that
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Figure 1.5: E¤ect on Care of Increasing Ambiguity under Negligence with Fixed
Accident Losses
the fourth result is consistent, note that (i) when ambiguity is high and the injurer
is optimistic, 1
(c
=4) = 2:5 > 2:42 = F (c
SL)   cSL and the expected benet of
exercising due care increases by less than the cost when the magnitude of accident
losses increases from low to high, and (ii) in all other cases, F (cSL)  cSL > 2:5 =
1
(c
=4) and the expected benet of exercising due care increases by more than
the cost when the magnitude of accident losses increases from low to high. Figure
1.5 illustrates how an optimistic injurer will take optimal care in the absence of
ambiguity or if ambiguity is low, but will exercise too little care when ambiguity
is high. It assumes accident losses are low.
1.3.2 Variable Accident Losses
Next suppose accident losses are variable and their magnitude is given by l(c) =
108
1+c
. Under this assumption, the socially optimal level of care is c = 5.
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Table 1.3: Levels of Care under Strict Liability with Variable Accident Losses
(; ) c cSL
(0; 1
50
) 5 5
(0; 39
50
) 5 5
( 9
25
; 1
50
) 5 4:22
( 9
25
; 39
50
) 5 6:06
(21
25
; 1
50
) 5 2:44
(21
25
; 39
50
) 5 7:65
A. Strict Liability
Table 1.3 sets forth the socially optimal level of care, c, and the injurers level
of care, cSL, for each possible pair (; ). From Table 1.3 we can see that:
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity, but in the
presence of ambiguity he will exercise too little care when he is optimistic
and too much care when he is pessimistic.
2. For any given degree of ambiguity, the injurers level of care increases with
his degree of pessimism.
3. The injurers level of care decreases with ambiguity when he is optimistic
and increases with ambiguity when he is pessimistic.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 collectively illustrate all three results, each of which is consistent
with Proposition 1.4. In particular, with respect to the third result note that
because cSL  2:44 we have  = 39
50
> 2
1+cSL
= L
0(cSL)
l0(cSL) .
B. Negligence
Table 1.4 sets forth the relevant cost-benet calculations and species the in-
jurers level of care, cN , for each possible pair (; ). Recall that the injurer will
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Figure 1.6: E¤ect on Care of Increasing Ambiguity under Strict Liability with
Variable Accident Losses if the Injurer is Optimistic
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Figure 1.7: E¤ect on Care of Increasing Ambiguity under Strict Liability with
Variable Accident Losses if the Injurer is Pessimistic
38
Table 1.4: The Injurers Level of Care under Negligence with Variable Accident
Losses
(; ) c cSL G(cSL) cN
(0; 1
50
) 5 5 8 5
(0; 39
50
) 5 5 8 5
( 9
25
; 1
50
) 5 4:22 6:91 5
( 9
25
; 39
50
) 5 6:06 11:74 5
(21
25
; 1
50
) 5 2:44 4:43 2:44
(21
25
; 39
50
) 5 7:65 16:06 5
exercise due care if c  G(cSL)  cSL + l(cSL) + (1   )L(cSL); otherwise he
will exercise cSL. From Table 1.4 we can see that:
1. The injurer will take optimal care in the absence of ambiguity, if ambiguity
is low, or if he is pessimistic. The injurer will exercise too little care only
when ambiguity is high and he is optimistic.
2. In the presence of ambiguity, the expected benet of exercising due care in-
creases with the injurers degree of pessimism. Specically, when ambiguity
is low, as the injurers degree of pessimism increases from low to high the
expected benet of exercising due care rises from 6:91 to 11:74. When ambi-
guity is high, as the injurers degree of pessimism increases from low to high
the expected benet of exercising due care leaps from 4:43 to 16:06.
3. Increasing ambiguity progressively reduces the expected benet of exercising
due care if the injurer is optimistic and progressively increases it if he is pes-
simistic. In particular, if the injurer is optimistic, as the degree of ambiguity
increases from zero to low to high the expected benet of exercising due care
falls from 8 to 6:91 to 4:43. If the injurer is pessimistic, however, as the
degree of ambiguity increases from zero to low to high the expected benet
of exercising due care rises from 8 to 11:74 to 16:06.
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Note that each of the results is consistent with Proposition 1.5.
1.4 DISCUSSION
The results of the model suggest that neither strict liability nor negligence is gen-
erally e¢ cient in the presence of ambiguity. Under both liability rules the injurer
may exercise too little care, and under strict liability he even may exercise too
much care in the case of variable accident losses. In addition, the injurers level of
care generally decreases with optimism, increases with pessimism, and decreases
or increases with ambiguity depending on whether he is optimistic or pessimistic,
respectively.
A further implication of the results is that negligence is more robust to ambi-
guity, which implies that negligence may be superior to strict liability in unilateral
accident cases. Generally speaking, in the presence of ambiguity strict liability
is never e¢ cient (save only a borderline case when accident losses are variable),
while negligence is e¢ cient for a range of model parameter values. More speci-
cally, the results suggest that although we might expect the two liability rules to
perform equally poorly to the extent that optimism is the prevailing attitude to-
ward ambiguity with respect to accident risk (as the psychology literature appears
to suggest), we would expect negligence to outperform strict liability in unilateral
accident contexts in which people are su¢ ciently pessimistic (for example, where
an accident is highly available in the sense used in the psychology literature). Of
course, an important countervailing factor is that strict liability is less costly for a
court to implement. Nevertheless, the implication that negligence is more robust
to ambiguity may help explain why it is the predominant liability rule in modern
tort law.
Whatever the relative merits of strict liability and negligence, the basic result
remains that neither liability rule is generally e¢ cient when the injurer faces am-
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biguity with respect to accident risk. The exercise, then, is to design a liability
rule that will induce the injurer to exercise optimal care in the face of ambiguity.
One approach is to modify strict liability or negligence to include an adjustment
to damages, which may be positive or negative, that equates the injurers costs
with total accident costs. Let h denote such adjustment. In the case of variable
accident losses,34 h is implicitly dened by
c+ (l(c) + h) + (1  )[(c)(l(c) + h)] = c+ (c)l(c): (1.19)
Rearranging terms, we have
h =
l(c)[(c)  ]
 + (1  )(c) : (1.20)
It follows immediately from equation (1.20) that
h T 0 as (c) T  (1.21)
and that
jhj increases with j(c)  j : (1.22)
That is, (i) the adjustment will be positive when the injurer is optimistic, negative
when he is pessimistic, and zero when he is neither optimistic nor pessimistic and
(ii) the absolute magnitude of the adjustment increases as the injurer becomes more
optimistic or pessimistic, as the case may be. Consequently, in light of the com-
parative statics results on optimism and pessimism, we may interpret h as a scaled
(by the magnitude of accident losses) ambiguity adjustment that operates to pun-
ish optimism and the resulting tendency to decrease care and to reward pessimism
34I derive h for the case of variable accident losses because it is the more general case. The
case of xed accident losses is the special case where l(c) = l for some scalar l > 0.
41
and the resulting tendency to increase care. It is straightforward to demonstrate
the e¢ ciency of an ambiguity adjusted rule of strict liability or negligence. Under
an ambiguity adjusted rule of strict liability, the injurer faces problem (1.7) above
and accordingly will choose cSL = c. Under an ambiguity adjusted negligence
rule, the injurer faces problem (1.8) above and accordingly will choose cN = c.
It is worth noting that modifying negligence to include an adjustment to the
standard of due care rather than to damages is not a viable alternative approach.
Suppose ambiguity would lead an injurer to exercise suboptimal care under a
negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially optimal
level of care. A downward adjustment of the standard of due care below the
socially optimal level of care could not induce the injurer to exercise the socially
optimal level of care because the injurers level of care would never exceed the
standard of due care under a rule of negligence. To see that an upward adjustment
of the standard of due care above the socially optimal level of care could not
induce the injurer to exercise the socially optimal level of care, consider the case
of variable accident losses (which includes xed accident losses as a special case).
By assumption, the injurer would choose cN < c under a negligence rule with
c = c. This implies that cN = cSL < c, that the injurers decision rule is given by
cN =
8><>: c if c  G(c
SL)
cSL < c if c > G(cSL)
, and that c > G(cSL). It follows that increasing
c such that c > c would not induce the injurer to choose cN = c because it still
would be the case that c > G(cSL) and, therefore, the injurer still would choose
cN = cSL < c.
We can imagine (at least) two objections to an ambiguity adjusted liability rule.
First, one could object that it is unworkable because the adjustment requires the
court to determine the injurers degree of and attitude toward ambiguity  and
 which are unobservable. While the unobservability of  and  may preclude the
42
court from perfectly implementing the ambiguity adjustment, the court conceivably
could use observable characteristics of the injurer as proxies or instruments for 
and  in a "second-best" implementation.35 Second, one could object that an
ambiguity adjusted liability rule is unfair because the adjustment to damages is
based not on the injurers acts (i.e., his level of care) but rather on his beliefs (i.e.,
his degree of and attitude toward ambiguity). Many legal determinations, however,
are based on a persons state of mind. In criminal cases, for example, whether a
harmful act constitutes a crime, and quite often the degree of criminal liability,
depends on the defendants state of mind, or mens rea. Perhaps more on point,
courts may award exemplary or punitive damages in tort cases on the basis that the
harmful act was intentional, willful, wanton, or malicious. In addition, the purpose
of the ambiguity adjustment is not to punish or reward the injurers beliefs, but
to cause the injurer to internalize the external social costs of suboptimal care. In
this sense, it is analogous to a Pigouvian corrective tax and subsidy scheme and
may be justied on the same grounds.
1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter generalizes the basic unilateral accident model of tort law and eco-
nomics to allow for ambiguity with respect to accident risk. Standard formulations
of the basic accident model are based on the expected utility framework, in which
agentsbeliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events are represented by probabil-
ities. As a result, the standard models do not allow for ambiguity with respect to
accident risk and cannot accommodate optimistic or pessimistic attitudes toward
ambiguity. The Ellsberg paradox and related experimental evidence, however,
35In addition, recall that, in conformity with the basic accident model, I assume the court can
accurately determine all relevant facts, including the agentspreferences. Under this assumption,
which is central to the basic accident model, the court would be able to determine  and  and
perfectly implement the ambiguity adjustment.
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suggest the importance of ambiguity attitudes for individual decision making gen-
erally. Moreover, psychology research suggests that people exhibit optimism and
pessimism in the accident context.
To incorporate ambiguity into the basic unilateral accident model, I recast
the model in the Choquet expected utility framework and represent the injurers
beliefs about accident risk with a neo-additive capacity. Choquet expected utility
is a generalization of expected utility that allows for ambiguity. Under Choquet
expected utility theory, agentsbeliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events are
represented by a non-additive probability, or a capacity. The non-additivity of
the capacity allows for di¤erent ambiguity attitudes. A neo-additive capacity is
a special type of capacity that is based on a probability distribution. That is, it
is a probability weighting function. Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive
capacity amounts to a weighted sum of the minimum utility, the maximum utility,
and the expected utility with respect to the probability distribution on which the
neo-additive capacity is based.
I represent the injurers beliefs with a neo-additive capacity for several reasons.
First, numerous empirical studies indicate that individuals weight probabilities
in a manner consistent with a neo-additive capacity, and there is experimental
evidence that preferences have the form suggested by Choquet expected utility with
a neo-additive capacity. Second, a neo-additive capacity lends itself to concrete
notions of ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism. Ambiguity corresponds to an
agents lack of condence in his belief about the probability of uncertain events,
while optimism and pessimism correspond to an agent overweighting the best and
worst outcomes, respectively. Moreover, a neo-additive capacity parameterizes
ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism, allowing us to perform comparative statics
on changes in their degrees. Finally, Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive
capacity is tractable and also quite general in that it includes as special cases or is
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mathematically equivalent to a number of alternative models of decision making
under uncertainty.
The central result of the model is that, in the basic unilateral accident setting,
neither strict liability nor negligence is generally e¢ cient in the presence of ambi-
guity. This is in contrast with the standard results of the basic unilateral accident
model, namely that both strict liability and negligence are e¢ cient. In particular,
I show that (i) under strict liability, the injurer will exercise too little care in the
case of xed accident losses and may exercise too little or too much care in the
case of variable accident losses and (ii) under a negligence rule with the standard
of due care set equal to the socially optimal level of care, the injurer may exercise
too little care in both cases on accident losses. In addition, I nd that, in general,
the injurers level of care decreases with his degree of optimism, increases with
his degree of pessimism, and decreases or increases with the degree of ambiguity
depending on whether the injurer is optimistic or pessimistic, respectively.
The basic intuition behind the main results may be summarized as follows.
Ambiguity has two e¤ects on the injurers incentives to take care under strict
liability. On the one hand, ambiguity leads the injurer to discount the benet
from a reduction in expected accident losses, which causes the injurer to tend to
reduce his level of care. On the other hand, ambiguity leads the injurer to benet
from a reduction in the magnitude of accident losses per se, which causes the
injurer to tend to increase his level of care. In the case of xed accident losses,
the injurer cannot a¤ect the magnitude of accident losses, so only the former e¤ect
applies and the injurer will exercise too little care. In the case of variable accident
losses, whether the injurer exercises too little or too much care depends on which
of the two e¤ects dominates. The former e¤ect will dominate and the injurer will
exercise too little care if the marginal benet from a reduction in expected accident
losses exceeds the marginal benet from a reduction in the magnitude of accident
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losses and the injurer is optimistic or not too pessimistic. Otherwise, the latter
e¤ect will dominate and the injurer will exercise too much care. The injurer will
take optimal care only in the borderline case where the two e¤ects perfectly o¤set.
Under a negligence rule with the standard of due care set equal to the socially
optimal level of care, the injurer faces no liability if he satises the standard of
due care and faces strict liability otherwise. Accordingly, if per the above analysis
the injurer would exercise optimal care or even too much care under strict liability,
then he will take optimal care under negligence. If, however, the injurer would
exercise too little care under strict liability, he may or may not exercise optimal
care under negligence depending on whether the expected benet of exercising
due care, which equals his expected costs of being negligent, exceeds the cost of
exercising due care, which is the price of facing no liability.
A key implication of the results of the model is that negligence is more robust
to ambiguity. This suggests that negligence may be superior to strict liability in
unilateral accident cases. It also may help explain why negligence is the general
basis for accident liability under modern Anglo-American tort law.
The models results and implications aside, a principal contribution of this
chapter is that it proposes a method to generalize the basic accident model to allow
for ambiguity with respect to accident risk. The scope of the model presented in
this chapter is limited to the case of unilateral accidents with xed activity levels.
Natural extensions of this chapter, therefore, include introducing ambiguity in the
case of unilateral accidents with variable activity levels and in the more general case
of bilateral accidents, including bilateral care and harm, with xed and variable
activity levels. In addition, future research could examine the implications of
ambiguity for the economic analysis of other basic areas of law such as contracts,
property, and criminal law, as well as other traditional law and economics topics
such as litigation and settlement.
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APPENDIX
A.1 CHOQUET EXPECTED UTILITY FRAMEWORK
A.1.1 General Framework
Let S be a non-empty, nite set of states. Associated with S is a set of events E ,
which we take to be the power set of S. Let X  R be a non-empty, nite set of
outcomes and let F = ff : S ! Xg be a set of simple functions from states to
outcomes, called simple acts. Let u : X ! R be a monotone increasing function
from outcomes to real numbers. We interpret u as a Bernoulli utility function.
We now dene a capacity and the Choquet integral of a simple act with respect
to a capacity.
Definition A.1 (Capacity) A capacity is a function  : E ! R that satises:
(i) monotonicity: E;F 2 E and E  F imply (E)  (F ); and
(ii) normalization: (?) = 0 and (S) = 1:
Note that a probability distribution is a special case of a capacity that satises
additivity: E;F 2 E and E \ F = ? imply (E) + (F ) = (E [ F ).
Definition A.2 (Choquet integral) Let f : S ! X be a simple act that
takes on the values x1      xn. The Choquet integral of f with respect to a
capacity  is dened as
Z
fd :=
nX
i=1
xi[(fs 2 Sjf(s)  xig)  (fs 2 Sjf(s) > xig)]:
We interpret the Choquet integral as the expected value of the simple act f with
respect to the capacity . The Choquet integral of the composition u(f(s)) with
respect to the capacity  is dened as the Choquet expected utility of f with
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respect to .36
A neo-additive capacity is a special type of capacity that is based on a proba-
bility distribution.
Definition A.3 (Neo-additive capacity) Let ;  be real numbers such that
0  ;   1. A neo-additive capacity  based on a probability distribution p is
dened as
(E) :=
8>>>><>>>>:
0 for E = ?
(1  ) + (1  )p(E) for ? $ E $ S
1 for E = S
:
A neo-additive capacity is additive on non-extreme outcomes, hence the name.
We interpret the additive part of a neo-additive capacity as follows: p represents
the agents beliefs about the likelihood of uncertain events and 1    represents
the agents degree of condence in this belief. The complement of the degree of
condence is the degree of ambiguity .
It can be shown that the Choquet integral of a simple act f with respect to a
neo-additive capacity  based on p is given by
Z
fd = xn + (1  )x1 + (1  )
nX
i=1
xip(fs 2 Sjf(s) = xig);
where f takes on the values x1      xn (Chateauneuf et al. 2007). Thus, with
respect to a neo-additive capacity, the Choquet integral of a simple act f is the
weighted sum of the worst outcome under f , the best outcome under f , and the
expected value of f with respect to p.
It follows that the Choquet expected utility of the simple act f with respect to
36Note that the composition u(f(s)) : S ! R is a simple act.
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the neo-additive capacity  based on p is given by
Vp(f) :=
Z
u(f)d = u(xn) + (1  )u(x1) + (1  )Ep(f);
where Ep(f) 
nP
i=1
u(xi)p(fs 2 Sju(f(s)) = u(xi)g). That is, it is the weighted sum
of the minimum utility under f , the maximum utility under f , and the expected
utility of f with respect to p. We interpret  as the degree of pessimism and 1 
as the degree of optimism because they determine the respective weights given to
the minimum utility and the maximum utility. As stated above, we interpret 1  
as the degree of condence in p and  as the degree of ambiguity. Note that in the
absence of ambiguity ( = 0) Choquet expected utility reduces to expected utility.
A.1.2 The Model
Placing the model in this framework, the state space is S = faccident, no accidentg.
The outcome space is X = fm(c), M(c)g, where m(c) and M(c) depend on the
applicable liability rule. Because a negligence rule e¤ectively imposes no liability if
c  c and strict liability if c > c, we only need to denem(c) andM(c) for the rules
of no liability and strict liability. Under a rule of no liability, m(c) = M(c) = k c.
Under strict liability, m(c) = k   c   l(c) and M(c) = k   c. The set of acts is
F = ff(c) : c  0g, where f(c) =
8><>: m(c) if s = accidentM(c) if s = no accident . The injurers
Bernoulli utility function is u(f(c)) = f(c).
The injurers beliefs about accident risk are given by a neo-additive capac-
ity  based on the probability distribution p = f(c); 1   (c)g. With a slight
abuse of notation, we say  is based on  and we dene () := (accident),
(1   ) := (no accident), and V(c) := Vp(f(c)). In addition, we dene
E(c) := (c)m(c) + (1   (c))M(c). It follows that the injurers Choquet ex-
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pected utility of exercising level of care c under a rule of no liability or strict
liability is V(c) = m(c) + (1  )M(c) + (1  )E(c) and under a negligence
rule is
8><>: V(c) under no liability if c  cV(c) under strict liability if c < c .
A.1.3 Relationship to Other Models
A principal advantage of Choquet expected utility with a neo-additive capacity is
that it contains as special cases or is mathematically equivalent to several alterna-
tive models of decision making under uncertainty. Special cases include (see, e.g.,
Schipper 2005):
 subjective expected utility, if  = 0 and  2 [0; 1];
 maxmin expected utility (Wald 1950), if  = 1 and  = 1;
 maxmax expected utility, if  = 1 and  = 0; and
 Hurwicz (1951) criterion, if  = 1 and  2 [0; 1].
Additional special cases include:
 maxmin expected utility with multiple priors (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989),
if  2 [0; 1] and  = 1; and
 maxmax expected utility with multiple priors, if  2 [0; 1] and  = 0,
in each case where the set of priors is D = fq 2 4 : q  (1 )pg and p denotes the
probability distribution on which the neo-additive capacity is based (see Eichberger
and Kelsey 2009).
With a neo-additive capacity  based on p, Choquet expected utility is math-
ematically equivalent to:
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 subjective expected utility where the subjective probability of the least fa-
vorable event W is qW = (1   )pW + , the most favorable event B is
qB = (1  )pB + (1  ), and every other event E is qE = (1  )pE;
 -maxmin expected utility with multiple priors (Ghirardato et al. 2004)
where the set of priors is D = fq 2 4 : q  (1   )pg (see Chateauneuf et
al. 2007; Eichberger and Kelsey 2009);
 rank dependent expected utility with probability weighting function !(p) =
(p) (see Wakker 1990); and
 cumulative prospect theory with probability weighting function !(p) = (p)
and symmetric treatment of gains and losses (see Tversky and Wakker 1995).
A.2 SOCIAL PLANNERS PROBLEM
Here we prove the assertion, made in footnote 28, that c is the level of care that
would be chosen by a rational social planner as part of a Pareto optimal allocation.
Let w and v denote the initial wealth of the injurer and the victim, respectively.
Let wa and va denote the wealth of the injurer and the victim, respectively, in the
event of an accident and let wn and vn denote the wealth of the injurer and the
victim, respectively, in the event of no accident. The social planners problem is
max
c0
wa;wn;va;vn0
(c)va + (1  (c))vn
subject to
wa + (1  )wn + (1  )[(c)wa + (1  (c))wn] = V
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and
[(c)va + (1  (c))vn] + [(c)wa + (1  (c))wn] + c+ L(c) = w + k + v:
The foregoing expresses the social planners problem as maximizing the expected
utility of the victim subject to meeting a required Choquet expected utility level for
the injurer V and a resource constraint in which expected resource use equals the
available resources. Expected resource use is calculated using objective accident
risk because the social planner is rational. The solution to the social planners
problem is a Pareto optimal allocation. We may assume, without loss of generality,
that wa = wn. With this assumption, the social planners problem reduces to max
c0
w + k + v   V   c  L(c), which is equivalent to choosing c  0 to minimize total
accident costs c+ L(c).
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CHAPTER 2
ALLOCATION RULES AND THE
STABILITY OF MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS
A class action allows one or more representative parties to sue or be sued
on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons. Rule 23(b)(3) of the United
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a case to proceed as a class action
when, inter alia, "a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly
and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)). In light
of the general tradeo¤ between equity and e¢ ciency in matters of public policy
and law (Okun 1975; Kaplow and Shavell 2002), a class action that satises the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) would appear to be socially desirable.
A distinguishing feature of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is that the putative
class members have the right to opt out of the class action and pursue their own
interests (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)). Advocates of opt-out rights o¤er various
deontological and instrumental arguments in their favor.1 Notwithstanding the
merits of such arguments, the right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action cre-
ates the risk that the class will unravel in spite of the fact that a class action is in
societys best interests. This risk is acknowledged widely among class action schol-
ars (e.g., Abraham 1987; Mullenix 1991; Perino 1997; Rosenberg 2002), including
by opt-out rights advocates (e.g., Schuck 1995; Rutherglen 1996; Nagareda 2003).
The risk that the class will unravel is thought to be particularly signicant in
the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action in which separate actions are
1The deontological arguments usually emphasize the concept of plainti¤ autonomy and invoke
the notion that "everyone should have his own day in court" (Ortiz v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 846 (1999)). The instrumental arguments usually emphasize the idea that the right to opt
out serves as a mechanism to mitigate the principal-agent problems inherent in class actions. For
summaries of these arguments and concise reviews of the literature, see, e.g., Perino (1997) and
Eisenberg and Miller (2004b). For criticisms of these arguments, see, e.g., Rosenberg (2003).
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viable (Co¤ee 1987; Bone 2003).2 Indeed, there is empirical evidence that opt-out
rates are highest in mass tort cases (Eisenberg and Miller 2004b). In recognition of
the problem, several legal commentators propose restricting or even abolishing opt-
out rights in mass tort class actions (e.g., Mullenix 1986; Co¤ee 1987; Rosenberg
2003). Contrary to such proposals, however, recent amendments to Rule 23 have
expanded opt-out rights.3
One reason why the class might unravel in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action
is adverse selection due to damage averaging (Co¤ee 1987; Bone 2003). Damaging
averaging occurs when the allocation rule governing the division of the net recovery
of the class among its members assigns class members with below-average (above-
average) claims more (less) than their pro rata shares.4 If the governing allocation
rule engages in damage averaging, then, even if the per member expected recovery
in the class action exceeds the mean expected recovery from separate actions,
which may be the case if, for example, the class action enjoys economies of scale,
superior prospects of prevailing at trial, or enhanced bargaining power in settlement
negotiations, the amount that one or more putative class members with above-
average claims can expect to recover by opting out may exceed the amount that
they can expect to recover by remaining in the class action.
This chapter formally examines how di¤erent allocation rules inuence the risk
2There is no single, universally accepted denition of "mass tort" litigation. Deborah Hensler,
a leading class action scholar, denes it as "large scale personal injury or property damage
litigation arising out of product use or exposure" (Hensler 2001, pp. 181-182). The American
Bar Association Commission on Mass Torts denes it as involving "at least 100 civil tort actions
arising from a single accident or use of or exposure to the same product or substance, each of
which involves a claim in excess of $50,000 for wrongful death, personal injury or physical damage
to or destruction of tangible property" (Willging 1999, pp. 8-9). Examples of high prole mass
tort class actions include the Agent Orange litigation, the Dalkon Shield litigation, and several
asbestos cases (Co¤ee 1995; Weinstein 1995).
3In 2003, Rule 23 was amended to explicitly authorize the court to refuse to approve a settle-
ment in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action unless it a¤ords class members a second opportunity to opt
out after the terms of the settlement are known (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3); Advisory Committees
Notes to Rule 23).
4According to Silver and Baker (1998, p. 1481), "[a]llocation plans used in class actions
inevitably involve some degree of damage averaging."
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that the class will unravel in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. I focus on
three allocation rules: (1) equal sharing; (2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3)
pro rata by outside options (i.e., expected claim values). I consider these rules for
two reasons. First and foremost, they run the gamut of damage averaging. Rules 1
and 3 correspond to full damage averaging and no damage averaging, respectively,
while rule 2 involves partial damage averaging.5 Second, these rules are natural and
obvious candidates for "fair" allocation standards; as one commentator states in a
closely related context, each rule has "immediate, though perhaps naive, appeal"
(Kornhauser 1998, p. 1568).6
I analyze a two-stage model of class action formation in which a single defendant
faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage claims. A global class action is
certied at the outset. In stage 1, the plainti¤s play a coalition formation game in
which each plainti¤ simultaneously announces whether it will remain in the class
or opt out. Stage 1 is modeled as a noncooperative game in partition function form
(see, e.g., Bloch 2003; Yi 2003). The global class is stable if the strategy prole in
which all plainti¤s remain in the class constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the game. In stage 2, the class action and any individual actions by opt-out
plainti¤s are resolved via either litigation or settlement. Stage 2 is modeled in
the divergent expectations tradition (see, e.g., Priest and Klein 1984) and assumes
that if the parties settle their dispute they divide the joint surplus from settlement
according to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
5Rule 2 involves partial damage averaging in my model because plainti¤s share a common
probability of prevailing at trial. It also would involve partial damage averaging if the probability
of prevailing at trial were higher for plainti¤s with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with
below-average claims. However, if the probability of prevailing at trial were lower for plainti¤s
with above-average claims than for plainti¤s with below-average claims, then rule 2 would involve
negative averaging whereby class members with below-average (above-average) claims would
receive less (more) than their pro rata shares.
6Rule 3 reects the normative standard embraced by many class action scholars (Silver 2000),
and arguably by the United States Supreme Court (Rosenberg 2003). For a forceful economic
argument in support of rule 2, see Rosenberg (2002).
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I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allocation
rule. The global class is asymptotically stable if the probability that it is stable
converges to one as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large. I am inter-
ested in the asymptotic stability of the global class because in the situation under
consideration a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action the number of plainti¤s
presumably is large. This presumption follows not only from the fact that it is a
mass tort class action, but also because certication under Rule 23(b)(3) implies
that the class is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
I show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the
class will be allocated pro rata in accordance with its membersoutside options
(rule 3), but that it may not be asymptotically stable if the net recovery of the
class will be shared equally (rule 1) or allocated pro rata in accordance with the
membersdamage claims (rule 2). For rules 1 and 2, I derive necessary and suf-
cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class. I also derive
su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class
under rules 1 and 2. In addition, I show that the asymptotic stability of the global
class under rule 1 necessarily implies the asymptotic stability of the global class
under rule 2 but not vice versa.
I nd that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability of the global class under
rule 1 is the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims. Generally
speaking, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1
if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage claims is narrow.
If the claims distribution is unimodal and has a bounded support, this implies
that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under rule 1 when
the distribution is negatively skewed. In addition, I nd that the magnitude of
the scale benets of the class action and the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at
trial and bargaining power in settlement negotiations are important determinants
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of the asymptotic stability of the global class under rules 1 and 2. In particular,
if the scale benets of a class action are high, the global class is more likely to
be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤sbargaining power in
settlement negotiations is low. If, however, the scale benets of a class action are
low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2
if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining power
in settlement negotiations is low.
In an e¤ort to understand the relative stability of the global class under the
three allocation rules, I simulate the model using standard Monte Carlo methods.
As compared to rule 3, I nd that the global class is asymptotically stable about
two-thirds as often under rule 2 and about a quarter as often under rule 1. The
simulations also conrm my ndings regarding the determinants of class stability.
An important implication of my results is that selecting an allocation rule in a
Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action generally involves a tradeo¤ between ex ante
and ex post e¢ ciency. On the one hand, the risk that the class will unravel due to
adverse selection generally increases with the degree of damage averaging in which
the governing allocation rule engages. On the other hand, the cost of implementing
an allocation rule generally decreases as the degree of damage averaging in which
it engages increases (Co¤ee 1987, 1998; Silver and Baker 1998; Silver 2000).7 At
the same time, however, my results suggest when this tradeo¤ may be avoided,
e.g., when the plainti¤sdamage claims are severely negatively skewed over a very
narrow range or when a class action would achieve signicant scale economies and
the likelihood that the plainti¤s will prevail on the merits is low.
More generally, my results provide guidance regarding when and how allocation
7As Silver (2000, p. 226) explains, "[i]t is more expensive to pay claimants amounts that
roughly reect the size and strength of their claims than it is to engage in damages averaging
and pay them equal amounts, and it is more expensive still to distribute payments that reect
ne di¤erences between claimants."
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rules may be used to promote the stability of the class in Rule 23(b)(3) mass
tort class actions. Accordingly, they suggest criteria to attorneys and courts for
structuring and approving e¢ cient allocations plans in such actions; e.g., if the
proposed allocation plan is likely to destabilize the class then perhaps the court
should not nd that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate" (Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C)). The results also suggest criteria for class certication under
Rule 23(b)(3); e.g., if no cost-e¤ective allocation rule exists under which the global
class would be asymptotically stable then perhaps a class action is not "superior
to other available methods for . . . e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy" (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 briey discusses
the institutional background and related literature. Section 2.2 presents the model.
Section 2.3 analyzes the asymptotic stability of the global class under each alloca-
tion rule. Section 2.4 presents the results of the Monte Carlo simulations. Section
2.5 contains concluding remarks. It discusses implications and possible extensions
of the model. The Appendix contains certain mathematical details.
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
2.1.1 Introduction to Class Actions and Rule 23
The class action is a procedural device pursuant to which "[o]ne or more members
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members"
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)). In general, the resolution of a class action binds all
members of the class, including absent parties.8 Thus, the class action forms an
exception to the "principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence
that one is not bound by a judgment . . . in a litigation in which he is not designated
8For an historical analysis of the binding e¤ect of class actions on absent parties, see Hazard
et al. (1998).
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as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process" (Ortiz
v. Fireboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999)).
The raison dêtre of the class action is e¢ ciency. Class actions can enhance
e¢ ciency in several ways. A class action can solve a collective action problem in
a case in which individual actions are not economically viable, thereby promot-
ing optimal deterrence (Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997); Macey and Miller 1991). When individual actions are economically viable,
a class action can achieve economies of scale, thereby reducing litigation costs and
promoting optimal investment in the litigation (Hay and Rosenberg 2000), and
promote uniformity in the law, thereby avoiding the social costs associated with
legal inconsistency.
The historical roots of the class action run deep. Litigation by representatives of
a group seeking to redress communal harms dates back medieval England (Yeazell
1987). The modern ancestry of the class action includes the bill of peace with
multiple parties, which was developed in the seventeenth century by the Court of
Chancery in England (Chafee 1932, 1950). In the United States, the rst provision
for class actions in federal courts, Rule 48 of the Federal Equity Rules, was adopted
in 1843.9 It permitted a representative suit when the parties on either side were
too numerous to be brought before the court without manifest inconvenience and
oppressive delays and the representative parties were su¢ cient to represent the
interests of the absent parties (42 U.S. (1 How.) lvi (1843)).10 In 1912, Rule 48
9Rule 48 provided:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and cannot, without manifest
inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit, be all brought before it, the court
in its discretion may dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in
the suit, having su¢ cient parties before it to represent all the adverse interests of
the plainti¤s and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But in such cases the
decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.
10Note that although Rule 48 provided for representative suits, its last sentence enigmatically
provided that the suits resolution would not bind absent parties. A decade after the adoption
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was amended and restated as Rule 38. The revised rule succinctly provided, "When
the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting a
class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court,
one or more may sue or defend for the whole" (226 U.S. 659 (1912)).
The existing class action device in the United States is Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Originally adopted in 1938, Rule 23 was substantially
revised in 1966 and last amended in 2007. As amended, Rule 23(a) enumerates
four prerequisites to a class action: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." Commonly known as numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation (Amchem Products Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997)), these prerequisites echo the requirements
of the former equity rules (Hensler et al. 2000).
Rule 23(b) species three situations in which a case that satises the prereq-
uisites of Rule 23(a) may proceed as a class action. Rule 23(b)(1) permits a class
action when separate actions would create a risk that the party opposing the class
would face inconsistent or varying adjudications or that an adjudication as to one
or more class members would prejudice the interests of other class members. For
example, Rule 23(b)(1) traditionally includes "limited fund" cases (Ortiz v. Fire-
board Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999)), in which "claims are made by numerous
persons against a fund insu¢ cient to satisfy all claims" (Advisory Committees
Notes to Rule 23). Rule 23(b)(2) covers situations where the actions or omissions
of Rule 48, the Supreme Court ignored the rules enigmatic proviso and indicated in dicta that
when "a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body,
. . . the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court" (Smith v. Swormstedt,
57 U.S. (1 How.) 288, 303 (1853)).
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of the party opposing the class a¤ect the entire class and injunctive or declaratory
relief respecting the class as a whole is appropriate. A prime example is a civil
rights suit alleging unlawful discrimination against a class (Advisory Committees
Notes to Rule 23; Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997);
see also Miller 1979).
Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained if common ques-
tions of law or fact predominate over individual questions and if a class action
is "superior to other available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the
controversy." According to its drafters, Rule 23(b)(3) "encompasses those cases
in which a class action would achieve economies of time, e¤ort, and expense, and
promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacricing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results" (Advisory Com-
mittees Notes to Rule 23). Rule 23(b)(3) is a catchall for class actions that do
not t into the "pigeonholes" of Rule 23(b)(1) or (2) (Bronsteen and Fiss 2003,
p. 1434), but that "may nevertheless be convenient and desirable depending upon
the particular facts" (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23).
Class actions maintained under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) are mandatory;
class members do not have a statutory right to exclude themselves from the class
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3)(A)). By contrast, putative class members have the
right to opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action. The rules require the court to
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion in accordance with the
time and manner restrictions set forth in the class action notice (Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B)(v)(vi)). Those who duly opt out are not bound by the outcome of
the class action (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3)(B)).
When deemed appropriate by the court, a class may be divided into subclasses
and each subclass treated as a separate class (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B)). In
addition, the court may limit the scope of a class action to one or more particular
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issues (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A)). In a products liability case, for example, the
court may certify a class action only on the issue of the defendants liability and
require that the class members proceed individually to prove the amounts of their
respective damage claims (see Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23).
Any settlement of a certied class action must be approved by the court (Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A)). In order for the settlement to be binding, the court must
conduct a hearing and nd that the settlement is "fair, reasonable, and adequate"
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C)). Although the rules do not dene these terms, courts
have elaborated several multifactor tests (see generally Macey and Miller 2009).
The courts review of a proposed settlement is distinct from and in addition to the
courts certication inquiry, including with respect to the adequacy requirement
and, in the case of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action, the superiority requirement (Am-
chem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1997); Nagareda 2002). The
court may refuse to approve a proposed settlement of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action
unless it a¤ords class members a new opportunity to opt out after the terms of
the settlement are known (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3); Advisory Committees Notes
to Rule 23). In addition, the rules provide that any class member may object to
a proposed settlement and that any such objection may be withdrawn only with
the courts approval (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(4); Leslie 2007).
When class actions are certied in mass tort cases, they usually are certied
under Rule 23(b)(3) (Weinstein 1995). However, the use of class actions to resolve
mass tort cases is highly controversial (Schuck 1995; Hensler 2001). Moreover,
judicial attitudes towards certication of mass tort class actions have ebbed and
owed since the 1966 overhaul of Rule 23 (Co¤ee 1995; Schuck 1995; Weinstein
1995; Perino 1997; Tidmarsh 1998).11
11The advisory notes accompanying the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 state that a "mass
accidentresulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action
because of the likelihood that signicant questions, not only of damages but of liability and
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2.1.2 Relation to the Literature
This chapter relates to several strands of literature within law, economics, and their
intersection. Within law, this chapter contributes to the vast literature on class
actions. Silver (2000) surveys this literature. In particular, this chapter adds to
the legal scholarship that discusses allocations in class actions, including Morawetz
(1993), Silver and Baker (1997, 1998), Co¤ee (1998), Dana (2006), Edelman et al.
(2006), and Macey and Miller (2009).
This chapter closely relates and directly contributes to the small, but growing
literature on the economics of class actions, which includes Kornhauser (1983,
1998), Che (1996), Perino (1997), Marceau and Mongrain (2003), and De¤ains and
Langlais (2009). Kornhauser (1983, 1998) and Perino (1997) model the formation
of a class action as a cooperative game in characteristic function form. Kornhauser
considers an "allocation of common costs" game and adopts the core of the game
as the standard for a "fair" allocation. While certain of his results are comparable
to results in this chapter, Kornhauser focuses on how di¤erent court procedures for
approving settlements (intervention rules, voting rules, and attorney compensation
schemes) inuence whether the class attorney and the defendant will propose a
fair allocation. Perino uses a simple, three-player game to construct a series of
examples that illustrate how the concept of core stability can elucidate several
academic theories and real-world phenomena pertaining to class actions and opt-
out rights. Although he does not develop a general model, Perino demonstrates
the usefulness of core theory for the analysis of class action dynamics.
Che (1996), Marceau and Mongrain (2003), and De¤ains and Langlais (2009)
study the equilibrium formation of class actions using di¤erent noncooperative
defenses to liability, would be present, a¤ecting the individuals in di¤erent ways" (Advisory
Committees Notes to Rule 23). However, courts often disregard this comment (Wright et al.
2005, sec. 1783) and ocassionally expressly repudiate it (see, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,
880 F.2d 709, 729-38 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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games. Che examines the adverse selection hypothesis in a model that features a
single defendant, two types of plainti¤s (small stakes and large stakes), and full
damaging averaging. He focuses on the role of asymmetric information, consider-
ing two cases: when the defendant has complete information about the plainti¤s
claims and when the plainti¤sclaims are private information. In both cases he
nds equilibria in which the class partially or fully unravels, although he nds
that pure adverse selection arises only in the case of complete information. Ches
model is closely related to my model and his results in the case complete informa-
tion are comparable to my results on class stability under equal sharing. Marceau
and Mongrain analyze a waiting game among multiple plainti¤s with heterogenous
damage claims and examine how the degree of damage averaging inuences which
plainti¤ will assume the role of class representative and initiate the class action.
They nd that if there is full damage averaging, the class representative will be
the plainti¤ with the lowest damage claim, while if there is less than full damage
averaging, other plainti¤s may initiate the class action. De¤ains and Langlais con-
sider a sequential entry game between two plainti¤s (high stakes and low stakes)
that have been injured by the same defendant. They focus on the consequences
of information externalities and information sharing for the formation of a class
action, though in an extension of their model they prove one result on damage
averaging that is comparable to results in this chapter.
In addition, this chapter draws on the litigation and settlement literature within
law and economics, including, most notably, Landes (1971), Posner (1973), Gould
(1973), Shavell (1982), Priest and Klein (1984), and Hylton (2006). A recent survey
of this literature is Spier (2007). This chapter also draws on and contributes an
application to the literature within economics and game theory on noncooperative
games of coalition formation. Surveys of this literature are provided by Konishi
et al. (1997), Bloch (1997, 2003), and Yi (2003).
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2.2 TWO-STAGE MODEL OF CLASS ACTION FORMATION
Consider a mass tort case involving n plainti¤s and one defendant. Let N denote
the set of all plainti¤s and i denote an arbitrary plainti¤ in N . All parties are risk
neutral expected wealth maximizers.
Each plainti¤ i 2 N has a damage claim i against the defendant. Each plain-
ti¤s damage claim is its private knowledge. However, it is common knowledge that
the plainti¤sdamage claims are independent and identically distributed according
to a cumulative distribution function F and a probability density function f that
is strictly positive on its support set [; ], where 0 <  <  < 1. I assume that
the defendants assets are available and su¢ cient to satisfy the damage claims of
all plainti¤s.12
At the outset, a class action on behalf of all plainti¤s is certied under Rule
23(b)(3). In stage 1, each plainti¤simultaneously announces whether it will remain
in the class action or opt out pursuant to Rule 23(c).13 Let A  N denote the
subset of plainti¤s that remain in the class action and let N=A denote the subset
of plainti¤s that opt out. I refer to A as the class, to each plainti¤ i 2 A as a class
member, and to each plainti¤ i 2 NnA as an opt-out plainti¤ . The number of class
members is denoted by jAj and I refer to jAj as the class size.
Following Che (1996), I assume that each plainti¤s announcement is binding
(i.e., no class member may opt out and no opt-out plainti¤ may rejoin the class)
and that each opt-out plainti¤ must pursue its claim individually (e.g., no other
class actions are maintained on behalf of opt-out plainti¤s and no opt-out plainti¤s
maintain joinder actions under Rule 20).14 Accordingly, the plainti¤sannounce-
12I revisit this and other key assumptions of the model in Section 2.5.
13Assuming simultaneous announcements captures the idea that a plainti¤ does not know the
announcements of the other plainti¤s when it makes its announcement.
14Rule 20 provides, in pertinent part: "All persons may join in one action as plainti¤s if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law
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ments induce a partition 
A of N , where 
A =
n
A; (i)i2NnA
o
. I refer to 
A as the
class structure and to each ! 2 
A as a stage 2 plainti¤ . For the sake of brevity,
I often refer to a stage 2 plainti¤ simply as a plainti¤.
In stage 2, the defendant and each plainti¤ ! 2 
A resolve their dispute via
either litigation or settlement. I assume that the classdamage claim equals the
expected damage claim multiplied by the class size: A = E []  jAj. In addition, I
assume that there are no externalities or spillovers across plainti¤s. In particular,
I assume that the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s are
resolved simultaneously and that all plainti¤s claims have the same priority in
bankruptcy.
Because the plainti¤sexpected payo¤s in stage 1 are functions of their expected
recoveries in stage 2, I proceed in reverse order and begin with stage 2.
2.2.1 Stage 2: Dispute Resolution
A. Probability of Settlement
Plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle rather than litigate their dispute if a settle-
ment range exists i.e., if plainti¤ !s reservation price (its minimum settlement
demand) is less than or equal to the defendants reservation price (its maximum
settlement o¤er):
P!!   C!  Q!! +K!; (2.1)
where (i) P! and Q! denote the respective estimates by plainti¤ ! and the defen-
dant of the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) C! > 0 and
K! > 0 denote the respective litigation costs of plainti¤ ! and the defendant.15 If
no settlement range exists the parties litigate. Condition (2.1) implicitly assumes
or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)).
15Condition (2.1) is a so-called Landes-Posner-Gould condition (see Landes 1971; Posner 1973;
Gould 1973; Hylton 2006).
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that if the parties litigate and plainti¤ ! prevails at trial the defendant is liable
to plainti¤ ! for its damage claim !,16 that the parties bear their own litigation
costs,17 and that settlement costs are zero.18 Note that by (2.1), Q! > P! is a
su¢ cient (but not necessary) condition for settlement and P! > Q! is a necessary
(but not su¢ cient) condition for litigation.
The parties estimate the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial with
error. In particular, I assume that the partiesestimates are given by
P! = W! + !; (2.2)
Q! = W! + !; (2.3)
where (i) W! is the probability that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial and (ii) !
and ! represent the respective prediction errors of plainti¤ ! and the defendant.
I assume that ! and ! are independently realized at the beginning of stage 2 and
that each is uniformly distributed on the interval [maxf W!;W! 1g;minfW!; 1 
W!g]. The latter assumption ensures that the partiesestimates of the probability
that plainti¤ ! would prevail at trial are between zero and one (P! 2 [0; 1] and
Q! 2 [0; 1]) and are correct in expectation (E [P!] = E [Q!] = W!). As Figure 2.1
displays, this assumption also implies that the variance of the partiesprediction
errors is zero at W! = 0 and W! = 1, when the outcome of a trial is certain, and
achieves its maximum at W! = 12 , when the outcome of a trial is most uncertain
(cf. Priest and Klein 1984; Hylton 2006).
Given (2.2) and (2.3), we can restate condition (2.1) as follows: plainti¤ ! and
16That is, I assume the court accurately determines plainti¤ !s damages and awards compen-
satory but not punitive damages. I follow Che (1996) in making this assumption.
17This reects the American rule (see, e.g., Shavell 1982; Hylton 1993)
18This is a standard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Shavell 1982; Hylton 1993, 2006).
Alternatively, we could relax this assumption and then assume that litigation costs exceed settle-
ment costs, in which case C! and K! would denote the excess of litigation costs over settlement
costs for plainti¤ ! and the defendant, respectively.
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Figure 2.1: Variance of ! and ! as a Function of W!
the defendant settle rather than litigate their dispute if
!   ! 
C! +K!
!
: (2.4)
It follows that the probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant settle is
! = F(W!)

C! +K!
!

; (2.5)
where F(W!) is the cumulative distribution function of (W!) = !   !.19 Con-
versely, the probability that plainti¤ ! and the defendant litigate is 1  !.
We can infer from (2.4) and (2.5) how various factors generate litigation in the
model. Condition (2.4) implies that litigation may result from "overoptimism"
on the part of both parties (i.e., ! > 0 and ! < 0) (cf. Shavell 1982; Hylton
2006). Equation (2.5) implies that the probability that the parties litigate is weakly
decreasing in joint litigation costs, C!+K!, and weakly increasing in the litigation
19The distribution of (W!) is derived in the Appendix.
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stakes, ! (cf. Posner 1973; Hylton 2006). This is because F! is nondecreasing. In
addition, equation (2.5) implies that the probability of litigation is weakly greater
the more uncertain is the outcome of a trial (cf. Priest and Klein 1984; Hylton
2006). This is because F(W!) rst-order stochastically dominates F(W) on [0; 1]
if
W!   12  < W   12 .
B. Expected Recovery
If the parties litigate, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
L! = P!!   C!: (2.6)
If the parties settle, plainti¤! expects to recover its minimum settlement demand,
P!!  C!, plus its bargained-for share of the joint surplus from settlement, ! =
(Q!! +K!)   (P!!   C!). I assume that the parties divide the surplus !
in accordance with the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.20 Accordingly, if
! 2 [0; 1] represents plainti¤ !s bargaining power, plainti¤ ! expects to recover
S! = (P!!   C!) + !!
= ! (Q!! +K!) + (1  !) (P!!   C!) : (2.7)
Hence, plainti¤ !s expected recovery in stage 2 is
! = !
S
! + (1  !)L!
= !! (Q!! +K!) + (1  !!) (P!!   C!) : (2.8)
20Formally, the bargaining problem is hX!;0i, where X! = f(x!; xd) 2 R2+ : x! + xd = !g is
the set of possible divisions and 0 = (0; 0) is the disagreement point. If ! 2 [0; 1] represents plain-
ti¤ !s bargaining power, then the asymmetric Nash solution is (x!; x

d) = (!!; (1  !) !),
which is the unique solution to max(x!;xd)2X! (x!)
! (xd)
1 ! . For a discussion of the asymmet-
ric Nash bargaining solution, see, e.g., Muthoo (1999).
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This formulation of plainti¤ !s expected recovery relies on two presumptions.
First, it presumes that plainti¤! knows (or at least correctly estimates) the proba-
bility of settlement, !, but does not know the underlying data generating process
(i.e., equations (2.2) and (2.3)), which seems reasonable insofar as the plainti¤
(or its lawyer) has experience with or data on similar cases (cf. Priest and Klein
1984). Second, it presumes that the parties know (or at least learn) each others
reservation price. This is a common presumption in the literature (see, e.g., Bar-
Gill 2006). To support this presumption in our setting, it is su¢ cient (and seems
reasonable) to assume that, in stage 2, the defendant learns plainti¤ !s damage
claim (while continuing to assume that the damage claim of each class member
remains its private knowledge, unknown to the defendant, the other class mem-
bers, and any opt-out plainti¤s) and each party learns the other partys estimate
of the probability that the plainti¤ would prevail at trial (without updating its
own estimate).21
C. Additional Assumptions
Symmetry. On the basis that class certication under Rule 23(b)(3) implies
that the plainti¤s are "similarly situated" with respect to their factual and legal
claims against the defendant (Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23), I assume
that: (i) each individual plainti¤ has the same litigation costs and the defendants
litigation costs are the same with respect to each individual plainti¤:
C! = C and K! = K for all ! 6= A; (2.9)
CA = C and KA = K for jAj = 1; (2.10)
21The no updating assumption relies on the partiesignorance of the data generating process
(i.e., equations (2.2) and (2.3)).
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(ii) each plainti¤ has the same probability that it would prevail at trial:
W! = W for all ! 2 
A; and (2.11)
(iii) each plainti¤ has the same bargaining power in settlement negotiations:
w =  for all ! 2 
A: (2.12)
Economies of scale. Class certication under Rule 23(b)(3) also implies that
"a class action would achieve economies of time, e¤ort, and expense" (Advisory
Committees Notes to Rule 23). Accordingly, I assume that although litigation
costs are increasing in class size, per-plainti¤ litigation costs are weakly decreasing
in class size,22 but always positive:
CA  C and KA  K for jAj > 1; (2.13)
1
jAjCA 
1
jA0jCA0 and
1
jAjKA 
1
jA0jKA0 for all A;A
0  N , jAj > jA0j ; (2.14)
1
jAjCA ! c > 0 and
1
jAjKA ! k > 0 as jAj ! 1: (2.15)
Because the class enjoys neither a higher probability of prevailing at trial nor
enhanced bargaining power in settlement negotiations, these scale benets provide
the key incentive in the model for plainti¤s to remain in the class action.23 Indeed,
the per-plainti¤ net recovery is weakly increasing in class size and achieves its
maximum when the class includes all plainti¤s (i.e., when A = N).
22I follow Che (1996) in making this assumption, although he assumes that per-plainti¤ litiga-
tion costs are strictly decreasing in class size.
23Scale economies are the basic force that attracts plainti¤s to the class action in Ches (1996)
model as well.
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Viability of litigation. Consistent with Che (1996), I restrict attention to mass
tort cases in which litigation is objectively viable for each plainti¤:
W   C  0: (2.16)
Accordingly, the model does not pertain to mass torts for which a class action is
socially desirable because it solves a collective action problem. Rather, it pertains
to mass torts for which a class action is socially desirable because it achieves
economies of scale. Similarly, I assume that litigation against each plainti¤ is
objectively viable for the defendant:
W  K  0: (2.17)
2.2.2 Stage 1: Class Formation Game
The formation of the class is modeled as a noncooperative, simultaneous move,
single coalition formation game  , where: (i) the set of players is the set of all
plainti¤s, N ; (ii) the set of actions available to each plainti¤ is fIn;Outg; and (iii)
payo¤s are described by a per-member partition function V = R, where (a) 
is a partition function that assigns to each class structure 
A a vector  2 Rj
Aj
which species the expected recovery ! of each plainti¤ ! 2 
A in stage 2 and
(b) R is an allocation rule that maps each stage 2 expected recovery prole  into
a vector v 2 Rn which species the expected payo¤ vi of each plainti¤ i 2 N at
stage 1.
Under any allocation rule, the expected payo¤of each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 NnA
under class structure 
A is simply the expected value at stage 1 of its expected
recovery in stage 2. However, the expected payo¤ of each class member i 2 A un-
der class structure 
A depends on the allocation rule R. I consider the following
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three allocation rules, each of which is dened in terms of the vector of expected
payo¤s v it induces:
(R1) Equal sharing: vi(
A) =
8><>:
1
jAjE [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
;
(R2) Pro rata by damage claims: vi(
A) =
8><>:
i
A
E [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
;
(R3) Pro rata by outside options: vi(
A) =
8><>:
E[i]P
j2A E[j ]
E [A] for i 2 A
E [i] for i 2 NnA
:
The class structure 
A is stable if, given the announcements of the other plain-
ti¤s, no class member could increase its expected payo¤ by opting out of the class
and no opt-out plainti¤could increase its expected payo¤by remaining in the class.
Formally, for a class member i 2 A, let 
A i denote the alternative class structure
in which plainti¤ i opts out of the class action, i.e., 
A i =
n
Anfig; i; (j)j2NnA
o
.
I refer to vi(
A i) as class member is outside option. Similarly, for an opt-out
plainti¤ i 2 NnA, let 
A+i denote the alternative class structure in which plainti¤ i
remains the class action, i.e., 
A+i =
n
A [ fig; (j)j2NnA[fig
o
. I refer to vi(
A+i) as
opt-out plainti¤ is inside option. The class structure 
A is internally stable if for
each class member i 2 A its expected payo¤ under 
A is greater than its outside
option:
vi(

A)  vi(
A i) for all i 2 A: (2.18)
The class structure 
A is externally stable if for each opt-out plainti¤ i 2 NnA its
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expected payo¤ under 
A is greater than or equal to its inside option:
vi(

A)  vi(
A+i) for all i 2 NnA: (2.19)
The class structure 
A is stable if it is both internally stable and externally stable.
Note that this notion of stability corresponds to the concept of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium: the class structure 
A is stable if and only if the announcement prole
that induces 
A constitutes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of game  .24
For purposes of this chapter, I focus on the stability of the class structure 
N ,
which consists of the class of all plainti¤s, A = N , and no opt-out plainti¤s. I refer
to 
N as the global class. Note that the global class is stable provided it is internally
stable; it is trivially externally stable because there are no opt-out plainti¤s. I focus
on the global class for two reasons. First, it is the default class structure. The
global class is formed by operation of law upon certication of a class action under
Rule 23. Second, it presumably is the e¢ cient class structure. Class certication
under Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of all plainti¤s implies that "a class action is superior
to other available methods for fairly and e¢ ciently adjudicating the controversy"
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)) and that it is inappropriate to divide the global class
into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)).
In particular, I examine the asymptotic stability of the global class.
Definition 2.1 The global class is asymptotically stable if and only if for every
plainti¤ i 2 N , plim
n!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0.
According to Denition 2.1, the global class is asymptotically stable if and only
if the probability that it is (internally) stable converges to one as the number of
24This notion of stability was introduced by dAspremont et al. (1983). My formulation closely
follows Weikard (2009).
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plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large.25 As noted above, I examine the asymptotic
stability of the global class because the situation under consideration is a mass
tort class action in which the class is "numerous" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
2.3 ASYMPTOTIC STABILITY OF THE GLOBAL CLASS
This section examines the asymptotic stability of the global class under each allo-
cation rule. I show that the global class is asymptotically stable if the net recovery
of the class is allocated pro rata in accordance with the membersoutside options
(R3), but that the global class is not necessarily asymptotically stable if the net
recovery of the class is shared equally by the members (R1) or allocated pro rata
in accordance with their damage claims (R2). For R1 and R2, I derive necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability of the global class as well as
su¢ cient conditions for the asymptotic stability and instability of the global class.
In addition, I show that the asymptotic stability of the global class under R1 nec-
essarily implies the asymptotic stability of the global class under and R2 but not
vice versa.
Before proceeding with the analysis by allocation rule, I note the following
prefatory results, which hold for every allocation rule.
Lemma 2.1 Take any allocation rule.
(a) Take any A  N . Then for all i 2 NnA, i  A if and only if
i >

C+K
1
jAj (CA+KA)

1
jAjA

.
(b) Dene (1) = min
1in
i and (1) = F(W )

C+K
(1)

. Then (1)  N .
(c) Dene (n) = max
1in
i and (n) = F(W )

C+K
(n)

. Then:
25To see this, note that plim
n!1
 
vi(

A)  vi(
A i)

= d  0 if and only if for all e > 0,
lim
n!1Pr(
 vi(
A)  vi(
A i)  d < e) = 1.
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(i) plim
n!1
(n) = ;
(ii) plim
n!1
 
(n)   N
  0 if  >  C+K
c+k

E []; and
(iii) plim
n!1
 
(n)   N
  0 if  <  C+K
c+k

E [].
Proof. (a) Follows immediately from the fact that F(W ) is nondecreasing.
(b) By assumptions (2.13)-(2.15) and because f is strictly positive on [; ],
we have C+K1
n
(CN+KN )
 1 > (1)1
n
N
. Because F(W ) is nondecreasing, this implies
(1) = F(W )

C+K
(1)

 F(W )

CN+KN
N

= N .
(c) (i) For any " > 0, Pr
 (n)     " = Pr  (n)   + "+Pr  (n)     ".
Note that Pr
 
(n)   + "

= 0 (because i   for all i 2 N). Note further that
Pr
 
(n)     "

=

F(   ")
n
(see, e.g., Casella and Berger 2002, thm. 5.4.4)
and that F(  ") 2 [0; 1) (because  is the upper bound of the support set of F).
It follows that limn!1 Pr
 (n)     " = limn!1 F(   e)n = 0.
(ii)-(iii) Because F(W ) is continuous, plimn!1 (n) = F(W )

C+K


and
plimn!1 N = F(W )

c+k
E[]

by the continuous mapping theorem (see, e.g., Casella
and Berger 2002, thm. 5.5.4). Because F(W ) is nondecreasing,  >
 
C+K
c+k

E []
implies plimn!1
 
(n)   N

= plimn!1 (n) plimn!1 N  0 and  <
 
C+K
c+k

E []
implies plimn!1
 
(n)   N

= plimn!1 (n)   plimn!1 N  0.
Lemma 2.1(a) says that an opt-out plainti¤ is less likely to settle, and therefore
more likely to litigate, than the class if and only if its damage claim exceeds the
average damage claim of the class members by a factor greater than the scale bene-
t of the class action. Lemma 2.1(b) says that the member of the global class with
the lowest damage claim would be more likely to settle, and therefore less likely to
litigate, than the global class were that member to opt out. Lemma 2.1(c)(i) says
that, as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large, the probability that
at least one plainti¤ has the maximum damage claim converges to one. Lemmas
2.1(c)(ii) and (iii) say that, as the number of plainti¤s becomes arbitrarily large,
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the probability that the member of the global class with the highest damage claim
would be less (more) likely to settle, and therefore more (less) likely to litigate,
than the global class were that member to opt out converges to one, provided that
the factor by which the maximum damage claim exceeds the expected damage
claim is greater (less) than the maximum scale benet of a class action.
2.3.1 Equal sharing (R1)
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
asymptotic stability of the global class under equal sharing.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose the allocation rule is R1. Then the global class is as-
ymptotically stable if and only if
  E [] + 1 (2.20)
where 1 =
1
W

(C   c) + 
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
Proof. Under R1, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N) =
1
n
E [N ]
= N

E [QN ]
N
n
+
KN
n

+ (1  N)

E [PN ]
N
n
  CN
n

=

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

:
In addition, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N
 i) = E [i]
= i (E [Qi] i +K) + (1  i) (E [Pi] i   Ci)
= (Wi   C) + i (C +K) :
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Note plimn!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0, plimn!1 vi(
N)  plimn!1 vi(
N i)  0.
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as
plainti¤ (n). That is, (n) = max1in i. Because (n)  i and (n)  i for
all i 2 N , we have plimn!1 v(n)(
N (n))  plimn!1 vi(
N i) for all i 2 N . It
follows that plimn!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N , plimn!1 v(n)(
N) 
plimn!1 v(n)(

N
 (n))  0.
By assumption, N
n
= E[]n
n
= E []. By assumption (2.15), plimn!1
CN
n
= c
and plimn!1
CN+KN
n
= c + k. By Lemma 1(c), plimn!1 N = F(W )

c+k
E[]

,
plimn!1 (n) = , and plimn!1 (n) = F(W )

C+K


. Thus,
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N) = plim
n!1

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

= (WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)
and
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N
 (n)) = plim
n!1
 
W(n)   C

+ (n) (C +K)

=
 
W   C+ F(W )C +K


(C +K) :
Therefore, plimn!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N
, (WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)
   W   C  F(W )C +K


(C +K)  0
,   E [] + 1
W

(C   c) + 
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
The following results follow from Proposition 2.1.
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Corollary 2.1 Suppose the allocation rule is R1. Then:
(a) The global class is not asymptotically stable if E [] <    .
(b) If E [] >    , then:
(i) the global class is asymptotically stable if C+K
c+k
is su¢ ciently high and 
is su¢ ciently low; and
(ii) the global class is not asymptotically stable if C+K
c+k
is su¢ ciently low and
either W is su¢ ciently high or  is su¢ ciently low.
Proof. (a) Assume E [] <    . It follows that  > E [] + 1 if 1  . By
denition,
1 =
1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

:
Let
  = 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

:
If   < 0, then 1  CW   because W   C  0. If   > 0, then
1 
1
W

(C   c) +

(c+ k)  1
2
(C +K)

because  2 [0; 1] and F(W )(z) 2

1
2
; 1

for z  0. It follows that
1 
1
2

C
W
+
K
W

 
because k  K, W   C  0, and W  K  0.
(b) (i) Assume E [] >    . Suppose  = 0. Then 1 = C cW . Recall that
W   C  0. It follows that 1     cW . Because C + K  2W, C+Kc+k ! 1
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implies c + k ! 0, which in turn implies c ! 0. Therefore, 1 !  from below
as C+K
c+k
! 1. It follows that there exists x > 0 such that C+K
c+k
> x implies
E [] +  > E [] + 1 > . Therefore, by continuity of 1, there exist  > 0 and
x > 0 such that if  <  then C+Kc+k > x implies  < E [] + 1.
(ii) Suppose C+K
c+k
= 1 and W = 1. Note that because 0 < c  C and 0 <
k  K, C+K
c+k
= 1 implies C = c. Note further that because F(1)

c+k
E[]

=
F(1)

C+K


= 1, W = 1 implies 1 = ((C   c) +  [(c+ k)  (C +K)]). It
follows that 1 = 0 when
C+K
c+k
= 1 and W = 1. Therefore, by continuity of
1, there exist C > 1 and W < 1 such that if
C+K
c+k
< C and W > W then
1 <  E []. Now suppose C+Kc+k = 1 and  = 0. Because C+Kc+k = 1 implies C = c,
it follows that 1 = 0. Therefore, by continuity of 1, there exist C > 1 and  > 0
such that if C+K
c+k
< C and  <  then 1 <    E [].
Corollary 2.1(a) implies that a key determinant of the asymptotic stability
of the global class under R1 is the shape of the distribution of the plainti¤s
damage claims. It suggests that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically
stable under R1 if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage
claims is narrow. If the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims is unimodal,
Corollary 2.1(a) implies that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically
stable under R1 if the distribution is negatively skewed. Corollary 2.1(b) suggests
that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable underR1 if the scale
benets of a class action are high and the plainti¤sbargaining power in settlement
negotiations is low. If the scale benets of a class action are low, however, Corollary
2.1(b) suggests that the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable under
R1 if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or their bargaining
power in settlement negotiations is low.
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2.3.2 Pro Rata by Damage Claims (R2)
The following proposition sets forth a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the
asymptotic stability of the global class if the net recovery of the class is allocated
pro rata in accordance with the membersdamage claims.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose the allocation rule is R2. Then the global class is as-
ymptotically stable if and only if
  C
c
E [] + 2 (2.21)
where 2 =

c
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
Proof. Under R2, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N) =
i
N
E [N ] =
i
1
n
N
1
n
E [N ]
=
i
1
n
N

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

:
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as
plainti¤ (n). By the same logic in the proof of Proposition 2.1, it follows that
plim
n!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N , plim
n!1
v(n)(

N)  plim
n!1
v(n)(

N
 (n))  0:
Now
plim
n!1
v(n)(

N) = plim
n!1

(n)
1
n
N

W
N
n
  CN
n

+ N

CN +KN
n

:
=

E []

(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

:
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Therefore, plimn!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N
, 
E []

(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

   W   C  F(W )C +K


(C +K)  0
, WE []    c + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)
 WE []  + CE []  E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  0
,   C
c
E [] + 
c
h
F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K)
i
.
The following results follow from Proposition 2.2.
Corollary 2.2 Suppose the allocation rule is R2. Then:
(a) The global class is asymptotically stable if C+K
c+k
is su¢ ciently high and  is
su¢ ciently low; in particular, if
C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
and   c CE[]
F(W )( c+kE[])(c+k) E[]F(W )(C+K )(C+K)
.
(b) The global class is asymptotically stable if

E[]
  K
c
  
1 + k
c
 1  C+K
c+k
 
E[]
.
(c) The global class is not asymptotically stable if C+K
c+k
is su¢ ciently low and
either (i) W is su¢ ciently high and  < C or (ii)  is su¢ ciently low.
Proof. (a) Rewrite condition (2.21) as 2     Cc E []. This holds if


F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 c   CE [] :
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Now if C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
, then F(W )

c+k
E[]

< F(W )

C+K


because F(W ) is non-
decreasing. It follows that C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
F(W )( c+kE[])
F(W )(C+K )
, or F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k) <
E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K). In addition, C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
implies c < CE []. To see
this, let C+K
c+k
= x. Then we have C
c
=
 
1 + k
c

x   K
c
< x < 
E[]
. It follows that
condition (2.21) holds if C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
and   c CE[]
F(W )( c+kE[])(c+k) E[]F(W )(C+K )(C+K)
.
(b) Suppose C+K
c+k
 
E[]
. Then F(W )

c+k
E[]

> F(W )

C+K


. It follows that
C+K
c+k
 
E[]
F(W )( c+kE[])
F(W )(C+K )
, or F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C+K


(C +K).
Thus, C+K
c+k
 
E[]
implies 2  0. It follows that if C+Kc+k  E[] , then condition
(2.21) holds if   C
c
E []. Now let C+K
c+k
= x. Then C
c
=
 
1 + k
c

x   K
c
and we
can rewrite the foregoing condition as    1 + k
c

x   K
c
E []. This holds if x 

E[]
  K
c
  
1 + k
c
 1
. Therefore, condition (2.21) holds if


E[]
  K
c
  
1 + k
c
 1 
C+K
c+k
 
E[]
.
(c) (i) Suppose C+K
c+k
= 1, W = 1, and C > . Let g = C
c
E [] + 2. We know
from the proof of Corollary 2.1(b)(ii) that C+K
c+k
= 1 implies C = c and thatW = 1
implies 2 =

c

 (c+ k)  E [] (C +K). It follows that g = 
C
  1  
C

E [] <
 when C+K
c+k
= 1, W = 1, and C > . Therefore, by continuity of g, there exist
C > 1 and W < 1 such that if C+Kc+k < C and W > W and C >  then g < .
(ii) Let g = C
c
E [] + 2. From part (i) above we know that C = c when
C+K
c+k
= 1. It follows that g = E [] <  when C+K
c+k
= 1 and  = 0. Therefore, by
continuity of g, there exist C > 1 and  > 0 such that if C+Kc+k < C and  < 
then g < .
The results of Corollaries 2.2(a) and (c) closely resemble those of Corollaries
2.1(b)(i) and (ii). They suggest that if the scale benets of a class action are
high, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under R2 if the
plainti¤sbargaining power in settlement negotiations is low, and that if the scale
benets of a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically
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stable under R2 if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or their
bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. Corollary 2.2(b) suggests that,
irrespective of the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial or bargaining power
in settlement negotiations, the global class is likely to be asymptotically stable
under R2 if the maximum scale benets of a class action are close to (but do not
exceed) the ratio of the maximum damage claim to the expected damage claim.
It is interesting to note how the results of Lemma 2.1 inform certain results of
Corollaries 2.1 and 2.2. First, Corollaries 2.1(b)(i) and 2.2(a) indicate that even
if the scale benets of a class action are high, damage averaging may lead the
global class to unravel if the plainti¤sbargaining power in settlement negotiations
is high. Lemma 2.1(c) suggests why: when the scale benets of a class action are
high, the probability of reaching a settlement (and realizing the benets of their
high bargaining power) is greater for opt-plainti¤s than it is for the global class.
Second, Corollaries 2.1(b)(ii) and 2.2(c) indicate that when the scale benets of a
class action are low, damage averaging may lead the global class to unravel if the
plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high. Again Lemma 2.1(c) suggests
why: when the scale benets of a class action are low, the probability of litigation
(and realizing the benets of their high probability of prevailing at trial) is greater
for opt-out plainti¤s than it is for the global class.
The following proposition states that asymptotic stability of the global class
under R1 necessarily implies asymptotic stability of the global class under R2 but
not vice versa.
Proposition 2.3 If the global class is asymptotically stable under R1, then the
global class is asymptotically stable under R2. If the global class is asymptotically
stable under R2, however, the global class may or may not be asymptotically stable
under R1.
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Proof. Assume   E [] + 1. This implies 1 > 0 because E [] < . It follows
that
1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

> 0;
which implies
F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k) > F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  (C   c) :
Recall that W   C > 0,  < E [] < , and 0 < c  C. This implies W   c >
WE []  c > 0. In addition, note that F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k) > 0. It follows that

W   c
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

>

WE []  c
c

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)  (C   c)

;
which implies

WE []  c
c

(C   c) >

WE []  c
c

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 

W   c
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

:
It follows that

C   c
c

E [] >

C   c
W

+

E []
c
  1
W

F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

 


c
  1
W

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)

;
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which implies
C
c
E []  E []
>
1
W

(C   c) + 

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

  
c

F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  E []F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

;
or
C
c
E []  E [] > 1   2:
Hence, E [] + 1 <
C
c
E [] + 2. Thus,   E [] + 1 implies  < Cc E [] + 2.
2.3.3 Pro Rata by Outside Options (R3)
The following proposition states that the global class is asymptotically stable if
the net recovery of the class is allocated to the members pro rata in accordance
with their outside options.
Proposition 2.4 Suppose the allocation rule is R3. Then the global class is as-
ymptotically stable.
Proof. Under R3, for all i 2 N ,
vi(

N) =
E [i]Pn
j=1E [j]
E [N ] =
E [i]Pn
j=1
1
n
E [j]
1
n
E [N ] :
Without loss of generality, label the plainti¤ with the highest damage claim as
plainti¤ (n). By the same logic in the proof of Proposition 2.1, it follows that
plim
n!1
 
vi(

N)  vi(
N i)
  0 for all i 2 N , plim
n!1
 
v(n)(

N)  v(n)(
N (n))
  0:
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Now
plim
n!1
 
v(n)(

N)  v(n)
 

N (n)

= plim
n!1
 
E

(n)
Pn
j=1
1
n
E [j]
1
n
E [N ]  E

(n)
!
= plim
n!1
  
1
n
E [N ]Pn
j=1
1
n
E [j]
  1
!
E

(n)
!
= plim
n!1
0B@

W
N
n
 CN
n
+N

CN+KN
n

W
N
n
 C+( 1n
Pn
j=1 j)(C+K)
  1

 W(n)   C + (n)(C +K)
1CA
=
0@ WE []  c+ F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)
WE []  C + 

plimn!1

1
n
Pn
j=1 j

(C +K)
  1
1A


W   C + F(W )

C +K


(C +K)

:
Note that
plim
n!1
 
1
n
nX
j=1
j
!
= plim
n!1

1
n
"
plim
n!1
 
nX
j=1
j
!#
= plim
n!1

1
n
Z C+K

C+K

F(W ) (x) dx = 0
because
R C+K

C+K

F(W ) (x) dx 
R C+K

C+K

dx = C+K

  C+K

<1. In addition, note that
(WE []  c) + F(W )

c+ k
E []

(c+ k)  WE []  C
because C  c > 0 and F(W )

c+k
E[]

(c+ k)  0. Lastly, note that W   C > 0
because W   C  0 and  < . Thus, plimn!1

v(n)(

N)  v(n)(
N (n))

 0.
2.4 MASS TORT SIMULATIONS
In an e¤ort to understand the relative stability of the global class under the three al-
location rules, I simulate the model using standard Monte Carlo methods. For pur-
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Figure 2.2: Three Densities of i on [1; 4]
poses of the simulations, I assume that i =
 
   Xi+, whereXi iid Beta(; ).
That is, I assume that i follows a Beta distribution on the interval

; 

with shape
parameters  and . Figure 2.2 illustrates three densities of i on [1; 4] for di¤erent
shape parameters (; ).
To simulate each mass tort, I follow eight steps/assumptions:
1.  = 1; 000; 000[min(x; y)] and  = 1; 000; 000[max(x; y)], where x and y are
drawn from Uniform(0; 7). I assume that the maximum possible value of 
is $7 million because it is the median estimated value of a statistical life in
the literature (Viscusi and Aldy 2003).
2. Draw  and  from Uniform(0; 20).
3. E[] = (   )


+

+ .
4. C = 1
3
E[]. This reects the standard contingency fee (Eisenberg and Miller
2004a, p. 35).
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Figure 2.3: Selected Histograms (Raw Data)
5. c = tC, where t is drawn from Uniform(0; 1).
6. k = 2zc, where z is drawn from Beta(10; 10).
7. K = (1 + )k, where  is drawn from Uniform(0; 1).
8. Draw W and  from Uniform(0; 1).
I repeat steps 1-8 250,000 times to generate the raw data. Figure 2.3 contains
histograms for four variables:  (thetal),  (thetah) E[] (etheta), and C+K
c+k
(ratio).
To generate the dataset for the stability analysis, I keep only those observations
where W   C  0 and W   K  0. This leaves me with 93,980 observations.
Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics for the dataset.
Analyzing the dataset for class stability, I nd that the frequency with which
the global class is asymptotically stable is 0.276 underR1 (equal sharing) and 0.693
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics (Dataset)
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
 93; 980 3; 063; 788 1; 544; 757 12; 534 6; 973; 400
 93; 980 4; 655; 124 1; 654; 862 21; 595 6; 999; 908
 93; 980 9:206 5:894 0:000 20:000
 93; 980 10:629 5:682 0:000 20:000
E [] 93; 980 3; 728; 501 1; 600; 845 17; 566 6; 986; 195
W 93; 980 0:729 0:172 0:334 1:000
 93; 980 0:499 0:289 0:000 1:000
C 93; 980 1; 242; 834 533; 615 5; 855 2; 328; 732
K 93; 980 832; 080 694; 572 7 5; 684; 206
c 93; 980 581; 086 454; 446 7 2; 311; 018
k 93; 980 566; 977 462; 238 7 3; 241; 751
under R2 (pro rata by damage claims). In addition, I nd that the frequency with
which the global class is asymptotically stable under R1 conditional on asymptotic
stability under R2 is 0.398 and that the frequency with which the global class is
asymptotically stable under R2 conditional on asymptotic stability under R1 is
1.00.
Thus, as compared to R3, the global class is asymptotically stable about two-
thirds as often under R2 and about a quarter as often under R1. Moreover, when
the global class is asymptotically stable underR1, it is always asymptotically stable
under R2 as well, but when the global class is asymptotically stable under R2, it
is asymptotically stable under R1 about two-fths of the time. Loosely speaking,
therefore, the results suggest that R1 is about two-fths as stable as R2 which is
about two-thirds as stable as R3.
Analyzing the dataset for the determinants of class stability, I nd that the
simulations conrm the theoretical results in Section 2.3. Conditional frequency
tabulations conrm the sharp results in Corollaries 2.1(a) and 2.2(a) and (b): the
global class is never asymptotically stable under R1 when the expected damage
claim is less than the di¤erence between the maximum and minimum damage
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claims (E[] <    ), and the global class is always asymptotically stable under
R2 when the conditions set forth in Corollary 2.2(a) or (b) are satised.
Tables 2.2-2.5 and Figure 2.4 generally conrm the qualitative results in Corol-
laries 2.1(b)(i) and (ii) and 2.2(c). Table 2.2 reports the means of key variables
for the raw data, for the dataset, and for the subsets of the dataset in which the
global class is asymptotically stable under R1 and R2 (which subsets I label ASR1
and ASR2, respectively). It also reports p-values of t-tests comparing the means in
ASR1 or ASR2, as the case may be, with those in the dataset. For each of R1 and
R2, Table 2.3 compares the means of key variables for the subsets of the dataset in
which the global class is and is not asymptotically stable thereunder and reports
p-values of t-tests comparing these means. Figure 2.4 compares the histograms for
four variables E[] (etheta),  (lambda),    (range), and C+K
c+k
(ratio) for the
subsets of the dataset in which the global class is and is not asymptotically stable
under R1. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report estimates from four logit regressions. The
dependent variable of the model in the left column of Table 2.4 indicates whether
the global class is asymptotically stable under R1; the dependent variable of the
model in the right column indicates whether the global class is asymptotically
stable under R2. The dependent variable of both models in Table 2.5 indicates
whether the global class is asymptotically stable under R2; the di¤erence between
the models is that the model in the left column is restricted to observations for
which C+K
c+k
< 
E[]
and the model in the right column is restricted to observations
for which C+K
c+k
> 
E[]
.
The results on , , E [], and    in Tables 2.2-2.4 and on E [] (etheta) and
    (range) in Figure 2.4 show that class stability under R1 is associated with
negatively skewed claims distributions over narrow damages ranges. Likewise, the
results on C+K
c+k
, W , and  in Tables 2.2-2.4 and on C+K
c+k
(ratio) and  (lambda)
in Figure 2.4 show that class stability under R1 and R2 is associated with high
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Table 2.2: Means Comparisons
Raw Data Dataset R1 R2
Variable Mean Mean Mean P Mean P
 2; 330; 078 3; 063; 788 3; 775; 801 0:000 3; 014; 127 0:000
 4; 663; 202 4; 655; 124 4; 658; 449 0:747 4; 655; 194 0:991
 9:998 9:206 11:047 0:000 9:149 0:013
 10:005 10:629 8:709 0:000 10:670 0:064
E [] 3; 497; 359 3; 728; 501 4; 329; 306 0:000 3; 696; 148 0:000
W 0:501 0:729 0:676 0:000 0:723 0:000
 0:500 0:499 0:322 0:000 0:447 0:000
    2; 333; 124 1; 591; 336 882; 647 0:000 1; 641; 067 0:000
C+K
c+k
6:522 7:433 13:55 0:013 9:98 0:028
Obs 250; 000 93; 980 25; 907 65; 129
Table 2.3: Additional Means Comparisons
R1 R2
Variable Not AS AS P Not AS AS P
 2; 792; 812 3; 775; 801 0:000 3; 175; 894 3; 014; 127 0:000
 4; 653; 859 4; 658; 449 0:704 4; 654; 967 4; 655; 194 0:985
 8:506 11:047 0:000 9:335 9:149 0:000
 11:360 8:709 0:000 10:536 10:670 0:001
E [] 3; 499; 848 4; 329; 306 0:000 3; 801; 535 3; 696; 148 0:000
W 0:750 0:676 0:000 0:743 0:723 0:000
 0:566 0:322 0:000 0:615 0:447 0:000
    1; 861; 047 882; 647 0:000 1; 479; 073 1; 641; 067 0:000
C+K
c+k
5:11 13:55 0:000 1:69 9:98 0:000
Obs 68; 073 25; 907 28; 851 65; 129
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Note For each variable, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the equivalence of the distributions.
Figure 2.4: Selected Histograms (Dataset)
Table 2.4: Logit Regressions
ASR1 ASR2
Odds Robust Odds Robust
Variable Ratio Std Err P Ratio Std Err P
 1:122 0:002 0:000 0:999 0:001 0:474
 0:868 0:002 0:000 1:000 0:001 0:957
E [] (millions) 1:751 0:015 0:000 0:951 0:005 0:000
    (millions) 0:165 0:003 0:000 1:154 0:009 0:000
C+K
c+k
2:365 0:025 0:000 3:508 0:066 0:000
W (x10) 0:709 0:005 0:000 0:921 0:005 0:000
 (x10) 0:488 0:002 0:000 0:767 0:002 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:557 0:218
Obs 88; 308 88; 308
Note Regressions exclude observations with C+K
c+k
 10.
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Table 2.5: Additional Logit Regressions
ASR2

C+K
c+k
< 
E[]

ASR2

C+K
c+k
> 
E[]

Odds Robust Odds Robust
Variable Ratio Std Err P Ratio Std Err P
 1:024 0:006 0:000 0:988 0:002 0:000
 0:991 0:004 0:040 1:005 0:002 0:008
E [] (millions) 0:990 0:019 0:616 0:898 0:006 0:000
    (millions) 1:027 0:018 0:126 1:371 0:015 0:000
C+K
c+k
5:132 0:410 0:000 4:409 0:113 0:000
W (x10) 0:869 0:012 0:000 0:904 0:005 0:000
 (x10) 1:602 0:014 0:000 0:589 0:003 0:000
Pseudo R2 0:261 0:376
Obs 13; 991 74; 317
Note Regressions exclude observations with C+K
c+k
 10.
scale benets, low probabilities of plainti¤ prevailing at trial, and low plainti¤
bargaining power. Finally, the the results on  in Table 2.5 highlight the nuance
that when the scale benets of a class action are low, class stability under R2 is
associated with high plainti¤ bargaining power.
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter examines the asymptotic stability of the global class in a Rule 23(b)(3)
mass tort class action under three rules for allocating the net recovery of the class
among its members: (1) equal sharing; (2) pro rata by damage claims; and (3)
pro rata by outside options. I analyze a two-stage model of class action formation
in which a single defendant faces multiple plainti¤s with heterogeneous damage
claims. A global class action is certied at the outset. In stage 1, the formation
of the class is modeled as a noncooperative, simultaneous move, single coalition
formation game in partition function form. In stage 2, the resolution via litigation
or settlement of the class action and any individual actions by opt-out plainti¤s
is modeled in the divergent expectations tradition and assumes that if the parties
102
settle their dispute they divide the joint surplus from settlement according to the
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution.
I show that the global class is asymptotically stable under rule 3, but may not
be asymptotically stable under rules 1 and 2. The shape of the distribution of the
plainti¤sdamage claims proves to be a key determinant of class stability under rule
1. In particular, I nd that the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable
under rule 1 if the expected damage claim is high and the range of damage claims
is narrow, which suggests that if the distribution of the plainti¤sdamage claims
is unimodal then the global class is more likely to be asymptotically stable under
rule 1 if the distribution is negatively skewed. I also nd that the scale benets
of the class action and the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial and their
bargaining power in settlement negotiations are important determinants of class
stability. Under rules 1 and 2, the global class is more likely to be asymptotically
stable when the scale benets of a class action are high and when the plainti¤s
bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low. When the scale benets of
a class action are low, the global class is less likely to be asymptotically stable
under rules 1 and 2 if the plainti¤sprobability of prevailing at trial is high or
their bargaining power in settlement negotiations is low.
To supplement the theoretical analysis, I perform Monte Carlo simulations and
compare the relative stability of the global class under the three allocation rules.
As compared to rule 3, the global class is asymptotically stable about two-thirds
as often under rule 2 and about a quarter as often under rule 1. The simulations
also conrm my ndings regarding the determinants of class stability.
My results highlight a general tradeo¤between ex ante and ex post e¢ ciency in
selecting an allocation rule in a Rule 23(b)(3) mass tort class action. The tradeo¤
exists because the governing allocation rules degree of damage averaging is pos-
itively related to the risk that the class will unravel due to adverse selection but
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negatively related to the cost of implementing the allocation rule. However, the
results also provide guidance regarding when this tradeo¤ may be avoided. Ac-
cordingly, they suggest criteria to courts for evaluating whether the predominance
and superiority requirements for class certication are satised. For example, if
the plainti¤sdamage claims are positively skewed over a wide range then per-
haps the court should not nd that common questions of law or fact predominate
over individual questions, or if even a mild degree of damage averaging is likely to
destabilize the class then perhaps the court should not nd that a class action is
superior in terms of e¢ ciency. The results also suggest criteria to attorneys and
courts for structuring and approving e¢ cient allocation plans. Given that class
actions scholars (and presumably courts) view the standards for judicial review of
class action settlements as "confused" and the numerous multifactor tests elabo-
rated by courts as "uncertain in scope, ambiguous in meaning and undened in
weight" (Macey and Miller 2009, pp. 167-168), this would appear to be a welcome
contribution.
There are several ways in which this chapter could be extended. First, we could
relax the assumption that each opt-out plainti¤must pursue its claim individually.
This would require redening the stability concept from Nash equilibrium to strong
Nash equilibrium (Aumann 1959) or coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim
et al. 1987).26 Although allowing plainti¤s to form subcoalitions would make the
analysis more general,27 it is not warranted in our setting. The assumption that
opt-out plainti¤ pursue their claims individually rests on two presumptions, each
26Informally, a strategy prole constitutes a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) if it is immune to
deviations by coalitions. A strategy prole constitutes a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE)
if it is immune to credible deviations by coalitions, i.e., coalitional deviations that themselves are
immune to further deviations by subcoalitions. For formal denitions of SNE and CPNE, see,
e.g., Bloch (2003).
27One consequence of relaxing this assumption would be that Proposition 2.3 would no longer
hold; that is, allocating the net recovery of the class to the members pro rata in accordance with
their outside options would no longer ensure the asymptotic stability of the global class.
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of which is consistent with the premise that a global class action has been certi-
ed under Rule 23(b)(3). First, it presumes that no other court would certify a
separate class action on behalf of some or all opt-out plainti¤s, which is consis-
tent with the fact that the court did not deem it appropriate to divide the global
class into subclasses (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)). Second, it presumes that search
costs, personal jurisdiction requirements, or other transaction costs preclude opt-
out plainti¤s from maintaining one or more joinder actions under Rule 20, which is
consistent with the fact that the court determined that "the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)).
Second, we could relax the assumption that there are no externalities or spillovers
across plainti¤s. In particular, we could assume that the class action is resolved
rst and that the existence or size of the class a¤ects the expected recovery of
opt-out plainti¤s.28 For example, we could assume that the class action increases
the probability that opt-out plainti¤s would prevail at trial due to the potential for
a factual or legal determination in favor of the class to be given preclusive e¤ect
against the defendant in a subsequent individual action by an opt-out plainti¤ un-
der the doctrine of nonmutual o¤ensive collateral estoppel.29 We also could relax
the assumptions that the defendants assets are su¢ cient to satisfy all damage
claims and that all plainti¤s have the same priority in bankruptcy. Instead, we
could assume that the class action reduces the expected payo¤ for opt-out plainti¤s
due to the potential that, after the resolution of the class action, the defendant
28We also could consider making the timing of litigation/settlement endogenous, as in Marceau
and Mongrain (2003).
29Under this assumption, if the class settles or losses at trial, the probability that an opt-out
plainti¤ prevails in a subsequent trial is W , but if the class prevails at trial, the probability
that an opt-out plainti¤ prevails in a subsequent trial is Y > W . Accordingly, by the law of
total probability, the ex ante probability that an opt-out plaintif would prevail at trial is W+ =
[A + (1  A) (1 W )]W + [(1  A)W ]Y > W . The class action, therefore, increases the
expected payo¤of pursuing individual litigation against the defendant, which serves to undermine
the stability of the global class. On the topic of preclusion in class action litigation, see generally
Wol¤ (2005).
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will not have su¢ cient assets available to satisfy the damage claims of all opt-out
plainti¤s.
Third, we could relax the symmetry assumptions. For instance, we could con-
sider the possibility that the class may enjoy enhanced bargaining as compared to
individual plainti¤s (Silver 2000; Che 2002). We also could imagine that a plain-
ti¤s bargaining power may be a function of the probability that it would prevail
at trial.
Fourth, we could extend the model to give class members a second opportunity
to opt out in stage 2 in the event of a proposed settlement of the class action.
Extending the model to include a second opt-out would be consistent with the
2003 amendments to Rule 23, which, among other things, authorizes the court to
refuse to approve a settlement in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action unless it a¤ords class
members a second opportunity to opt out after the terms of the settlement are
known (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(3); Advisory Committees Notes to Rule 23).
Lastly, we could generalize the model to cover all possible allocations rules
(i.e., all degrees of damage averaging). Technically, this would entail modeling the
recovery to a plainti¤ as a linear combination of his own damage claim and the
average damage claim of the class. We also could modify or generalize the model
to apply to or encompass other nonmandatory claim aggregation mechanisms.
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APPENDIX
DISTRIBUTION OF (W )
Let ";   Uniform(a; b) and dene  = "   . It can be shown that the
probability density function of  is
f(z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
z+(b a)
(b a)2 a  b  z  0
(b a) z
(b a)2 0 < z  b  a
0 otherwise
:
It follows that the cumulative distribution function of  is
F(z) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 z < a  b
1
2

z+(b a)
(b a)
2
a  b  z  0
1  1
2

(b a) z
(b a)
2
0 < z  b  a
1 z  b  a
:
If W 2 [0; 1
2
], then a =  W and b = W , which implies
f(W )(z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
z+2W
4W 2
 2W  z  0
2W z
4W 2
0 < z  2W
0 otherwise
and
F(W )(z) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 z <  2W
1
2
 
z+2W
2W
2  2W  z  0
1  1
2
 
2W z
2W
2
0 < z  2W
1 z > 2W
:
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If W 2 [1
2
; 1], then a = W   1 and b = 1 W , which implies
f(W )(z) =
8>>>><>>>>:
z+2(1 W )
4(1 W )2 2(W   1)  z  0
2(1 W ) z
4(1 W )2 0 < z  2(1 W )
0 otherwise
and
F(W )(z) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 z < 2(W   1)
1
2

z+2(1 W )
2(1 W )
2
2(W   1)  z  0
1  1
2

2(1 W ) z
2(1 W )
2
0 < z  2(1 W )
1 z > 2(1 W )
:
The density of (W ) is a symmetric tent (centered at z = 0) whose peak decreases
to 1 as W increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W increases from 0:5 to 1.
Similarly, the distribution of (W ) is a symmetric "S" (through F(W )(0) = 0:5)
whose slope decreases as W increases from 0 to 0:5 and then increases as W
increases from 0:5 to 1. Furthermore, it can be shown that F(W )(z) is continuous
in W .
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CHAPTER 3
ANALOGICAL LEGAL REASONING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
How do judges reason about the law? There are many theories. The canoni-
cal theory is that judges reason by analogy from case to case (Levi 1949; Weinreb
2005). This method of reasoning is known as analogical legal reasoning to jurispru-
dence scholars and case-based legal reasoning to scholars in the eld of articial
intelligence and law.1
In its purest form, analogical legal reasoning (ALR) involves reasoning directly
from prior cases to the case at hand the judge evaluates the similarities and
di¤erences between prior cases and the case at hand and reaches a decision through
application of the principle that like cases should be treated alike (Alexander and
Sherwin 2008). Notably, ALR operates without invoking a legal rule that governs
the decision in the case at hand (Sunstein 1993, 1996).2
A leading alternative theory is that judges reason deductively from legal rules
(Alexander and Sherwin 2008; Schauer 2009).3 In other words, they engage in rule-
based legal reasoning (RLR). In its purest form, RLR operates without reference to
prior cases the judge simply applies the governing legal rule to the case at hand.
At most, the judge uses prior cases to infer (perhaps abductively or inductively)
the governing legal rule; however, she does not reason directly from case to case.
Both ALR and RLR constitute "legalist" theories of judicial behavior (Posner
2008). According to the legalist theory, "judges decide cases through systematic
1Some commentators argue that its use of analogy makes legal reasoning a distinctive form
of reasoning (e.g., Fried 1981; Weinreb 2005). The mystical notion that legal reasoning is a
distinctive form of reasoning was famously articulated by Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice
of England, who denied the authority and competence of the King of England to render legal
judgments on the grounds that legal questions "are not to be decided by natural reason but by
the articial reason and judgment of law" (Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (1607)).
2On the di¤erent forms of analogical legal reasoning, see generally Macagno and Walton
(2009).
3See also Westen (1982), Eisenberg (1988), Posner (1990, 1995, 2006, 2008), Schauer (1991),
and Alexander (1996, 1998).
116
application of the external, objective sources of authority that classically comprise
the law" (Cross 2003).4 Although the legalist theory is the traditional theory of
judicial behavior in legal circles, it has many critics. Perhaps the leading criticism
of the legalist theory is that it su¤ers from theoretical indeterminacy (Cross 2003),
presumably due to the paucity of formal models in the jurisprudence literature.
ALR has been especially targeted by critics, with one commentator complaining
that "it is infrequently described with any rigor or care" (Alexander 1996).5
This chapter has two objectives. The rst objective is to o¤er a formal model
of ALR. I model ALR as similarity-weighted averaging of prior outcomes. More
specically, the model posits that the outcome in the case at hand is a weighted
average of the outcomes of prior cases, where the weights are a function of the
fact similarity and precedential authority of prior cases. The full specication of
the model appears in Section 3.1. The main theoretical result of the chapter is an
axiomatization of a key feature of the model, which appears in Section 3.2.
The ALR model is closely related to the "empirical similarity" model of Gilboa
et al. (2006), as well as the wider literature on case-based decision theory.6 Case-
based decision theory is an axiomatic model of reasoning by analogy to past cases
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001).7 Empirical similarity theory is a closely-related
axiomatic model in which assessments are made according to similarity-weighted
4Of course, there are many other theories of judicial behavior. Posner (2008) identies no fewer
than nine theories, including most notably the legalist theory, the attitudinal theory, which posits
that judges decide cases according to their ideological preferences (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993,
2002), and the economic and strategic theories, which posit that judges decide cases strategically,
taking into account the responses of other actors, to promote their ideology (e.g., Epstein and
Knight 1998; Smith and Tiller 2002), enhance their reputation or career prospects (e.g., Miceli
and Cos¸gel 1994; Levy 2005), or further some other specied objective.
5Notable exceptions include Sunstein (1993, 1996), Brewer (1996), and Weinreb (2005).
6In case-based decision theory, the term "case" is used generically; it does not refer to a legal
case.
7See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2002, 2003) and Gilboa et al.
(2002). Case-based decision theory was inspired by work on case-based reasoning in articial in-
telligence (Riesbeck and Schank 1989) and harkens back to the notion that all human "reasonings
concerning matter of fact are founded on a species of Analogy" (Hume 1748).
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averages of prior assessments (Gilboa et al. 2006).8 I compare and contrast the
ALR model and empirical similarity theory in the course of specifying the ALR
model in Section 3.1.
Empirical similarity theory is closely related to various methods in computer
science, statistics, and related elds, including, most notably: kernel methods
(Pagan and Ullah 1999), which are commonly used in nonparametric estimation;
nearest neighbor methods (Dasarathy 1991; Devroye et al. 1996), which are com-
monly used in machine learning and pattern recognition; and conditional autore-
gressive (CAR) and simultaneous autoregressive (SAR) models (Banerjee et al.
2004), which are commonly used in the analysis of areal and other spatial data.9
In addition, ALR is studied in the articial intelligence and law literature, which
contains a number of computational models of case-based adjudication (Rissland
1990; Rissland et al. 2003, 2006; Ashley and Brüninghaus 2006), as well as various
theoretical models that are directed towards providing algorithmic or logical un-
derpinnings for the computational models (Bench-Capon et al. 2004; Sartor 2005;
Walton 2005; Bench-Capon and Prakken 2006; Bench-Capon et al. 2009).
The second objective of the chapter is to empirically evaluate the ALR model
by testing whether it has more explanatory power than a simple RLR model. For a
simple model of RLR, I turn to fractional polynomial regression (Royston and Alt-
man 1994).10 A fractional polynomial is an extension of a conventional polynomial
that allows for noninteger and negative powers. Fractional polynomial regression
is a exible parametric method for approximating unknown functions using few
parameters. Under the view that legal rules are functions (which map facts to
8See also Billot et al. (2005), Gayer et al. (2007), Billot et al. (2008), Lieberman (forthcoming),
and Gilboa et al. (forthcoming).
9I expand upon the connection between empirical similarity theory and kernel regression in
Section 3.3.1. For discussions of the relationship between empirical similarity theory, on the one
hand, and nearest neighbor methods and conditional autoregressive models, on the other hand,
see Lieberman (forthcoming) and Gilboa et al. (forthcoming).
10See also Royston and Altman (1997) and Royston and Sauerbrei (2008).
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outcomes),11 fractional polynomial regression provides a exible yet parsimonious
method for modeling legal rules.12 The full specication of the RLR model appears
in Section 3.3.
Using data on U.S. maritime salvage cases, I compare the ALR and RLRmodels
according to their Bayesian information criteria (BIC).13 Proposed by Schwarz
(1978), BIC is a standard criterion for comparing and selecting among nonnested
models. The maximum likelihood estimates for both models and the results of the
BIC test appear in Section 3.3. The main conclusion is that the RLR model ts
the data better than the ALR model.
As a supplement to the main empirical analysis, Section 3.3.4 presents a re-
gression tree analysis of the maritime salvage cases. Regression tree analysis is a
nonparametric method for analyzing the relationship between categorical or con-
tinuous independent variables and a continuous dependent variable (Bierman et al.
1984).14 Although the regression tree analysis does not shed light directly on the
question of which model better ts the data, it serves as a robustness check of the
coe¢ cient estimates for both models.
In Section 3.4, I discuss implications and limitations of the empirical analysis. I
also discuss a conceptual issue that underlies the enterprise of the chapter, namely
the extent to which ALR and RLR are theoretically distinct methods of legal
reasoning. Concluding remarks appear in Section 3.5. The Appendix provides an
overview of U.S. maritime salvage law.
11See, e.g., Kornhauser (1992a,b), Cameron et al. (2000), Cameron and Kornhauser (2005,
2009), and Kastellec (forthcoming).
12The use of mathematical and statistical methods to model legal rules is the enterprise of
the fact-pattern analysis literature in political science (Kort 1957, 1963, 1968, 1973; Kort and
Mars 1957; Mackaay and Robillard 1974; Segal 1984; Cameron and Kornhauser 2005; Kastellec
forthcoming).
13In Section 3.3.3, I explain why U.S. maritime salvage cases provide a fertile testing ground
for comparing the ALR and RLR models.
14A closely related method classication tree analysis is used when the dependent variable
is categorical. Kastellec (forthcoming) conducts classication tree analysis of search and seizure
cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and confession cases decided by the Courts of Appeals.
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3.1 A MODEL OF ANALOGICAL LEGAL REASONING
Let K denote the set of judges or courts in the legal system. The courts in K
are ordered in accordance with the hierarchy of courts in the legal system. Let
Q denote the set of questions of law that may be presented to a court. For each
question q 2 Q, there exists a set of conclusions of law Yq that a court may reach
with respect to question q and a vector of issues of fact 'q = ('q1; :::; 'qn) that the
court must resolve in order to reach a conclusion with respect to question q.15 For
each issue 'qi, there exists a set of ndings of fact qi that the court may make
with respect to issue 'qi. Accordingly, each question q 2 Q induces a fact space
q = q1      qn. Each element  = (1; :::; n) 2 q is a fact pattern. Given
question q, the set of conclusions Yq, the vector of issues 'q, and the fact space q
are known and unique. A case involving question q is a triple c = (; ; y), where
 2 q,  2 K, and y 2 Yq. Dene x = (; ) as the inputs and y as the outcome
of the case. The set of all possible cases involving question q is Cq = (qK) Yq.
I shall assume throughout the chapter that the inputs and outcomes of cases are
or may be represented as real variables: q = Rn+, K = R+, and Yq = R.
At time t 2 N++, a court is presented with question q and a body of evidence.
Based on the evidence, the court makes ndings of fact t 2 q with respect to
issues 'q. The court has access to a q-relevant case history Ct = (c1; :::; ct 1),
where each cj = (xj; yj) 2 Cq is a prior case involving question q. How the court
reaches its conclusion yt depends on whether the court engages in ALR or RLR.
What fundamentally distinguishes ALR and RLR is that under ALR the outcome
of the case at hand is a function of the inputs of the case at hand as well as the
history of prior cases, yt = Y (xt; Ct), whereas under RLR the outcome of the case
at hand is a function of the inputs only, yt = Y (xt).16
15Note that n (the dimension of 'q) is a function of q.
16Stated another way, under RLR the outcome depends on a bounded number of parameters,
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I model ALR as similarity-weighted averaging of prior outcomes. Formally,
yt = Y (xt; Ct) =
X
j<t
 
s (xt; xj)P
j<t s (xt; xj)
!
yj; (3.1)
where
s (xt; xj) = exp (  (xt; xj)) ; (3.2)
 (xt; xj) = v (xt; xj) d
 
t; j

; (3.3)
v (xt; xj) =
8><>:
cos

arctan


d(t;j)

if t 6= j & t < j
1 otherwise
;   0; (3.4)
and
d
 
t; j

=
vuut nX
i=1
!i
 
ti   ji
2
: (3.5)
The model posits that the outcome yt in the case at hand is a weighted average
of the outcomes y1; :::; yt 1 of prior cases. The weight placed on the outcome yj
of a prior case depends on the degree to which the inputs xj of the prior case
are similar to the inputs xt of the case at hand. The degree of input similarity
is given by s. The greater is the input similarity of a prior case, the greater is
the weight given to the outcome of the prior case in the determination of the
outcome of the case at hand. Hence, I interpret s as measuring the precedential
inuence of a prior case on the case at hand. I assume that input similarity
and, therefore, precedential inuence is an exponentially decaying function of
the distance  from the inputs of the prior case to the inputs of the case at hand.17
whereas under ALR the number of parameters increases with the size of the prior case history
(cf. Gayer et al. 2007).
17The assumption that inuence decays exponentially with distance seems rather natural, and
appears in other contexts as well (Bolhuis et al. 1986; Nosofsky 1986; Shephard 1987; Glaeser
et al. 2003; Billot et al. 2008). Several studies provide evidence of exponential decay with time
of the precedential inuence of legal cases in U.S. federal courts (Post and Eisen 2000; Fowler
and Jeon 2008; Black and Spriggs II 2009).
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In turn, I assume that input distance is a proportional function (with nonconstant
proportionality factor v) of the weighted Euclidean distance d between the facts j
of the prior case and the facts t of the case at hand.
18 The proportionality factor
v is less than one if the prior case was decided by a superior court (t < j) and
equals one otherwise. All else equal, therefore, prior cases decided by a superior
court receive greater weight and, therefore, have more inuence than prior cases
decided by a parallel or inferior court in the determination of the outcome of the
case at hand. The size of this inuence advantage, however, is smaller the greater
is d (the distance between the prior case and the case at hand in fact space); how
much smaller is determined by the shape parameter .
The notion of similarity-weighted averaging as a model of analogical reason-
ing was introduced by Gilboa et al. (2006), who provided an axiomatization of
similarity-weighted averaging with a generic similarity function. Although they
did not specify a particular similarity function or even a particular functional
form, Gilboa et al. (2006) were interested in similarity functions that depend on
a weighted Euclidean distance. The notion of a similarity function that decays
exponentially as a function of distance was introduced by Billot et al. (2008), who
provided an axiomatization of an exponential similarity function based on a generic
metric (i.e., a symmetric distance function). Billot et al. (2008) also axiomatized
an exponential similarity function based on a weighted Euclidean distance, which
is a special case of a metric.
In my model of ALR, the similarity function s is based on the input distance ,
which is a quasimetric (i.e., an asymmetric distance function) (see Section 3.2).19
This generalization of the standard similarity function is instrumental to my pur-
18Note that the weights !1; :::; !n in the weighted Euclidean distance d reect the relative
importance of the n issues of fact that the court must resolve in order to reach a conclusion with
respect to the legal question at issue.
19Strictly speaking,  is a quasimetric provided that the parameter  is su¢ ciently small (see
Section 3.2).
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poses,20 because the precedential inuence of a prior case in a legal system with
hierarchical courts depends not only on the fact similarity of the prior case, which
depends on the distance from the prior case in fact space, but also on the prece-
dential authority of the prior case, which depends on the position in the judicial
hierarchy of the court that decided the prior case. Although fact similarity is sym-
metric,21 precedential authority is not symmetric. All else equal, the precedential
authority of a case decided by a superior court is greater than the precedential
authority of a case decided by a parallel or inferior court. Therefore, if the prior
case was decided by a superior court, its inuence on the case at hand ought to be
greater than the inuence of the case at hand on the prior case (under the coun-
terfactual that the case at hand was decided before the prior case). Specifying a
similarity function that is based on quasimetric allows the model to capture this
distinctive feature of precedential inuence in law.
Figure 3.1 displays the relationship in the model between precedential inuence
(s), fact similarity (d), and precedential authority (v).22 As the gure illustrates,
the precedential inuence of a prior case is at its maximum (s = 1) when the facts
of the prior case are identical to the facts of the case at hand (t 6= j , d = 0).
As fact similarity decreases (i.e., as d increases), precedential inuence decays
exponentially at rate v i.e., s = exp( vd). The rate of decay di¤ers depending
on the precedential authority of the prior case. If the prior case was decided
by a parallel or inferior court (t  j), the rate of decay equals one (v = 1).
If, however, the prior case was decided by a superior court, the rate of decay is
20Like Gilboa et al. (2006) and Billot et al. (2008), Gayer et al. (2007), Lieberman (forthcom-
ing), and Gilboa et al. (forthcoming) contemplate similarity functions based on a metric, usually
a weighted Euclidean distance.
21That is, the distance in fact space from the prior case to the case at hand is equal to the
distance from the case at hand to the prior case.
22Note that fact similarity and precedential authority are negatively related to d and v, re-
spectively.
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Figure 3.1: s = exp( vd)
v = cos(arctan(=d)) < 1.23 All else equal, therefore, the precedential inuence
of a prior case that was decided by a superior court is greater than precedential
inuence of a prior case that was decided by a parallel or inferior court. Moreover,
the size of the inuence advantage due to enhanced precedential authority (which,
as noted above, is negatively related to v) increases with the degree of fact similarity
(i.e., it increases as d decreases) at a rate determined by (and positively related
to) the shape parameter  (see Figure 3.2).
23The specication of v is motivated as follows. For any two points x1; x2 2 Rn+, x1 6= x2,
a standard generic measure of the asymmetric distance from x1 to x2 is f(12)d(x1;x2), where:
d(x1;x2) is the Euclidean distance between x1 and x2; 12 is the polar direction from x1 to x2;
and f() is a monotonically increasing function on (0; =2), typically chosen or normalized such
that f(0) = 0 and f(=2) = 1 (Drezner and Wesolowsky 1989). Turning to our setting, take any
xj = (j ; j) and xt = (t; t) in the input space q  K =Rn+1+ , where t 6= j and t < j
(implying xj 6= xt). If we normalize the distance in K =R+ (judicial hierarchy space) between
superior and inferior courts to one (so j t = 1), then jt = arctan(=d(t; j)) is the -scaled
polar direction from xj to xt, and v(jt) = cos(jt) is just the standard quasimetric described
above, where f() = cos() and d is the weighted Euclidean distance in q = Rn+ (fact space).
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3.2 THEORETICAL RESULTS
In this section I prove two theoretical results pertaining to the model.
3.2.1 Similarity as a Quasimetric
The rst result is that the function  : (q  K)  (q  K)!R+, on which
the similarity function s : (q  K)  (q  K)!R++ is based, is a quasimetric
provided that the shape parameter  is su¢ ciently small. Recall the denition of
a quasimetric:
Definition 3.1 (Quasimetric) A function  : Rn Rn ! Rn is a quasimetric
on Rn if for all x; y 2 Rn:
(i) (x; y) = 0 if x = y (identity of indiscernibles);
(ii) (x; y) > 0 if x 6= y (positivity);
(iii) (x; z)  (x; y) + (y; z) for any z 2 Rn (triangle inequality).
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Note that a metric is a quasimetric that also satises symmetry: (x; y) = (y; x).
A quasimetric is not necessarily symmetric, i.e., in general (x; y) 6= (y; x).
The following is a formal statement of the rst result.
Theorem 3.1 For all ;  2 Rn and ;  2 R, with w = (; ) and z = ( ; ), let
 (w; z) = v (w; z) d (;  ) ;
where
v (w; z) =
8><>: cos

arctan


d(; )

if  6=  &  < 
1 otherwise
;   0;
and d is a metric on Rn. There exists  > 0 such that for all  < ,  is a
quasimetric on Rn+1.
Proof. First, take any   0. If w = z, then  =  and  = . This implies
d (;  ) = 0 and v (w; z) = 1, which in turn implies  (w; z) = 0. Thus,  satises
the identity of indiscernibles for every   0.
Next, suppose  = 0. Then v(w; z) = 1 (because arctan(0) = 0 and cos(0) = 1).
This implies  (w; z) = d (;  ). Because d is a metric, it follows that  satises
positivity and the triangle inequality for  = 0.
Finally, suppose  > 0. If  =  or   , then v (w; z) = 1 (by denition).
This implies (w; z) = d(;  ). It follows that  satises positivity and the triangle
inequality for  > 0 when  =  or   .
If  6=  and  < , then d (;  ) > 0 (by positivity of d) and v(w; z) 2 (0; 1)
(because arctan() 2 (0; 
2
) for 0 <  < 1 and cos() 2 (0; 1) for 0 <  < 
2
). It
follows that  (w; z) > 0. (It also follows that (w; z) < d (;  ) = (z; w).) Thus,
 satises positivity (but not symmetry) for  > 0 when  6=  and  < .
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To complete the proof, we need to show that when  6=  and  < , there
exists  > 0 such that  satises the triangle inequality for every  < . Take any
# 2 Rn and  2 R, with x = (#; ). Note that  satises the triangle inequality i¤
v (w; z) d (;  )  v (w; x) d (; #) + v (x; z) d (#;  ).
Dene F () = v (w; x) d (; #) + v (x; z) d (#;  )   v (w; z) d (;  ). Note that
F (0) = d (; #) + d (#;  )   d (;  ) (because v = 1 for  = 0). Note further
that F (0) > 0 (because d is a metric and  6=  ) and that F is continuous
in  (because v is continuous in ). Because F is continuous in , for every
 > 0 there exists  > 0 such that  <  implies jF ()  F (0)j < . Let
 = F (0) > 0. It follows that there exists  = F (0) > 0 such that  <  implies
F () > F (0)   = 0. It follows, in turn, that there exists  > 0 such that for all
 < , v (w; x) d (; #) + v (x; z) d (#;  ) > v (w; z) d (;  ) :
3.2.2 Axiomatization of an Exponential Similarity Function Based on a Quasi-
metric
The second result is an axiomatization of an exponential similarity function based
on a quasimetric. The axiomatization closely follows Billot et al. (2008), which,
as noted above, provided an axiomatization of an exponential similarity function
based on a standard metric.
Let C = [t1(Rn+2)t 1. Suppose there are given functions Y : Rn+1C ! R
and s : Rn+1Rn+1 ! R++ such that for all xt = (t; t) 2 Rn+1 and Ct =
(xj; yj)j<t 2 C,
yt = Y (xt; Ct) =
X
j<t
 
s (xt; xj)P
j<t s (xt; xj)
!
yj (3.6)
and s is normalized such that s(x; x) = 1 for all x 2 Rn+1.
127
I impose three axioms on Y .
Axiom 3.1 (Ray Monotonicity) For all w; x; z 2 Rn+1, x 6= 0,
Y (w; ((w + x; 1) ; (w + z; 1))) is strictly decreasing in   0.
Axiom 3.1 considers a world with two prior cases, c1 = (1; y1) = (w + x; 1)
and c2 = (2; y2) = (w + z; 1). In such a world, equation (3.6) would generate
an outcome between y1 and y2, i.e., Y 2 [ 1; 1]. Axiom 3.1 states that as 
increases whereby 1 = w+ x moves further away from w (along a ray through
w), thereby becoming less similar to w Y decreases, i.e., moves away from y1 = 1
and toward y2 =  1.
Axiom 3.2 (Ray Shift Invariance) For case histories of the form
C = (w + jx; yj)j<t 2 C, where w; x 2 Rn+1, yj 2 R (j < t) , and j  0 (j < t),
Y

w; (w + (j + )x; yj)j<t

= Y

w; (w + jx; yj)j<t

for all  > 0.
Axiom 3.2 considers a world in which the inputs of all prior cases lie on a ray
through the inputs of the case at hand, w. Axiom 3.2 requires that a shift  along
this ray leaves the outcome Y unchanged.
Axiom 3.3 (Self-relevance) For all w; x; z 2 Rn+1,
Y (z; ((w; 1) ; (x; 0)))  Y (w; ((w; 1) ; (x; 0))).
Axiom 3.3 considers a world with two prior cases, (w; 1) and (x; 0). In such a
world, equation (3.6) would generate an outcome Y 2 [0; 1]. Axiom 3.3 requires
that the outcome Y in a new case z be less than the outcome Y in a new case
w. The idea is that any new case z must be judged less similar to w than w is to
itself.
Theorem 3.2 states the second result.
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Theorem 3.2 The following are equivalent:
(i) Y satises Axioms 3.1-3.3;
(ii) There exists a quasimetric  on Rn+1 such that s(w; z) = exp (  (w; z)) for
all w; z 2 Rn+1.
Proof. First, take any w; x; z 2 Rn+1 with x 6= 0. Ray Monotonicity (Axiom 3.1)
holds i¤
s (w;w + x)  s (w;w + z)
s (w;w + x) + s (w;w + z)
is strictly decreasing in   0. Let f () = s (w;w + x). It follows that Ray
Monotonicity holds i¤
2s (w;w + z)  f 0 ()
[f () + s (w;w + z)]2
< 0;
which holds i¤ f 0 () < 0.
Next, take C = (w + jx; yj)j<t 2 C, where w; x 2 Rn+1, yj 2 R (j < t) and
j  0 (j < t). Ray Shift Invariance (Axiom 3.2) holds i¤ for all  > 0,
X
j<t
 
s (w;w + (j + )x)P
j<t s (w;w + (j + )x)
  s (w;w + jx)P
j<t s (w;w + jx)
!
yj = 0:
This holds i¤ for all j and ,
s (w;w + (j + )x)
s (w;w + jx)
=
P
j<t s (w;w + (j + )x)P
j<t s (w;w + jx)
= g;
where 0 < g  1 (by Ray Monotonicity). Let f () = s (w;w + x),   0. It
follows that Ray Shift Invariance is equivalent to f (j + ) = f (j) g for all j
and . Observe that f (0) = 1; therefore, f () = g for all . Accordingly, Ray
Shift Invariance holds i¤ f (j + ) = f (j) f () for all j and . Because f
is continuous and positive (by continuity and positivity of s), it follows that Ray
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Shift Invariance is equivalent to f () = exp (hx) for   0, where hx  0 (by
Ray Monotonicity) with equality i¤ x = 0 (by s (w;w) = 1). Dening z = w + x
and (w; z) =  hx, we conclude that Axioms 3.1-3.2 are equivalent to s (w; z) =
exp ( (w; z)) for all w; z 2 Rn+1, where the function  satises all the properties
of a quasimetric, apart from the triangle inequality.
The last step is to show that Self-relevance (Axiom 3.3) holds i¤  satises the
triangle inequality, (z; x)  (z; w) + (w; x) for all w; x; z 2 Rn+1. Take any
w; x; z 2 Rn+1. Self-relevance holds i¤Y (z; ((w; 1) ; (x; 0)))  Y (w; ((w; 1) ; (x; 0))),
which holds i¤
s(z; w)
s(z; w) + s(z; x)
 1
1 + s(w; x)
;
which, in turn, holds i¤s (z; x)  s (z; w) s (w; x). Because s (w; z) = exp ( (w; z))
for all w; z 2 Rn+1, this holds i¤
exp (  (z; x))  exp (  (z; w)   (w; x)) ;
which, in turn, holds i¤  (z; x)   (z; w) +  (w; x) :
3.3 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Given the result of Theorem 3.2, Axioms 3.1 through 3.3 may be interpreted as
observable implications of similarity-weighted averaging with an exponential sim-
ilarity function based on a quasimetric. However, the special case histories con-
templated by the axioms are not ones that we would expect to observe in the real
world. Therefore, evaluating the ALR model by testing the validity of the axioms
is not a promising strategy.
I adopt an empirical approach to evaluating the ALR model. Namely, I test
whether the ALR model has more explanatory power than a simple RLR model.
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First, I embed the ALR model specied in Section 3.1 in a statistical model.
Second, I turn to fractional polynomial regression for a simple model of RLR.
Next, I describe the data on U.S. maritime salvage cases, explain why the data
provide a fertile testing ground for comparing the ALR and RLR models, and
describe the criterion according to which I compare the models (namely, the BIC).
I then present the maximum likelihood estimates for both models and the results
of the BIC test. Lastly, I present a regression tree analysis of the maritime salvage
cases as a supplement to the main empirical analysis.
3.3.1 Empirical Specication of the ALR Model
The rst step of the empirical analysis is to embed the ALR model specied in
Section 3.1 in a statistical model. Following Gilboa et al. (2006) and its progeny,24
I assume that y1 is an arbitrary random variable and that for t = 2; :::; T ,
yt = Y (xt; Ct; ALR) =
X
j<t
 
s (xt; xj)P
j<t s (xt; xj)
!
yj + "t; (3.7)
where "t
iid N (0; 2), s is dened by (3.2)-(3.5), and ALR = (; !1; :::; !n; 2).
I estimate the n + 2 parameter vector ALR via maximum likelihood. The log-
likelihood function is
l (ALR) =   t
2
log (2)  t
2
log
 
2
  y0S 0Sy
22
;
24See also Gayer et al. (2007), Lieberman (forthcoming), and Gilboa et al. (forthcoming).
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where y = (y1; :::; yT )0 and
S
(tt)
=
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0    0
 1 1 0 0 0    0
  s(x3;x1)P
j<3 s(x3;xj)
  s(x3;x2)P
j<3 s(x3;xj)
1 0 0    0
  s(x4;x1)P
j<4 s(x4;xj)
  s(x4;x2)P
j<4 s(x4;xj)
  s(x4;x3)P
j<4 s(x4;xj)
1 0    0
...
. . .
  s(xt;x1)P
j<t s(xt;xj)
        s(xt;xt 1)P
j<t s(xt;xj)
1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
:
For the derivation of the log-likelihood function, as well as an explication of the
asymptotic theory of model (3.7), which establishes a theoretical basis for simple
hypothesis tests involving the model parameters, see Lieberman (forthcoming).
Before turning to the RLR model, let me say a few words about the relationship
between model (3.7) and kernel regression.25 Kernel regression assumes a data
generating process of the form
yi = g(xi) + ei; i = 1; :::; N; (3.8)
where ei
iid (0; 2) and g is an unknown function. A standard estimator for g is
the Nadaraya-Watson estimator
g^(x) =
X
in
 
K
 
xi x
h
P
inK
 
xi x
h
! yi; (3.9)
where K is a kernel function (i.e., a non-negative function satisfying, among other
regularity conditions,
R
K(z)dz = 1) and h is a bandwidth parameter. Note that
the right-hand side of equation (3.9) has the same form as the rst term on the
right-hand side of equation (3.7). Indeed, a direct mapping exists between them
25On kernel regression, see Pagan and Ullah (1999).
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(Gilboa et al. forthcoming). Moreover, they operate in the same way. Each gener-
ates a new/predicted value of y by taking a weighted average of the observed values
of y where the weights are a function the distance between the new/hypothesized
x and the observed values of x. Notwithstanding these connections, however, there
is an important distinction between model (3.7) and kernel regression. Kernel re-
gression is a statistical technique that uses weighted averaging to estimate model
(3.8), which assumes that the data are generated by a function (i.e., a rule), whereas
model (3.7) assumes that that the data are generated by weighted averaging.26
3.3.2 Modeling RLR Using Fractional Polynomial Regression
The second step is to specify a simple RLR model. The essence of RLR is that it
involves the application of a governing legal rule to the case at hand. The source of
the governing legal rule is not important; for example, the rule may be stated in or
inferred from a statute or regulation or it may be stated in or inferred from prior
cases. What is important is that the court invokes the legal rule in determining
the outcome in the case at hand.
A legal rule may be viewed as a function which map facts to outcomes.27 This
view suggests a simple model of RLR the outcome in case at hand is a function
of the facts of the case at hand, yt = Y (t). A pragmatic, parametric approach
to estimating this unknown function is fractional polynomial regression (Royston
and Altman 1994).28 A fractional polynomial is an extension of a conventional
polynomial that allows for noninteger and negative powers. In reliance on Tay-
lors theorem, conventional polynomials are often used to approximate unknown
functions. However, polynomial regression generally involves a tradeo¤ between
26For more on the relationship between model (3.7) and kernel regression, see Gilboa et al.
(2006, forthcoming) and Lieberman (forthcoming).
27See, e.g., Kornhauser (1992a,b), Cameron et al. (2000), Cameron and Kornhauser (2005,
2009), and Kastellec (forthcoming).
28See also Royston and Altman (1997) and Royston and Sauerbrei (2008).
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exibility (i.e., t) and parsimony. Royston and Altman (1994) introduced frac-
tional polynomial regression as a exible parametric method for approximating
unknown functions using few parameters.
The standard multivariable fractional polynomial (MFP) regression model may
be expressed as
yt = Y (t; RLR) = b0 +
hX
i=1
biit +
nX
i=h+1
mX
j=1
bij
(pj)
it + "t; t = 1; :::; T; (3.10)
where "t
iid N (0; 2) and RLR = (b0; b1; :::; bh; bh+1;1; :::; bh+1;m; :::; bn1; :::; bnm; 2).
The rst h covariates, 1; :::; h, are binary, categorical, or ordinal, and the re-
maining covariates, h+1; :::; n, are continuous. The powers p1; :::; pm are chosen
from a predened set P according to the MFP algorithm developed by Sauer-
brei and Royston (1999).29 The round bracket notation signies the Box-Tidwell
transformation,

(pj)
it =
8><>: 
(pj)
it for pj 6= 0
lnit for pj = 0
:
The degree m is predened by the researcher. The researcher also predenes two
signicance levels: 1, which determines the critical value for variable selection;
and 2, which determines the critical value for model selection. The parameter
vector RLR, which has a maximum of (n h+1)m+h+1 parameters, is estimated
via maximum likelihood.
3.3.3 Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
My empirical strategy is to compare the ability of the ALR and RLR models
(models (3.7) and (3.10), respectively) to explain the time series of U.S. maritime
salvage cases. Under federal maritime law, a salvor of imperiled maritime prop-
29See also Royston and Sauerbrei (2008).
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erty on navigable waters is entitled to a monetary award from the owner.30 There
are two forms of maritime salvage: "contract" salvage and "pure" salvage. Con-
tract salvage is rendered pursuant to a prior agreement. Pure salvage is rendered
voluntarily in the absence of a contract. The data include only pure salvage cases.
In the United States, the federal courts have exclusive admiralty jurisdiction
in cases involving claims for salvage awards. There are three elements of a valid
pure salvage claim: (i) a marine peril; (ii) service rendered voluntarily (and not
required by a preexisting duty or contract); and (iii) success in whole or in part.
The peril need not be immediately impending reasonable apprehension of danger
is su¢ cient. In addition, although a party may render salvage services without
the request of the owner, it may not force its services upon an owner who refuses
assistance. Finally, under the "no cure-no pay" rule, there can be no salvage claim
if the property is lost, notwithstanding the e¤orts of the putative salvors.
In the case of a valid pure salvage claim, the court determines the proper award
according to six factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in The Blackwall, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869):
(1) the labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage service;
(2) the promptitude, skill, and energy displayed in rendering the service and
saving the property;
(3) the value of the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service,
and the danger to which such property was exposed;
(4) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing the property from the impending
peril;
30The following is a bare bones description of U.S. maritime salvage law. A more detailed
overview appears in the Appendix.
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(5) the value of the property saved; and
(6) the degree of danger from which the property was rescued.
There is no precise formula for computing a salvage award on the basis of the
Blackwall factors. The court has considerable discretion in weighing the factors
and making its determination on a case-by-case basis. The award, however, is
limited by the value of the property saved.
The data comprise 130 pure salvage cases from 1880 to 2007.31 For each case,
the data record the salvage award (in thousands of 1980 dollars),32 the courts
ndings of fact with respect to each of the six Blackwall factors (high = 1 or low
= 0),33 and the position of the court in the judicial hierarchy (circuit court = 1
or district court = 0).34 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide descriptive statistics. Table
3.1 displays summary statistics for each variable. For instance, it shows that the
salvage awards range from $320 to $1,865,000 with a mean award of $122,000; the
values of the salvaged property range from $1,2000 to $23,400,000 with a mean
value of $2,340,000; the danger to the salvaged property was high in 59 percent of
the cases; and 32 percent of the cases were nally adjudicated by a circuit court.
Table 3.2 displays the mean salvage award expressed as a percentage of the value
31The cases were identied by two search methods. The rst was "KeyCiting" and "Shep-
ardizing" The Blackwall in Westlaw and LexisNexis, respectively. The second was searching
three databases: Westlaws Federal Maritime Law - Cases (FMRT-CS); LexisNexisAdmiralty
Cases - Federal and State (MEGA); and American Maritime Cases (AMC), which is available on
Westaw and LexisNexis. The searches were designed to locate all reported federal cases decided
after December 31, 1869 and on or before December 31, 2007 that apply the Blackwall factors
to determine a pure salvage award, whether or not the cases cited The Blackwall.
32Adjustments for ination were made using Toms Ination Calculator, available at
http://www.halfhill.com/ination.html.
33I read each case and hand coded the data. For the vast majority of cases, it was straight-
forward to determine the salvage award and the courts ndings of fact with respect to all six
Blackwall factors. For a handful of cases, however, information necessary to determine one or
more variables was missing; these cases are excluded from the data. Absent a good reason why
a courts method of reasoning would be correlated with a case having missing information, there
is no reason to believe that excluding these cases biases the results of the empirical analysis.
34For each case, the court is the court of nal adjudication, and the data record the salvage
award and ndings of fact as determined by the court of nal adjudication.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
y Salvage award 122 271 0.32 1,865
x1 Labor expended by salvors 0.35 0.48 0 1
x2 Skill displayed by salvors 0.58 0.49 0 1
x3 Danger to salvorsproperty 0.26 0.44 0 1
x4 Risk to salvors 0.25 0.43 0 1
x5 Value of salvaged property 2,340 4,529 1.20 23,400
x6 Danger to salvaged property 0.59 0.49 0 1
court Circuit court indicator 0.32 0.57 0 1
Notes: 130 cases from 1880 to 2007. y and x5 in thousands of 1980 dollars.
Table 3.2: Conditional Mean Award Percentages
Variable Obs Mean
y=x5 130 0.132
y=x5 if x1 = 0 85 0.089
y=x5 if x2 = 0 54 0.092
y=x5 if x3 = 0 96 0.104
y=x5 if x4 = 0 98 0.104
y=x5 if x6 = 0 53 0.087
y=x5 if x1 = 1 45 0.212
y=x5 if x2 = 1 76 0.160
y=x5 if x3 = 1 34 0.211
y=x5 if x4 = 1 32 0.216
y=x5 if x6 = 1 77 0.162
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of the salvaged property, as well as conditional means given di¤erent ndings of
fact. For instance, it shows that the (unconditional) mean award percentage is 13.2
percent; the mean award percentage for cases in which the danger to the salvaged
property was low is 8.9 percent; and the mean award percentage for cases in which
the labor expended by the salvors was high is 21.2 percent.
There are several reasons why maritime salvage cases provide a fertile testing
ground for comparing the ALR and RLR models. First, the outcome (the salvage
award) is a continuous variable (a dollar amount) and the inputs (the Blackwall
factors) are well dened and stable over time.35 Second, awards in maritime salvage
cases arguably are apolitical legal questions. Moreover, it is hard to imagine that
a maritime salvage case is an opportunity for a judge to advance strategic goals
such as career advancement. Thus, if there is any setting in which we should
expect "legalist" models of judicial behavior to be operative (and other models
such as attitudinal or strategic models to be inoperative), it is maritime salvage
cases. Third, the law of maritime salvage is federal common law, and, as noted
above, federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving claims for salvage
awards. Accordingly, state variation in law or courts is not an issue. Fourth,
it seems reasonable to treat the federal courts as a single adjudicative body for
purposes of maritime salvage cases: there is no split among the circuits (Blackwall
is controlling precedent for all circuits); there are no specialty courts for maritime
cases; and it generally is believed that federal courts are reasonably uniform in
quality. Lastly, as noted above, although the criteria for determining a maritime
salvage award are well dened and stable through time, there is no explicit formula
or rule. This leaves open the possibility that courts are engaging in ALR or RLR.
I compare the ALR and RLR models according to their Bayesian information
35In the words of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Blackwall factors "have
weathered the storms of the past century" (Saint Paul Marine Transp. Corp. v. Cerro Sales
Corp., 505 F.2d 1115 (9th Cir. 1974)).
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criteria, or BIC (Schwarz 1978). For a given model, the BIC is
BIC = l(^)  1
2
k log T;
where l(^) is the maximized value of the likelihood function for the model, k is the
number of model parameters (i.e., the dimension of the parameter vector ), and
T is the number of observations. The basic idea behind the BIC is that it selects
the model with the highest likelihood value (or best t), subject to a penalty for
lack of parsimony (or overtting).
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the maximum likelihood estimates and BIC for
the ALR model and the benchmark RLR model, respectively. (Note that in the
benchmark RLR model, I set P = f 2; 1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1; 2; :::; 5g, m = 5, and
(1; 2) = (0:05; 0:05). Thus, although I allow for a fth degree fractional polyno-
mial (in the one continuos predictor, lnx5) with powers ranging from  2 to 5, the
MFP algorithm selects a simple linear specication.36) In both models, the depen-
dent variable is the natural logarithm of the salvage award and the independent
variables are the courts ndings of fact with respect to the six Blackwall factors
(where the value of the salvaged property (factor 5) is log-transformed). The es-
timates for both models suggest that three factors are statistically signicant to
the determination of the salvage award the labor expended by the salvors (factor
1), the value of the salvaged property (factor 5), and the danger to the salvaged
property (factor 6) with factors 5 and 6 commanding roughly equal weight and
factor 1 commanding greater weight than factors 5 and 6.37
36As a check of this selection, I estimated three alternative specications of the RLR model.
The rst was a fth degree convential polynomial (in lnx5). In the second alternative specica-
tion, I set P = f 2; 1; 0:5; 0; 0:5; 1; 2; :::; 8g, thereby enlarging the set of powers. In the third
alternative specication, I set 2 = 1, thereby forcing the MFP algorithm mto t the best possible
fth degree fractional polynomial (in lnx5). None of the alternative specications outperformed
the benchmark model.
37In addition, note that the estimate for the shape parameter  in the ALR model is su¢ ciently
small such that  is a quasimetric on the input space.
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Table 3.3: ALR Model (dependent variable: ln y)
Variable Coe¤ Std Err
x1 Labor expended by salvors 16.49 5.56
x2 Skill displayed by salvors 1.60 2.54
x3 Danger to salvorsproperty 6.16 3.95
x4 Risk to salvors 0.71 2.25
lnx5 Value of salvaged property 4.97 1.50
x6 Danger to salvaged property 3.38 1.75
 Shape parameter for v 0.00 0.29
Loglikelihood -244.16
BIC -263.63
Notes: Signicant at 5% level. Signicant at 1% level. ^ = 1:3821 10 7.
Table 3.4: Benchmark RLR Model (dependent variable: ln y)
Variable Coe¤ Std Err
x1 Labor expended by salvors 1.02 0.20
x2 Skill displayed by salvors 0.23 0.20
x3 Danger to salvorsproperty 0.35 0.27
x4 Risk to salvors 0.16 0.29
lnx5 Value of salvaged property 0.60 0.05
x6 Danger to salvaged property 0.59 0.20
Constant 9.41 0.15
Loglikelihood -177.99
BIC -197.46
Note: Signicant at 1% level.
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While interesting in their own right, the coe¢ cient estimates are not my main
concern. Rather, my main concern is the result of the BIC test. The BIC for
the ALR model is  263:63, whereas the BIC for the benchmark RLR model is
 197:46. This suggests that that the RLR model ts the data better than the
ALR model. I discuss the implications of this result in Section 3.4.
3.3.4 Regression Tree Analysis
The nal step of the empirical analysis is to perform a regression tree analysis of
the maritime salvage cases. Regression tree analysis is a nonparametric method
for analyzing the relationship between categorical or continuous independent vari-
ables and a continuous dependent variable (Bierman et al. 1984). I present the
regression tree analysis as a supplement to the main empirical analysis. Although
the regression tree analysis does not shed light directly on the question of whether
the ALR or RLR model better ts the data, it serves as a robustness check of the
coe¢ cient estimates for both models.
Table 3.5 summarizes the regression tree model. As before, the dependent vari-
able is the natural logarithm of the salvage award and the independent variables
are the courts ndings of fact with respect to the six Blackwall factors (where
the value of the salvaged property (factor 5) is log-transformed). The tree grow-
ing method partitions the data to minimize within-node variance ("impurity"),38
subject to four criteria/limitations: (i) only binary splits are allowed; (ii) the min-
38Formally, the measure of impurity is least squares deviation (LSD), and is computed as
1
N()
X
t2
[yt   y ()]2 ;
where is N() is the number of cases in node  , yt is the salvage award in case t, and
y () =
1
N()
X
t2
yt
is the mean salvage award for cases in node  .
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Table 3.5: Summary of Regression Tree Model
Dependent variable: ln y
Independent variables: x1, x2, x3, x4, lnx5, and x6
Growing method: CART
Impurity measure: LSD
Split type: binary
Minimum improvement: 0.0001
Maximum tree depth: 5
Minimum cases per node: 10
imum decrease in impurity required to split a node is is 0.0001; (iii) the maximum
number of levels beneath the root node is ve; and (iv) the minimum number of
cases in each node is ten.
Figure 3.3 presents the regression tree analysis.39 Like the ALR and RLR
model estimates, the regression tree analysis suggests that three factors are key to
the determination of the salvage award: the labor expended by the salvors (factor
1), the value of the salvaged property (factor 5), and the danger to the salvaged
property (factor 6). Unlike the ALR and RLR model estimates, however, the
regression tree analysis suggests that the value of the salvaged property (factor
5) is the most important factor.40 Moreover, the regression tree analysis suggests
how the factors interact. When the value of the salvaged property is low, this
fact alone appears to dictate a small award. A somewhat larger award is made
when the value of the salvaged property is moderate and the labor expended by
the salvors is low. Higher awards are granted when either the value of the salvaged
property is moderate and the labor expended by the salvors is high or the value of
the salvaged property is high and the danger to the salvaged property is low. The
highest awards occur when the value of the salvaged property and the danger to
39The risk estimate is the mean within-node variance across the terminal nodes. Note that the
tree did not require pruning to avoid overtting.
40A model importance analysis suggests factor 5 is ve times as important as factor 1 or factor
6.
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Figure 3.3: Regression Tree Analysis (risk estimate: 1.123)
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the salvaged property are high.
3.4 IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The main conclusion of the empirical analysis is that the RLR model ts the data
better than the ALR model. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the BIC
of the two models. The key implication is that it is more likely that the data were
generated by rule-based legal reasoning than by analogical legal reasoning. This
implication, however, is subject to several limitations.
First, data on the inputs and outcomes of legal cases provides only indirect
evidence regarding the method of legal reasoning. Nevertheless, it arguably is the
best available evidence. In many cases, a courts written opinion o¤ers no direct
evidence regarding the method of legal reasoning. Even in cases in which the
courts opinion o¤ers some direct evidence, it rarely is denitive and, in any event,
it arguably is of little probative value.41
Second, the two models are simplistic representations of ALR and RLR in their
purest forms. Thus, not only are they highly stylized, they are rather extreme. It
is quite possible that a combination or hybrid model, perhaps along the lines of a
mixed SAR model (Anselin 1988), may t the data better than either model. Ex-
amination of such a hybrid model would be intriguing direction for future research.
Third, both models take a representative agent approach. The ALR model
assumes that all judges are equipped with the same similarity function, whereas
the RLR model assumes that all judges apply the same legal rule. Allowing for
heterogeneous judges surely would be more realistic, although tractability would
41"As a rule, we conceive of the judges writing of an opinion as a procedure in which he
justies his decision. The writing coincides neither necessarily nor realistically with the process
by which he reaches his decision, the process of discovery" (Murray 1982). There are (at least)
two reasons to think that a court might use the language of RLR to justify its decision even if it
engages in ALR in reaching its decision. First, "the language of rulesis much more e¢ cient and
parsimonious than that of cases" (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2000). Second, "[r]ules are excellent
justication mechanisms" (Hunter 2001).
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require making strong assumptions about the structure of such heterogeneity.
Fourth, the ALR is less exible than the RLR model. The ALR model is
quite rigid in terms of structure. It species a particular method of assessment
(similarity-weighted averaging) as well as a very specic functional form for the
similarity function (equations (3.2)-(3.5)). The RLR model is more exible. A
fractional polynomial can approximate any su¢ ciently smooth function. It is con-
ceivable that a more exible specication (or even just a di¤erent specication)
of the ALR could outperform the RLR model. Future research could explore the
robustness of the BIC test result to alternative specications of the ALR model.
Lastly, the empirical analysis in Section 3.3 o¤ers not a statistical hypothesis
test but rather a model selection exercise. The objective is to choose the best of
the two competing models, without regard to whether either model is false. As
such, the result of the BIC test cannot be interpreted either as a rejection of the
hypothesis that the data were generated by ALR nor as a failure to reject the
hypothesis that the data were generated by RLR. Rather, it should be interpreted
as statistical evidence favoring the RLR model over the ALR model.
A further limitation of the empirical analysis is that it speaks only to the ability
of the ALR and RLR models to explain the awards in maritime salvage cases. It
says nothing about the ability of either model to explain the outcomes of cases
in other areas of law. Moreover, the fact that both models are legalist models
of judicial behavior suggests that they may not be well suited to other areas of
law, including, in particular, politically charged areas (to which we might expect
attitudinal or strategic models to be better suited).
Finally, the import of the empirical analysis is subject to an underlying con-
ceptual question regarding the theoretical distinction between "analogical" and
"rule-based" methods. One might question the distinction at two levels. At a
general level, one might ask, if judges, as a rule, decide new cases via similarity-
145
weighted averaging of prior cases, then is this not a "rule-based" method? The
answer is no. The question speciously trades on an ambiguity in the meaning of
the word "rule" in ordinary language. When jurisprudence scholars refer to "rule-
based" methods, they mean methods that entail invoking generalizations (Schauer
1991; Alexander and Sherwin 2008; Schauer 2009). They do not mean any method
that judges generally or even invariably use to decide new cases.
At a deeper level, one might ask, does not the process of making similarity
judgments entail invoking generalizations (and thereby render "rule-based" all pu-
tative "analogical" methods)? This question is the subject of active debate among
jurisprudence scholars. Skeptics argue that judges cannot make similarity judg-
ments without invoking generalizations (Dworkin 1997; Alexander and Sherwin
2008).42 Alexander and Sherwin (2008) state the skeptical view thusly:
"Our point is that [a judge] cannot reason that [two cases] should be
decided alike because they similar. To reason that they should be
decided alike, she must determine that they are importantly similar,
and to reason that they are importantly similar, she must refer to some
general proposition . . . . [I]n order to draw analogies . . . [a judge]
must refer to some general proposition that supports the analogy. . . .
[T]he rules or principles that govern similarity, rather than the outcome
of the precedent case, determine the result of the new case."
Dworkin (1997) makes the point succinctly: "An analogy is a way of stating a
conclusion, not a way of reaching one, and theory must do the real work."
Nonskeptics insist that judges can and do make similarity judgments without
invoking generalizations (Kamm 1997; Hunter 2001; Weinreb 2005). In the words
42See also Eisenberg (1988), Eisenberg (1988), Greenwalt (1992), Posner (1990, 1995, 2006,
2008), and Alexander (1996, 1998). Milder skeptics include Levi (1949), Sunstein (1993, 1996),
and Brewer (1996).
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of Hunter (2001), "analogy is a one-to-one similarity comparison that requires no
generalization to operative e¤ectively." Responding directly to Dworkin, Kamm
(1997) writes:
"I disagree with Dworkin when he says that analogy is only a way of
stating conclusions. Analogy can be a way of reaching a conclusion.
The relevance of an analogous case can be clear, even if one does not
have a theory that links the analogous case and the original case, and
even if one is initially uncertain about what one may permissibly do in
the analogous case. While we may need a theory to explain why case
A is really more like case B than case C, we may still, without deep
theoretical justication, see that case A is more like B than C and use
that conclusion to help us nd a solution to case A. Indeed, sometimes
one reaches a conclusion about a case by way of an analogous case
and still does not provide an adequate theoretical justication of ones
position in either case."
Weinreb (2005) o¤ers an extensive defense of the nonskeptical view. He rejects
the skeptical view on two grounds. First, citing research in cognitive science and
psychology, Weinreb posits that "the capacity for analogical reasoning is hard-
wired in us," including the "idea of relevant similarity." Moreover, he asserts that
analogical reasoning "cannot be assimilated or reduced" to rule-based reasoning
because the latter depends on the ability to discern relevant similarity. According
to Weinreb: "Unless one is able to identify an object as a member of a class despite
its di¤erences from other members of the class, no deductive inference is possible."
Second, Weinreb contends that the skepticsargument "proves too much." He
says:
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"By the same reasoning that would require a rule that makes the sim-
ilarity on which an analogy rests relevant, so also would there have to
be a rule for each and every one of the innumerable other similarities
and dissimilarities between the two things compared. Otherwise, how
would one know that beside the similarity to which the rule referred,
there was not some other feature of one or both that also was relevant
to the outcome, which would be changed accordingly?"
Weinreb accuses the skeptics of having it "backwards" when they argue that "the
rule precedes and is essential to the validity of any analogy on which the decision
rests." Instead, he avers that "the rule of the case. . . is a generalized statement
of the decision, not the predicate on which the decision rests," and that "[r]ather
than the analogy depending on the rule, the rule depends on the analogy."
I o¤er the ALR model as a formal representation of the nonskeptical account
of analogical legal reasoning. In doing so, I do not stake out a position in the de-
bate between the skeptics and nonskeptics. Rather, I simply allow the possibility
that the nonskeptical account is correct, and develop a formal representation us-
ing the apparatus of case-based decision theory, which embraces the nonskeptical
view.43 Under case-based decision theory, "the notion of similarity is primitive"
(Gilboa and Schmeidler 2001).44 A case-based decision maker does not engage
in explicit induction, whereby one formulates general rules. Rather, she engages
in implicit induction (Gilboa and Schmeidler 2000, 2001), whereby "similar past
cases are implicitly generalized to bear upon future cases" (Gilboa and Schmeidler
43It is noteworthy that Alexander and Sherwin (2008) concede to Weinreb that if "it is in fact
psychologically possible . . . to intuit important similarity without referrring to a supporting
generalization, this decision is geneuinely analogical." As a normative matter, however, they
lament that this is "a very impoverished view of judicial decision making, which we are reluctant
to attribute to judges adjudicating in good faith."
44See also Gilboa and Schmeidler (2000). Like Weinreb, Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) suggest
that "[o]ur ability to discuss counterfactuals . . . relies on our subjective similarity judgments."
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2000).45 Similarity-weighting averaging is one example of implicit induction. Un-
der similarity-weighted averaging, although the decision maker "does not explicitly
resort to general rules and theories," she "can be viewed as someone who believes
in a general rule of the form Y = f(X1; :::; Xm) but does not know the functional
form of f and therefore attempts to estimate it by nonparametric techniques"
(Gilboa et al. 2006).46
3.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The use of analogical reasoning in law is a central topic in the jurisprudence and
articial intelligence and law literatures. Contributing to these literatures, this
chapter presents and empirically evaluates a formal model of analogical legal rea-
soning. The model posits that the outcome of the case at hand is a weighted
average of the outcomes of prior cases, where the weights are a function of the
fact similarity and precedential authority of prior cases. To evaluate the model,
I test its ability to explain the outcomes in U.S. maritime salvage cases vis-à-vis
a simple model of rule-based legal reasoning (for which I turn to fractional poly-
nomial regression). Comparing their Bayesian information criteria, I nd that the
RLR model ts the data better than the ALR model. As a supplement to the main
empirical analysis, I present a regression tree analysis of the maritime salvage cases.
The work presented in this chapter points to several avenues of further research.
For instance, I would like to explore alternative ways to model ALR, including,
for example, similarity-weighted versions of other statistics, such as the median or
the mode. As mentioned in Section 3.4, I also would like to investigate a hybrid
45As noted by Hunter (1998), a number of accounts of ALR conate or equate analogy and
explicit induction (e.g., Levi 1949; Posner 1990, 1995, 2008). In other accounts of legal reasoning,
the relation between analogy and explicit induction (as well as deduction and abduction) are more
nuanced (e.g., Sunstein 1993; Brewer 1996; Sunstein 1996).
46Recall the discussion on the connection between empirical similarity theory and kernel re-
gression in Section 3.3.1.
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model along the lines of a mixed SAR model. In addition, I would like to probe
the extent to which non-legalist theories of judicial behavior could be formalized
using statistical models. For example, I believe one could protably model an
attitudinalist judge as a Bayesian nonparametric statistician. Finally, I would like
to examine areas of law other than maritime salvage. Although this likely would
require further data collection on my part, one area in which potentially suitable
data already have been collected is U.S. criminal confession cases.47
47See Benesh (2002) and Kastellec (forthcoming).
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APPENDIX
OVERVIEW OF U.S. MARITIME SALVAGE LAW
Throughout the colonial period, royal English courts decided salvage cases
(Mangone 1997). Following independence, the U.S. Constitution granted federal
courts original jurisdiction in "all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,"48
which include salvage cases. By the end of the nineteenth century, most salvage
law concepts were generally settled (Mangone 1997). Although the United States
is a party to both the 1910 Brussels Salvage Convention49 and the 1989 London
Salvage Convention,50 "U.S. courts usually decide salvage controversies under the
principles of the general maritime law without reference to international conven-
tions" (Force 2004; see also Gilmore and Black 1975).51
Jurisdiction and Types of Actions
By statute, subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate salvage claims lies with the
federal courts.52 When the matter at controversy is whether salvage is due and, if
due, the amount, a federal court applying admiralty law is the only one in which
48U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
49International Convention for the Unication of Certain Rules Relating to the Salvage of
Vessels at Sea (1910). Congress codied the 1910 Convention, with minor changes, as the Salvage
Act of 1912 (Gilmore and Black 1975; Mangone 1997).
50International Convention on Salvage (1989).
51See, e.g., Sobonis v. Steam Tanker Natl Defender, 298 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(allowing salvage awards without reference to the Salvage Treaty).
52"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other
remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
(2) Any prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of
property taken as prize."
28 U.S.C. § 1333. The Supreme Court assumed that salvage claims were within federal admiralty
jurisdiction as early as 1804. See Mason v. The Blaireau, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 240 (1804); Treasure
Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentied, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir.
1981) ("Claims arising out of salvage operation e¤orts to rescue or recover ships disabled or
abandoned at sea or to retrieve their cargo are, unquestionably, within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts.").
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such questions can be tried.53 By contrast, an action based on quantum meruit,
or for a case where a contract has been formed, may be tried in a state court,
which has the authority to "assess damages based upon contract but cannot make
a salvage award" (Norris 2008). A salvage suit is generally brought in rem against
a ship, its cargo, or both because salvors, under maritime law, have a lien upon the
property salved; if the ship or cargo is unavailable due to destruction or removal
from the jurisdiction a salvor may seek remedy from the owner directly or in
personam.54 Under current rules, a suit in rem and in personam may be joined.55
The federal court of appeals, when hearing an appeal of a federal district courts
salvage award, "will not disturb a salvage award unless it is based on erroneous
principles or a misapprehension of the facts or is so grossly excessive or inadequate
as to be deemed an abuse of discretion."56
Types of Salvage Services
Salvage services fall into two categories: "contract" salvage and "pure" salvage.
Contract salvage occurs when the owner of property enters into an agreement
with a salvor to rescue imperiled assets (Norris 2008). A salvage contract may
be entered into before any emergency or after the ship or cargo is already in
peril (Mangone 1997). The most common contract of this sort is the Lloyds of
London Open Form (LOF), although there is no obligation on any party to utilize
this document to form a valid contract (Mangone 1997).57 Although a court will
53Houseman v. The North Carolina, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 40 (1841).
54The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879).
55The G.L. 40, 66 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1933).
56Compania Galeana, S.A. v. Motor Vessel Caribbean Mara, 565 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1978).
See also Oelwerke Teutonia v. Erlanger & Galinger, 248 U.S. 521 (1919) ("Unless there has been
some violation of principle or clear mistake, appeals to this Court concerning the amount of the
allowance are not encouraged.").
57The LOF is four pages long, does not specify any sums, and proclaims its fundamental
premise of "no cure-no pay" in large, bold letters. The LOF also contains provisions relating to
enforcement of the contract through arbitration in London a provision that U.S. courts have
declined to enforce when the clause of the LOF is the only connection to an otherwise domestic
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closely examine a contract to make sure that neither side has taken advantage
of an emergency to subject the other party to "grossly unfair terms" (Mangone
1997),58 a contract wherein an owner has struck a "hard bargain" or where "the
service was attended with greater or less di¢ culty than was anticipated, will not
justify setting [the contract] aside."59 Should a contract be thrown out, however,
due to misconduct on the part of a shipowner or captain, innocent crew members
may still be entitled to an award.60
Pure salvage is rendered voluntarily in the absence of a contract. The reward
for a person at sea who rushes to save anothers property is "generously computed"
as a matter of public policy (Gilmore and Black 1975). Because a salvor may never
claim title to property by salvaging it, the need for incentive to save the property
of another evolved into a salvage award (Mangone 1997).
Three elements are necessary for a valid pure salvage claim: (1) a marine peril;
(2) service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a
special contract; and (3) success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered
contributed to such success.61 The peril involved in a salvage operation does not
necessarily have to be immediately impending just subjecting the ship to the
potential danger of damage or destruction.62
Because they already have a duty to aid their own ship in peril, crew members
operation between U.S. citizens. Jones v. Sea Tow Services Freeport NY Inc., 30 F.3d 360 (2d
Cir. 1994).
58This cuts both ways the salvors could, of course, extort a favorable agreement, but the
party in peril could also conceal the extent of danger or damage to its own advantage (Gilmore
and Black 1975).
59The Elfrida, 172 U.S. 186 (1898).
60Jackson Marine Corp. v. Blue Fox, 845 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1988).
61The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 (1879). Note the di¤erence between simple "towage," which is for
the simple convenience of another vessel in expediting her passage, and "salvage," which also
includes an element of peril. McConnochie v. Kerr, 9 F. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1881).
62Fort Myers Shell & Dredging Co. v. Barge NBC 512, 404 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1968). In the
spectrum of peril, the degree of danger is immaterial the degree "can a¤ect the amount of the
award, but not the establishment of a salvage service" (Norris 2008).
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may not be considered "voluntary" salvors of their own ship63 nor may any person
engaged in a profession which creates such a duty to salvage, such as remen (Force
2004).64 Regardless of heroic or costly measures to salvage property, any attempt
that results in the complete loss of property will not be rewarded nor will costs
be reimbursed (Norris 2008).65 A party may not force its services upon any owner
or master of a vessel who does not want assistance.66
The Supreme Court has made clear that only maritime property can be sal-
vaged,67 however the denition of maritime property can include any vehicle, cargo,
or object with a nexus to traditional maritime activities.68 The saving of life, in
63They may, however, participate in salvage operations for reward if "their ship has been
abandoned without hope of recovery, or the crew has been legally discharged from further services
by the master." Drevas v. U.S., 58 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Md. 1945). Common ownership of the
salving vessel and the salved vessel does not necessarily preclude salvors from claiming award.
46 U.S.C § 80107(b). In contrast, passengers have "no duty to a vessel or its cargo" and cannot
be compelled to assist in saving either (Mangone 1997). For this reason, passengers may "for
extraordinary services, and the use of extraordinary means, not furnished by the equipment of
the ship herself, by which she is saved from imminent danger . . . have salvage." The Connemara,
108 U.S. 352 (1883).
64In re Iowa Fleeting Service, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 794(M.D. La. 2002) ("Fireghters are
precluded from obtaining a salvage award when the salvage work they perform is in the course
of their existing duties as reghters."). But see Markakis v. S/S Volendam, 486 F. Supp. 1103
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that even within certain professions, actions outside the line of duty may
entitle a salvor to an award). Note, however, that nothing legally precludes the U.S. government
from claiming salvage, even though it usually does not as a matter of policy (Gilmore and Black
1975).
65Scott v. The Clara E. Bergen, 21 F. Cas. 816 (D.S.C. 1882) (No. 12526a) ("All attempts,
however costly, meritorious, or praiseworthy, go for nothing. In the event of failure, [the salvor]
has to make his own repairs and pocket all losses, and he must give before he can get. He must
save before he can ask to share what is saved. The owner, in fact and in law, can only be called
upon to give to the salvor a portion of that very property which the salvor has saved for him; to
restore only a portion of that which, but for the salvor, would have been lost to him. Thus it is
the salvor who enables the owner to make the payment.").
66The Indian, 159 F. 20 (5th Cir. 1908). In contrast, salvors may start operations on an aban-
doned vessel found at sea without prior authorization with the hope of later reward (Mangone
1997).
67Cope v. Vallette Dry-Dock Co., 119 U.S. 625 (1887) ([N]o structure that is not a ship or
vessel is a subject of salvage.).
68Broere v. Two Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Three Dollars, 72 F.Supp. 115 (1947) (nding
that that money found on a human body oating on navigable waters was a proper subject of
salvage); Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954) (considering a
seaplane which crashed in navigable waters a proper subject of salvage). But see Provost v.
Huber, 594 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979) (holding that house being dragged across a frozen lake had
not embarked upon a "maritime adventure" and dismissing the salvage action for lack of a nexus
with traditional maritime activities). Property considered salvable also traditionally includes any
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contrast to property, does not on its own confer an award of salvage (Gilmore and
Black 1975).69 To discourage disregard for human life in favor of saving property
in times of emergency, however, U.S. law allows for salvors of human life to receive
a "fair share" of the salvage award.70 In contrast to the law of salvage, the law of
"nds" controls property for which the title has been irrevocably lost and usually
applies to ancient shipwrecks (Schoenbaum 2004). Historically, the court might
award the title in place of a salvage award for property for which no owner came
forward, but the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 transferred ownership of most
such property to the government (Norris 2008).
Salvage Awards
In The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1869), the Supreme Court rst listed
the six factors for the determination of a salvage award: (1) the labor expended
by the salvors in rendering the salvage service; (2) the promptitude, skill, and
energy displayed in rendering the service and saving the property; (3) the value of
the property employed by the salvors in rendering the service, and the danger to
which such property was exposed; (4) the risk incurred by the salvors in securing
the property from the impending peril; (5) the value of the property saved; and
(6) the degree of danger from which the property was rescued. The value of any
potential cargo of the salving ship is not a factor (Norris 2008).71 By contrast, the
value of freight and cargo of the salved ship are taken into account when computing
the value of the property saved (Schoenbaum 2004). The burden of establishing the
object which has been "thrown overboard" (jetsam), "found freely oating on the sea" (otsam),
"attached to buoys" (ligan), and "washed up to shore from the sea" (lagan) (Mangone 1997).
69Note that masters of ships at sea are obliged by statute to "render assistance to any individual
found at sea in danger of being lost, so far as the master or individual in charge can do so
without serious danger to the masters or individuals vessel or individuals on board." 46 U.S.C.
§ 2304(a)(1).
7046 U.S.C. § 80107(a).
71See, e.g., The Ereza, 124 F. 659 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
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value of the salved property is on those seeking the award and should be assessed
according to fair market value.72
There is no "precise formula" for computing salvage awards.73 Although all of
the factors should be considered in determining the award, each factor is not given
equal weight (Force 2004). The trial court has considerable discretion in weighing
the factors and making its determination on a case-by-case basis.74 Courts do not
view salvage awards "merely as pay, on the principal of a quantum meruit, or as
a remuneration pro opere et labore, but as a reward given for perilous services,
voluntarily rendered, and as an inducement to seamen and others to embark in
such undertakings to save life and property."75 Salvage awards are apportioned
among co-salvors according to the relative participation and riskof each salvor
(Norris 2008).76 The statute of limitations for securing a salvage award is two
years,77 and the owners of both the ship and its cargo are liable to pay.78
As noted above, the salvage must be successful to merit an award. However, the
actions of a salvor that worsen the position of the salved property may reduce the
award, preclude it, or result in an award of damages (Force 2004). If the salvage
is successful, but the operation causes some damage through ordinary negligence,
72Nolan v. A. H. Basse Rederiaktieselskab, 267 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1959).
73Allseas Maritime, S.A. v. M/V Mimosa, 812 F.2d 243 (1987).
74The Emulous, 8 F. Cas. 704 (C.C.D. Mass.) (No. 4480) ("And here, again, the court is
asked to lay down some rules, by which to guide the parties in interest, underwriters as well as
owners, in the ascertainment of the proper rate of salvage. That is asking the court to do, what
it is utterly impracticable to do, to lay down rules, in cases admitting of an indenite diversity
of circumstances, and endless considerations of value, of perils, of services, and of merit. The
subject is necessarily one, in which the reward must depend upon a just estimate of all the
circumstances of each particular case."); The Rescue v. the George B. Roberts, 64 F. 139 (E.D.
Pa. 1894) (At best the award must be the result of an intelligent guess.).
75The Blackwall, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 1 (1870). See also B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United
States, 702 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1983).
76See, e.g., The Lydia, 49 F. 666 (E.D.N.Y. 1892).
7746 U.S.C. § 80107(c).
78In general, the owner of the cargo will be responsible for its own portion of the award and
the owner of the ship for its portion; however, the court has discretion to apportion the award
and the two owners may make other agreements between themselves before disbursement of the
cargo (Schoenbaum 2004; Norris 2008).
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the salvor is liable and the court will be reduce the award accordingly; if, however,
the salvor causes damage through "gross negligence or willful misconduct," then
the court may deny an award or even award a¢ rmative damages.79 Fraud or other
dishonest conduct also may deprive a salvor of an award (Mangone 1997).
79Basic Boats, Inc. v. U.S., 352 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Va. 1972); Schoenbaum (2004). Note that
professional salvors are held to a higher standard of care than non-professionals (Mangone 1997).
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